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1ARGUMENT
GUILT-PHASE ISSUES ON DIRECT APPEAL1
II. The Court Erred In Denying Mr. Hall’s Motion To Dismiss The Indictment
The district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment where it was not
signed by the presiding grand juror and, therefore, did not confer jurisdiction. App. Br., pp.9-10.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. See, e.g.,
State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 380 (1999). Where the statutory language is plain, the statute is
applied as written, regardless of whether such application would produce absurd results. Verska
v. St. Alphonsus Regional Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 894-96 (2011). In so doing, this Court gives
effect to all the words of the statute so that none are rendered void, superfluous, or redundant. Id.
at 897. Where multiple statutes are involved, the more specific statute controls over a general
one. Barnes, 133 Idaho at 382; Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 842 (1993). Even where multiple
statutes appear to be specific in certain respects, or have overlapping provisions, the statute that
more closely addresses the facts of the case controls. Barnes, 133 Idaho at 382.
Where a statute or court rule unambiguously directs what a judge must do, the result is a
ministerial act rather than a discretionary one. Ausman, 124 Idaho at 842-43. Such is the case
here. Pursuant to Idaho Code section 19-4901, “An indictment cannot be found without the
concurrence of at least twelve (12) grand jurors. When so found it must be endorsed, a true bill,
and the endorsement must be signed by the foreman of the grand jury.” I.C. § 19-1401 (emphasis
added). Idaho law specifies that so long as a timely motion is filed, “[t]he indictment must be set
aside  by  the  court  in  which  the  defendant  is  arraigned  ...  [w]hen  it  is  not  found,  endorsed  or
presented as prescribed in this code.” I.C. § 19-1601(1) (emphasis added).
1Where a reply to specific claims is not necessitated by the Respondent’s Brief, Mr. Hall relies
on his prior briefing. For those issues which require a response, for the sake of consistency and
ease of reference, Mr. Hall relies on the same numbering as in his Appellant’s Brief.
2Despite the plain language of the statutes, the State argues the absence of the foreperson’s
signature on the indictment is a defect in form that should be disregarded under Idaho Code
section  19-1419.  Resp.  Br.,  p.17.  The  State  fails  to  acknowledge  that  while  all  of  the  cited
jurisdictions, other than the federal system,2 require an indictment be endorsed and signed by a
grand jury foreperson, none appear to have a statute or rule like Idaho’s that requires dismissal
for lack of proper endorsement, presentment, or signature. Because Mr. Hall’s original
indictment was not signed by the grand jury foreperson, section 19-1401 was violated.
Consequently, it was insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction. See generally State v.
Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 621-22 (2005); State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228 (2004). Allowing
the State to resubmit the indictment to the grand jury foreperson for a signature is not a remedy
allowed by statute, where it clearly states the indictment must be set aside. I.C. § 19-1601(1).
The recent decision in State v. Schmierer, 159 Idaho 768, 772 (2016), does not dictate
differently. In Schmierer, there were no defects in the original indictment, but following plea
negotiations, the State amended the indictment and replaced an attempted lewd conduct charge
with a second enticement charge. Id. The prosecutor did not resubmit the matter to the grand
jury, but instead signed the amended indictment himself. Id. The defendant pled guilty to both
enticement counts on the same day it was filed. Id. Over three years later, the defendant filed a
motion to correct an illegal sentence, contending the failure to resubmit the amended indictment
to the grand jury deprived the district court of jurisdiction to convict him on the second count,
rendering his sentence illegal. Id. at 165. This Court disagreed, observing that although the
charging document was called an “indictment,” it was really an information masquerading as an
2“There is in the federal statutes no mandatory provision requiring such indorsement or
authentication, and the matter must therefore be determined on general principles.” Frisbie v.
United States, 157 U.S. 160, 163 (1895).
3indictment, and the mislabeling was a defect in form that did not deprive the court of jurisdiction.
Id. at 166. In Schmierer, there were no defects in the original indictment, and the defendant, by
pleading guilty, waived his right to a preliminary hearing on the second enticement charge
alleged in the amended “indictment.” Id. Here, by contrast, the original indictment was defective
from the outset, having never been signed by the foreperson.
The district court’s denial of Mr. Hall’s motion to set aside the indictment is contrary to
the plain, specific, and mandatory language of section 19-1601, which clearly requires a district
court to dismiss an unsigned indictment, unsigned by the foreperson, as a ministerial act.
III. The Court Denied Mr. Hall’s 6th, 8th, And 14th Amendment Rights To A Qualified And
Impartial Jury By Denying His Motions To Strike Two Biased Jurors
 “The 6th and 14th Amendments guarantee a defendant on trial for his life the right to an
impartial jury.” Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85 (1988). The standard for whether a
prospective juror must be excused for cause in a capital case because of his or her views on the
death penalty is “whether the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’”
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
While peremptory challenges are not themselves of constitutional dimension, Ross, 487
U.S. at 88, such challenges are “a means to guard against latent bias and to secure the
constitutional end of an impartial jury and a fair trial.” Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57
(1992); accord Ross, 487 U.S. at 88. Although peremptory challenges are a “creature of statute”
governed by State law, “[t]he right to challenge a given number of jurors without showing cause
is one of the most important rights secured to the accused.” Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S.
396, 408 (1894). Accordingly, a defendant’s right to the use of peremptory challenges to
vindicate constitutional rights is impaired if the defendant does not receive that which State law
4requires.3 Ross, 487 U.S. at 89. The erroneous denial of a for-cause challenge to a juror rises to
the level of a constitutional violation if a defendant was forced to use a peremptory challenge on
that juror and a biased juror is seated as a result. Ross, 487 Idaho at 89; State v. Ramos, 119
Idaho 568, 569-70 (1991).
Here,  the  district  court  erred  in  refusing  to  strike  Jurors  1  and  60  for  cause,  requiring
Mr. Hall to expend peremptory challenges on these jurors, resulting in a biased seated jury. The
State claims that because “Mr. Hall did not challenge for cause any of the jurors that actually sat
on his jury and establish those jurors were actually biased, his claim fails.” Resp. Br., p.20. In
Section IV of his opening brief, Mr. Hall asserted “many of the seated jurors were biased due to
their inability to meaningfully consider mitigation or other factors.” App. Br., p.15. Mr. Hall also
identified the biased seated jurors by number, and explained why each was biased and
unqualified to sit on a capital case. App. Br., pp.15-19. As a result, this Court must address the
district court’s erroneous denial of Mr. Hall’s motions to strike jurors for cause, which forced
him to use peremptory strikes to remove them, but failed to prevent the seating of a biased jury.
V. The Court Erred In Allowing A Police Detective To Testify He Believed An Alternate-/Co-
Perpetrator Was Innocent
On the question of relevance, the State has not argued  Det.  Smith’s  testimony  was
relevant  to  show  why  the  detective  did  what  he  did, see id. at 31-32, as the court concluded
below, see 31528 Tr., p.4140, L.24-p.4141, L.24. Presumably, that is because of State v. Parker,
157 Idaho 132, 145 (2014), where evidence offered to show “the effect on the listener” is
generally not relevant, and “is often used as a ruse to put inadmissible evidence before the jury
improperly.” Instead, the State argues Det. Smith’s opinion was relevant “because it is evidence
3The Supreme Court has recognized a violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14 th
Amendment may occur if a trial judge repeatedly or deliberately violates the law, or acts in an
arbitrary or irrational manner regarding peremptory challenges. Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148,
158 (2009).
5establishing Hall committed [Ms. Henneman’s] murder,” especially since Mr. Hall raised the
inference that Mr. Johnson was involved in Ms. Henneman’s death. Resp. Br., pp.31-32. This
argument skirts the actual issue. The critical inquiry is whether a police officer’s opinion as to a
suspect’s guilt is relevant. Clearly it is not because it does not make “any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable.” IRE 401.
On the question of foundation, Mr. Hall asserts the error was preserved through a proper
objection. Specifically, he objected to Det. Smith’s opinion on the basis that “there’s no
foundation for his conclusions.” 31528 Tr., p.4139, Ls.20-21. Clearly, this was an argument that
Det. Smith’s opinion testimony was inadmissible under the rules concerning opinion testimony
(IRE 701 & 702). And Mr. Hall’s argument on appeal—that the detective’s opinion was not
helpful to the jury and, therefore, not admissible—is based on State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53,
66-67 (2011), which applied IRE 702. Thus, the argument on appeal falls squarely within the
ambit of the objection made below. See State v. Rodgers, 119 Idaho 1047, 1049 (1991).
Alternatively, the State argues that because its “case was built upon Hall’s DNA in
Lynn’s vagina and his confession to her family,” any error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Resp. Br., p.33. However, the DNA evidence merely placed Mr. Hall with
Ms. Henneman; it certainly did not prove he killed her. This is especially true if he had an
accomplice. Although the letter Mr. Hall wrote includes vague, cryptic statements from which it
could be inferred he killed Ms. Henneman, see 31528 Ex.136, other evidence suggests any
admissions of guilt were false. Most notably, he consistently maintained he had little memory of
the timeframe during which Ms. Henneman died. See, e.g., Suppression Ex.4, pp.7, 8, 20, 32, 34,
37, 46-48, 53, 55-56, 58, 64, 66, 74. Since the jury was free to believe this contrary evidence, it
cannot be said that the letter would have surely led to Mr. Hall’s conviction.
6VI. The Prosecution Engaged In Misconduct In Discussing The DNA Evidence
“Given the persuasiveness of [DNA] evidence in the eyes of the jury, it is important that
it be presented in a fair and reliable manner.” McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 136 (2010). In
this case, the prosecution engaged in misconduct in presenting the DNA evidence—first, by
invoking the “prosecutor’s fallacy,” i.e., seeking to have the jury believe the random match
probability (in this case, 1 in 49 quadrillion) was the same as the probability of someone other
than Mr. Hall having been the source of sperm found in the victim; and second, by claiming the
DNA evidence “exclude[d]” Mr. Johnson “as the killer.” App. Br., pp.22-25 (emphasis added).
A. The Prosecution Overstated The Significance Of The DNA Match To Mr. Hall
The State claims the prosecution did not invoke the “prosecutor’s fallacy”4 and so, did
not commit misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error. Resp. Br., pp.35-37. The State
argues the prosecution and its expert witness “did not improperly conflate random match and
source probability, but merely allowed the jury to infer Hall’s DNA was found in Lynn’s vagina
based upon statistical probabilities.” Resp. Br., pp.35-36. That is not correct.
There is a line between proper and improper use of random match probabilities.
Admittedly, the prosecution may use the random match probability to express the strength of the
connection between the defendant and the biological evidence, see Resp. Br., pp.35-36; however,
it may not imply that probability is the same as the chance of another person having committed
the crime (or, the chance the defendant is innocent). Chischilly, 30 F.3d at 1157, 1158. Here, the
prosecution did both and, therefore, crossed the line between advocacy and misconduct.
4In an apparent attempt to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the “prosecutor’s fallacy,” the State
claims “the so-called ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’... is apparently based upon a study completed in
1996.” Resp. Br.,  p.35.  The book referred to was not a lone “study,” as the State suggests;  nor
was it the genesis of the criticism of logic. See, e.g., United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144,
1157 ns.21-23 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing pre-1994 sources discussing the “prosecutor’s fallacy”),
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008, 1019 (9th Cir. 2014).
7The  prosecution  did  more  than  point  out  the  chances  of  Mr.  Hall’s  DNA  profile
appearing randomly in the population would be one in 49 quadrillion. By emphasizing there are
not 49 quadrillion people on Earth, the prosecution suggested the chance of someone else being
guilty was also one in 49 quadrillion (i.e.,  essentially  zero).  In  questioning  Dr.  Finis,  the
prosecutor inquired about the strength of the DNA match, but in doing so, asked a compound
question which betrayed the State’s intent to conflate source probability with random match
probability. That lengthy compound question included the following: “How do you know that
somebody else doesn’t match also?” 31528 Tr., p.4376, Ls.8-9 (emphasis added). In answering
the prosecutor’s compound question, Dr. Finis spoke appropriately about random match
probabilities, but also volunteered that, given the types of probabilities at issue—one in multiple
trillions or quadrillions—“it’s much more rare that you’d find it in the general population.” Id.,
p.4376, L.13-p.4377, L.8. The prosecutor then ran with that assertion, eliciting testimony that a
random match probability in the quadrillions is “a thousand times over what the [earth’s]
population is … about 6 billion,” and that once “the probability numbers get greatly beyond the
current population,” it becomes “reasonable to ascertain that these sources are the same.” Id.,
p.4377, Ls.9-24 (emphasis added). Together, these questions and answers invited the jurors to
infer  the  random  match  probability  (in  this  case,  one  in  49  quadrillion)  was  the  same  as  the
probability of an alternate source of the sperm.
In at least two instances, the prosecutor explicitly conflated the random match probability
with  the  source  probability.  At  one  point,  the  prosecutor  asked  Dr.  Finis: “So when you get a
probability that is in the trillions ... does that tell you then that there could not be another person
on the planet who would have the same DNA that would match at all 13 of those locations?” Id.,
p.4386, Ls.16-21. Dr. Finis replied, “Other than an identical twin, yes, that would be a
8reasonable conclusion.” Id., p.4386, Ls.16-23 (emphasis added). Additionally, going back to the
State’s opening statement, the prosecutor explicitly argued that it was mathematically impossible
for someone else to have been guilty: “And that DNA, Ladies and Gentlemen, is his DNA. It’s a
match. Nobody else on this planet has his DNA. Nobody who lives now, nobody whoever will
live. It’s his DNA ….” 31528 Tr., p.3412, L.24-p.3413, L.2 (emphasis added).
In light of this, the State’s current claim that it cited the random match probability figure
below to “allow[ ] the jury to infer Hall’s DNA was found in Lynn’s vagina based on statistical
probabilities,” rings hollow. This case is remarkably similar to State v. Ragland, where an expert
from a state crime lab testified that if the random match probability is “over the world’s
population, then you know there could be no one else other than that person in the world,” and
that “anything over the world’s population, like I said earlier, can be no one other than that
person.” 739 S.E.2d 616, 624 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013). There, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
held the testimony was improper because the witness:
effectively  testified  that  defendant’s  DNA  profile  matched  the  DNA  [from  the
evidence]  .  .  .  and  that  the  probability  that  a  different,  unrelated  person  in  the
general population was the source of that DNA was zero. The testimony therefore
erroneously assumed “that the random match probability is the same as the
probability that the defendant was not the source of the DNA sample.”
Id. (quoting McDaniel, 558 U.S. at 128). Here, the State committed the same error.
B. The Prosecution Mischaracterized The DNA Exclusion Of Mr. Johnson
The State’s only attempt to defend the prosecutor’s misconduct in falsely claiming the
DNA evidence excluded Mr. Johnson “as the killer,” is a single sentence asserting the
prosecutor’s statement “was not false, but based upon a reasonable inference stemming from the
upcoming expert’s testimony.” Resp. Br., p.36. That is not true. In his guilt-phase opening
statement, the prosecutor stated that a potential alternate-/co-perpetrator, Christian Johnson,
“voluntarily gave his DNA, which later turned out that to [sic] exclude him as the killer.” 31528
9Tr., p.3423, Ls.11-12. This statement was not qualified as an interpretation; it was stated as fact,
which suggested the scientific evidence definitively exonerated Mr. Johnson of murder. This,
however, was a vast overstatement. As discussed in Mr. Hall’s opening brief, the DNA evidence
went to the question of whether Mr. Johnson had intercourse with Ms. Henneman; it in no way
informed the question of whether he killed her. See App. Br., p.25. The prosecutor’s false claim
constituted misconduct.
C. The Prosecution’s Misconduct Constituted Fundamental, Reversible Error
The State contends Mr. Hall failed to show fundamental error. Resp. Br., pp.36-37. It first
argues Mr. Hall showed no constitutional violation because he failed to show the misconduct “so
infect[ed] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.”
Resp. Br., p.36 (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181-82 (1986)). However, this
conclusory argument is belied by the authorities cited in Mr. Hall’s opening brief. See App. Br.,
pp.25-26 (quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, and State v. Givens, 28 Idaho 253, 268 (1915)).
Next, the State speculates that Mr. Hall’s counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s
misconduct for a strategic reason, and so Mr. Hall has failed to show the misconduct is “clear or
obvious.” Resp. Br., pp.36-37. The State guesses that the tactic spawned from a “fear associated
with highlighting or emphasizing the DNA evidence.” Id., p.37. However, this imaginary
justification would have been absurd. The DNA-related evidence was the crux of the State’s guilt
phase case against Mr. Hall and, thus, could not be avoided.5 Indeed, the State insists on appeal
5See, e.g., 31528 Tr., p.3412, L.15-p.3413, L.3, p.3423, Ls.3-12, p.3426, L.2-p.3428, L.22,
p.3431, L.5-p.3432, L.4, p.3513, Ls.21-25, p.3660, Ls.10-23, p.3776, Ls.13-15, p.3846, L.10-
p.3848, L.24, p.3929, Ls.9-23, p.3930, L.22-p.3932, L.23, p.3956, L.16-p.3961, L.21, p.4138,
L.17-p.4145, L.9, p.4145, L.19-p.4150, L.19, p.4155, L.3-p.4158, L.25, p.4271, L.24-p.4273,
L.18, p.4289, L.3-p.4306, L.6, p.4310, L.18-p.4313, L.3, p.4314, L.5-p.4316, L.13, p.4352, L.23-
p.4354, L.23, p.4356, L.4-p.4404, L.4, p.4409, L.25-p.4411, L.1, p.4423, L.22-p.4427, L.25,
p.4429, L.1-p.4475, L.21, p.4527, L.13-p.4533, L.16, p.4619, Ls.13-23, p.4625, Ls.1-3, p.4626,
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that many alleged guilt-phase errors were harmless because, “The State’s case was built upon
Hall’s DNA in Lynn’s vagina and his confession to her family ….” Resp. Br., p.33; accord id. at
37, 42-43, 52-53, 54. Given the circumstances of this case, there was no way to avoid, downplay,
or minimize the DNA evidence. In fact, it is apparent defense counsel was not trying to do so, as
they cross-examined many of the State’s witnesses on matters relating to the DNA evidence. See,
e.g., 31528 Tr., p.3940, L.13-p.3943, L.4, p.4335, L.25-p.4349, L.9, p.4404, L.12-p.4409, L.21,
p.4428, Ls.9-15, p.4476, L.1-p.4494, L.12, p.4498, L.18-p.4526, L.8. Since there was no
objectively reasonable basis for counsel to have failed to object to the prosecution’s misconduct,
the failure was not a tactical decision, and the error is clear and obvious. See State v. Sutton, 151
Idaho 161, 166-67 (Ct. App. 2011).
Finally, the State contends Mr. Hall failed to show the prosecutor’s misconduct affected
the outcome of the proceedings, arguing “there was significant additional evidence establishing
Hall’s guilt ….” Resp. Br., p.37. Such a claim, however, is inconsistent, as the State repeatedly
insists that its guilt-phase case was largely built upon the DNA evidence. Further, the State relies
upon the wrong standard. “The inquiry … is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the
error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,
279 (1993). Where the State’s case was based primarily on the DNA evidence, it cannot
reasonably claim that two instances of misconduct in presenting that evidence had no effect upon
the verdict.
Second, the State argues that “[w]hen an expert properly testifies regarding DNA
evidence and erroneously invokes the prosecutor’s fallacy, the proper testimony is generally
L.20-p.4627, L.15, p.4630, L.18-p.4631, L.1, p.4632, Ls.1-2, p.4654, Ls.12-14, p.4663, Ls.4-8,
p.4666, Ls.1-7.
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sufficient to establish any alleged error was harmless.” Resp. Br., p.37 (citing Ragland, 739
S.E.2d at 625). That is a misleading characterization of the authority. In Ragland,  the  Court
neither stated nor intimated that proper testimony regarding DNA evidence generally renders
harmless any invocation of the “prosecutor’s fallacy.”6 See Ragland, 739 S.E.2d at 624-26. The
Ragland Court evaluated all of the relevant facts of that particular case and concluded that, based
on the totality of the circumstances, the defendant failed to show “the jury would probably have
reached a different verdict in the absence of the prosecutor’s fallacy evidence” so as to satisfy
North Carolina’s “plain error” standard.7 Id. Contrary to the State’s suggestion, this Court should
evaluate the totality of the evidence in determining whether Mr. Hall met his burden of showing
the prosecutor’s misconduct was not harmless. In doing so, it can only conclude that the two
separate instances of misconduct regarding the DNA evidence affected the outcome of his trial.
VII. The Admission Of Testimonial Hearsay From One Of The State’s DNA Experts Violated
Mr. Hall’s 6th Amendment Right To Confrontation
At trial,  the State’s DNA expert,  Dr.  Carla Finis,  testified about the DNA testing of the
vaginal swabs from Lynn Henneman’s sex crimes kit by Cellmark, and the DNA testing of other
suspects done by Idaho State Crime Lab employees Ann Bradley and Cynthia Hall. 31528 Tr.,
p.4387, L.12-p.4390, L.6, p.4395, L.7-p.4398, L.12, p.4399, L.6-p.4400, L.6. Relying on
Ms. Bradley’s and Ms. Hall’s DNA analysis and testing,  Dr.  Finis testified that  the Crime Lab
had initially considered and eliminated 94 suspects, with another 35 later, as the source of the
6No bright-line rule was identified, as doing so would only encourage unscrupulous prosecutors
to invoke the “prosecutor’s fallacy” because as long as they also presented proper testimony
there would never be any consequences for trying to mislead the jury.
7Notably, North Carolina’s “plain error” standard differs from Idaho’s “fundamental error”
standard in that it appears to require the defendant-appellant to prove that the “the jury would
probably have reached a different verdict in the absence of” the error. See Ragland, 739 S.E.2d at
624, 626. In contrast, Idaho’s fundamental error test requires the defendant-appellant to
demonstrate the error was not harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 225. This appears to be a modified
version of the Chapman harmless error test, where the burden of persuasion is flipped, but the
substantive standard remains the same.
12
DNA profile on the vaginal swabs through DNA testing. 31528 Tr., p.4396, L.1-p.4398, L.12,
p.4399, L.16-p.4400, L.6. Dr. Finis had no personal knowledge of the DNA testing of the
eliminated suspects because she did not perform the testing herself. Dr. Finis’ testimony was
offered  to  show  the  jury  that  suspects  other  than  Mr.  Hall  had  been  eliminated  through  DNA
testing.
Neither  Ms.  Bradley  nor  Ms.  Hall  testified  at  Mr.  Hall’s  trial.  Dr.  Finis’  testimony
conveying the results of their DNA testing was testimonial hearsay, which violated Mr. Hall’s
constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. The facts in this case are virtually identical
to State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418 (2009). In Watkins, Dr. Carla Finis testified, as an expert, that
testing done at Identigenetix showed the defendant’s semen was found on the underwear an in
the condom. Id. at 420. Dr. Finis, however, neither received the evidence nor performed the tests,
but instead relied on the work and notes of a colleague. Id. In that case, counsel objected to
Dr. Finis’ testimony on hearsay grounds, but the objection was overruled. Id. at 423-26. On
appeal, this Court agreed that Dr. Finis’ testimony was inadmissible hearsay. Id. Although the
testimony was also challenged as a Confrontation Clause violation, this Court declined to address
the constitutional argument and granted the defendant a new trial based only on the inadmissible
hearsay argument. Id. at 427.
The State ignores Watkins, claiming Dr. Finis’ testimony was neither hearsay nor a
violation of the Confrontation Clause because it conveyed her own independent review and
analysis of raw data, much like the expert in State v. Stanfield, 158 Idaho 327, 336 (2015). Resp.
Br., pp.41-42. In Stanfield, this Court drew a distinction between situations like Watkins, where
an expert testifies to factual findings and conclusions reached by another, versus instances like
13
those in Stanfield, where an expert does not convey conclusions drawn by another, but simply
testifies about the nature of sources relied upon to reach an opinion. Stanfield, 158 Idaho at 91.
Dr. Finis relied on Ms. Bradley’s and Ms. Hall’s DNA testing profiles for their truth and
accuracy. She then compared their testing profiles to the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs.
But if the suspect DNA profiles were not accurate, then Dr. Finis’ opinion that the suspects were
all excluded as contributors could not be reliable. Accordingly, Dr. Finis’ testimony about testing
and conclusions reached by Ms. Bradley and Ms. Hall, was testimonial hearsay, and it violated
Mr. Hall’s right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him.
The State next claims that even if the testimony violated the Confrontation Clause, the
error was not clear or obvious because the majority of the cases which support Mr. Hall’s
argument  were  not  decided  until  after  Mr.  Hall’s  trial.  Resp.  Br.,  p.42.  Any  “new  rule  for  the
conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct
review or not yet final.” Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987). Because Mr. Hall’s case
was not final and was pending on direct appeal at the time the cases at issue were decided, the
State’s argument lacks merit.
Finally, the State suspects counsel did not object to Dr. Finis’ testimony for strategic
reasons. Resp. Br., p.42. It is unclear how Mr. Hall could have benefitted from the admission of
Dr. Finis’ hearsay testimony, which convincingly conveyed to jurors that the State had validly
excluded at least 129 potential suspects and definitively linked Mr. Hall to Ms. Henneman using
DNA profiles and evidence—whose reliability and accuracy was not established by any other
evidence at trial. The DNA evidence was critical in making that connection.
VIII. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct In Offering, And The Court Committed Error In
Admitting, Exhibits 118 Through 120 And The Opinion Testimony Surrounding Them
Mr. Hall contends the court erred in allowing the State’s pathologist, Dr. Glen Groben to
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testify that Ms. Henneman was hogtied before or after her death, and in admitting staged photos
of Ms. Henneman’s corpse as Dr. Groben imagined it may have been tied at some point. See
App. Br., pp.29-39. He asserts this evidence was based on mere speculation, was irrelevant and
unfairly prejudicial, and asserts the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by offering this
inadmissible and highly prejudicial evidence. App. Br., pp.33-39.
A. The Court Erred In Admitting The Re-Enactment Evidence
1. Inadequate Foundation For The “Hogtied” Opinion
Assuming Dr. Groben was correct and the “hogtied” theory “would account for the
marks, the lividity patterns,” Resp. Br., p.47, that simply means it was possible Ms. Henneman
was tied in such a manner. A mere possibility is not the same as a “probability” or a “likelihood.”
Indeed, as the State concedes, when pressed, Dr. Groben could not definitively opine that
Ms. Henneman was hogtied. Id.
The State also claims there is no other logical explanation for the livor patterns in
Ms. Henneman’s legs and feet. Resp. Br., p.48. That is not true. Common sense dictates that as
long as Ms. Henneman’s body was face down with her feet somewhat elevated (such as if they
were resting against a rock or a log, or were simply on an incline), there would be no livor in her
feet.8 Despite the State’s arguments, it is apparent that Dr. Groben’s “hogtied” theory is just
speculation. While it remains a possible explanation for the lividity patterns, it is not a
reasonable medical conclusion and, therefore, it should not have been admitted.
2. Inadequate Foundation For The Re-Enactment Photos
With regard to Exhibits 118-20 and Mr. Hall’s argument that there was an inadequate
foundation for admission of those staged photographs, see App. Br., pp.34-35, the State argues
8During the post-conviction proceedings, Mr. Hall produced an affidavit of Dr. Sally Aiken, the
Chief Medical Examiner for Spokane County, Washington, who disputed the reasonable degree
of medical probability and offered alternative explanations. PC Ex.46.
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that the exhibits were used for illustrative purposes. Resp. Br., p.49. It then goes on to argue that,
because the staged photos were offered to illustrate Dr. Groben’s testimony they were
automatically admissible because this Court held in State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139 (2008), that
inaccuracy does not render illustrative evidence irrelevant. Resp. Br., pp.49-50.
There  are  two  flaws  in  this  argument.  First,  it  is  based  on  a  selective  quotation  and
misleading characterization of Mr. Hall’s brief. Mr. Hall’s argument is based on more than
Dr. Groben’s lack of personal knowledge; it is also based on the fact that Dr. Groben’s opinion
on this subject was rank speculation. See App. Br., p.35. There was an insufficient basis to say
that the staged photographs correctly portrayed the positioning of Ms. Henneman’s body at or
before the time of her death and, therefore, insufficient foundation for admission of those
photographs under IRE 901(a).
Second, while Mr. Hall’s argument was based on IRE 901(a) and this Court’s
interpretation of that Rule, see App. Br., p.34, the State suggests Rule 901(a) has no application
because Exhibits 118-20 were “admitted for illustrative purposes,” Resp. Br., p.49. However,
this argument rests on a false assumption. Unlike in Stevens, where the exhibit was admitted for
illustrative purposes only and the court gave the jurors a limiting instruction on that point, see
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 143, here Exhibits 118-20 were admitted without qualification or
limitation, see 31528 Tr., p.4028, L.19-p.4029, L.4. Thus, from the jury’s perspective they were
admitted as substantive evidence.
A prerequisite for admission of photographs as substantive evidence is a foundational
showing that those photos accurately portray the relevant scene. See IRE 901(a); Shea v. Kevic
Corp., 156 Idaho 540, 546 (2014). Given the inadequate showing that the exhibits accurately
depicted the condition of the body, the court abused its discretion in admitting them.
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3. The “Hogtied” Evidence Was Irrelevant
Mr. Hall contends all of the “hogtied” evidence (the opinion testimony and the staged
photographs) was irrelevant because it was wholly speculative insofar as it suggested
Ms. Henneman was hogtied at all, much less prior to her death. App. Br., pp.35-36. The State
seems to concede that, if Ms. Henneman was hogtied, it happened after her death. See Resp. Br.,
p.48 (pointing out Dr. Groben acknowledged his “hogtied” theory is only plausible if
Ms. Henneman was already deceased, or unconscious), p.51 (“[T]he condition of Lynn’s body
after the criminal acts were fait accompli is  relevant.”).  But  it  never  offers  a  cogent  theory  of
how post-mortem hogtying would be relevant to the charged offenses; rather, it suggests that
evidence concerning corpses is always admissible, even it relates to post-mortem conduct. See
id., pp.50-51.
The State first cites State v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850 (1991).9 Resp. Br., p.50. However, by
Winn’s own language, photos of the condition of the body are relevant only because they bear on
“the question of the degree and atrociousness of the crime.” Winn, 121 Idaho at 853 (emphasis
added). By focusing on “the crime,” Winn suggests photos of the post-mortem condition of the
body are relevant only to the extent they reflect pre-mortem conduct. In other words, once the
victim is dead, further injuries or indignities do not bear upon the commission of that crime and,
therefore, are not relevant to guilt.
The State also cites State v. Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285 (1989). Resp. Br., p.51. In that case,
the jury was allowed to see gruesome photos of a mutilated corpse, and also hear testimony
9Clearly, Exhibits 118-20 are relevant to show Ms. Henneman was deceased. Given that
Ms. Henneman’s death was never in dispute, and that there was ample, far less prejudicial
evidence of her death already in the record, their admission could never withstand the balancing
test  of  IRE  403.  The  State  clearly  did  not  offer  the  exhibits  to  show  Ms.  Henneman  was
deceased; it offered them to support Dr. Groben’s theory that Mr. Hall hogtied Ms. Henneman
after she died. See, e.g., 31528 Tr., p.4001, L.22-p.4002, L.6; Resp. Br., p.52. This is not
relevant.
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concerning the manner in which the defendant had previously sexually mutilated the corpses of
game animals on hunting trips. Leavitt, 116 Idaho at 290. However, in Leavitt all of that evidence
was relevant to the defendant’s modus operandi of “mutilation and removal of the sexual organs
of the victim.” Id. Thus, Leavitt stands only for the proposition that post-mortem conduct may be
relevant if the unique circumstances make it relevant, such as a modus operandi. There is
nothing in this case that makes evidence of post-mortem hogtying remotely relevant. Indeed, at
no point does the State even attempt to explain how post-mortem hogtying is relevant to the
question of whether Ms. Henneman was kidnapped, raped, or murdered, and, if so, whether
Mr. Hall committed those crimes.
4. The Re-Enactment Photos Were Unfairly Prejudicial
The probative value of the “hogtied” photos, if any, was substantially outweighed by the
risk of unfair prejudice. See App. Br., pp.36-37. Speculation about how the corpse may have
been bound following the death was, at best, only minimally probative, while the prejudicial
effect of those gruesome photos was substantial. The State argues that gruesome photographs are
not automatically inadmissible at trial, and it contends the court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting Exhibits 118-20 because their gruesome nature did not outweigh their probative value
in establishing that Ms. Henneman was hogtied after death. Resp. Br., pp.51-52. The argument is
unavailing because the State still cannot explain the relevance of Ms. Henneman being hogtied
after her death. Even if Dr. Groben’s speculative re-enactment was correct, the photos of that re-
enactment have no probative value and only served to evoke emotion. Thus, the court abused its
discretion under IRE 403.
5. The  State  Has  Failed  To  Prove  The  Court’s  Errors  Were  Harmless  Beyond  A
Reasonable Doubt
The State also argues that even if the court erred in admitting Dr. Groben’s testimony on
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his “hogtied” theory, or the re-enactment photos, any such error was “harmless because the
state’s case was built upon Hall’s DNA found in Lynn’s vagina and his confession to her
family.” Resp. Br., pp.52-53. This argument was addressed above, see Section V, supra, and is
not repeated herein.
IX. The Court Erred In Instructing The Jury On The Elements Of First Degree Murder
The State argues any instructional errors were invited by Mr. Hall and, as a result, he
“should not be rewarded when he made suggestions resulting in the instructions being modified
and then accepting them by stating he had no objection.” Resp. Br., pp.55-56. Although Mr. Hall
did not actively object to the flawed instructions, contrary to the State’s claim, neither did he
propose them or encourage the district court to give them. The State’s misunderstands the law.
This Court has repeatedly recognized that counsel’s failure to object to flawed instructions is not
invited error. State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 449-50 (2012); State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240
(1999). In circumstances virtually identical to those in this case, this Court found that counsel’s
response to the district court’s after-the-fact summary of an off-record jury instruction
conference,10 stating, “Your Honor, we would concur. We have nothing to say on the record at
this time,” did not constitute invited error. Blake, 133 Idaho at 239-40. As the errors were neither
invited nor objected to, this Court must review them for fundamental error. State v. Draper, 151
Idaho 576, 588 (2011).
A. The Instruction On The Definition Of “Implied Malice” Was Incomplete
Mr. Hall’s jury was instructed as to the first-degree murder of a single victim, alleged to
be either a willful, unlawful, deliberate and premeditated killing with malice aforethought, or a
willful, unlawful killing, with malice aforethought, committed during the perpetration of a
10In Blake, the district court gave the parties a chance to make an objection on the record to the
instructions the court intended to give. 133 Idaho at 240.
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kidnapping and/or rape,11 or both. 31528 J.I.9. The jury was provided with an incorrect definition
of implied malice, which told them implied malice could be proven by an unintentional act
committed with a wanton disregard for human life. 31528 J.I.13. This error was compounded by
the deficient elements instruction for first degree murder, which reduced the State’s burden of
proof. See Section IX.B, infra.
The State argues that because Instruction 13 “virtually mirrors I.C. § 18-4002,” it was
proper. Resp. Br., p.59. The fact that a portion of Instruction 13 was legally correct does not
address the problem that the portion defining implied malice was not. The State also argues
Mr. Hall’s challenge to Instruction 13 due to its inconsistency with the definition of implied
malice in ICJI 703 is misplaced, where the version of the ICJI cited by Mr. Hall was not adopted
until after Mr. Hall’s trial. Resp. Br., pp.57-59. Nevertheless, Instruction 13 was legally
incorrect, regardless of how the ICJI defined implied malice.
Instruction 13 told jurors that implied malice could be shown by an unintentional act
accompanied by “wanton disregard for human life.” This impermissibly lowered the State’s
burden by allowing jurors to define first degree murder based on an unintentional act or
inadvertent conduct, coupled with less than a knowing and conscious disregard for human life.
Such a definition is not far from criminal negligence,12 while implied malice for first degree
11The  comments  to  ICJI  702,  have  always  cautioned  trial  courts  against  using  it  where  the
charged offense is felony murder because Idaho’s felony murder statute, and case law, have long
recognized malice aforethought “is satisfied by the fact that the killing was committed in the
perpetration of the felony.” State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 594, 598 (1994) (citations omitted).
Mr. Hall’s jury was instructed that if it found Mr. Hall killed Ms. Henneman in the perpetration
of a kidnapping or rape, “the element of malice aforethought required for the crime of murder
would be satisfied by such finding.” 31528 J.I.16.
12See, e.g., Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 752 n.4 (2012) (“Rather, ‘[c]riminal
negligence is gross negligence, such negligence as amounts to a wanton, flagrant, or reckless
disregard of consequences or willful indifference to the safety or rights of others ….’” (quoting
State v. Taylor, 59 Idaho 724, 735 (1939)).
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murder requires more. Specifically, malice aforethought requires an intentional act, coupled with
such a reckless disregard for the results of that act so as to manifest an extreme indifference to
human life. State v. Hokenson, 96 Idaho 283, 287 (1974). Contrary to the State’s claim, where
the heart of Mr. Hall’s defense at trial was that the death resulted from a momentary loss of
control, not an intentional and deliberate act, the erroneous instruction was prejudicial.
B. The Instruction On The Elements Of First Degree Murder Omitted The Requirements Of
Willfulness And Deliberateness
The  elements  instruction  for  first  degree  murder  erroneously  omitted  the  willful  and
deliberate requirements. Instead, jurors were told the State only had to prove the murder was
committed with malice aforethought and premeditation, or during the perpetration of a felony.
31528 J.I.13A. The State points to Instruction 15 as a cure for this obvious defect. Instruction 15
told jurors that “[a]ll murder which is perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing with malice aforethought is murder of the first degree.” 31528 J.I.15. The
State claims that because Instruction 15 defined the terms deliberate and premeditation, jurors
would have known to read willful and deliberate into the elements instruction. Resp. Br., p.62.
The State also argues that if jurors would have read Instruction 9 in conjunction with Instruction
15, they would have known the State had to prove the murder was committed willfully,
unlawfully, deliberately, with premeditation and malice aforethought. Resp. Br., p.63. The
State’s argument presumes that because an instruction was given, it was applied. This cannot be
true, especially where Mr. Hall’s jury received an instruction for second degree murder but did
not find him guilty of that offense. 31528, J.I.13B. The State’s argument also ignores Instruction
1, which told jurors not to be influenced by the fact that Mr. Hall was charged with the crimes
alleged in the indictment, emphasizing the indictment contained only allegations, not established
facts or evidence of guilt. 31528 J.I.1. Without willful and deliberate in the elements instructions,
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jurors would have believed the State only had to prove malice aforethought and premeditation,
or during the perpetration of a felony.
The State also asserts Mr. Hall did not support his argument with authority, ignoring his
reliance on Draper, 151 Idaho at 588-89, and Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1999).
See App. Br., pp.42-43. Because jurors were never told the State had to prove, that Mr. Hall
acted deliberately and willfully in order to find him guilty of first degree murder, the defective
elements instruction relieved the State of its burden of proof. Mr. Hall maintains the omitted
elements were essential to the jury’s determination of whether his conduct qualified as first
degree murder, or the lesser offense of second degree murder. Had Mr. Hall only been found
guilty of second degree murder, he would not have been death-eligible. Because the omitted
elements were disputed at trial, Mr. Hall was prejudiced by the defective instruction.
X. There Was Insufficient Evidence To Prove Forcible Rape As Charged In This Case
There is insufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Hall’s rape conviction because he was
charged under a subsection of Idaho’s rape statute which required the State to prove
Ms. Henneman resisted sexual penetration, but her “resistance [was] overcome by force or
violence.” I.C. § 18-6101(3) (2000); see also State v. Jones, 154 Idaho 412, 418-23 (2013)
(holding the “resistance” requirement may be satisfied with evidence of verbal or physical
resistance, but not “passive resistance”). Specifically, there is no evidence Ms. Henneman
verbally or physically resisted, or that Mr. Hall overcame any such resistance. App. Br., pp.43-
44.
The State argues there is sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. Resp. Br., pp.63-
66. It initially points to defense counsel’s closing argument, wherein he conceded that Mr. Hall
had non-consensual intercourse with Ms. Henneman. Resp. Br., pp.64-65 (citing 31528 Tr.,
p.4649); see also Resp. Br., pp.65-66. First, the arguments of counsel are not evidence. State v.
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Bounds, 74 Idaho 136, 142 (1953). Second, even if the arguments of counsel were evidence,
defense  counsel’s  closing  argument  would  not  have  satisfied  the  elements  of  the  charged  rape
provision. Counsel argued that Ms. Henneman was unconscious and, for that reason, any sexual
penetration was non-consensual; he did not concede that Ms. Henneman resisted (verbally or
physically), or that any such resistance was overcome by force or violence. 31528 Tr., p.4648,
L.18-p.4649, L.17. In fact, under defense counsel’s “unconscious” theory, the decedent could not
have resisted within the meaning of subsection 3.
Next,  the  State  points  out  Ms.  Henneman’s  sister  testified  that  Ms.  Henneman  was
cautious and careful, suggesting this commentary somehow proves Ms. Henneman was raped.
See Resp. Br., pp.65-66. In fact, this evidence tends to show only that Ms. Henneman would not
have had consensual intercourse with a stranger, not that she resisted.
The  State  also  relies  on  Mr.  Hall’s  statement  during  one  of  his  interrogations—that  he
would never have sex with a dead woman—as proof that he raped Ms. Henneman. (Resp. Br.,
p.65.)  Here  too,  the  State’s  argument  fails  to  account  for  the  relevant  provision  of  the  rape
statute. Even assuming Ms. Henneman was alive during intercourse, that fact does nothing to
show that Ms. Henneman resisted, or that such resistance was overcome by force or violence.
Finally, relying on a California Supreme Court case, the State argues the “brutal” manner
in which Ms. Henneman was strangled raises the inference that she did not consent to intercourse
with Mr. Hall. See Resp. Br., pp.65-66 (citing People v. Story, 204 P.3d 306 (Cal. 2009)).
Assuming the State is correct in claiming Ms. Henneman was strangled,13 the State’s argument
has little because Story is not controlling law. Further, under the Idaho statute, the State needed
13The State has failed to prove Ms. Henneman was strangled. See 31528 Tr., p.4068, L.19-
p.4072, L.20 (Dr. Groben offering an opinion that Ms. Henneman was strangled because she had
a ligature on her neck, but conceding that she could have drowned or bled to death); see also
35055 R., p.1532.
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to prove Ms. Henneman resisted and Mr. Hall used force or violence to overcome her resistance.
SENTENCING-PHASE ISSUES ON DIRECT APPEAL
In Mr. Hall’s prefatory argument to his sentencing-phase issues on direct appeal, he
asked this Court to reconsider its pronouncement of a new standard for reviewing capital
sentencing errors on appeal in State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361-63 (2013), cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 355 (2014), and a newer standard in State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 449-50 (2015). See
App. Br., pp.44-51. The State complains that Mr. Hall’s argument is improper because it does
not  have  its  own section  heading,  and  it  argues  he  has  failed  to  show a  basis  for  this  Court  to
overrule Dunlap and/or Abdullah.
The failure of undersigned counsel to designate a more specific section heading to
Mr. Hall’s argument in the opening brief is not fatal. The standard for reviewing all of Mr. Hall’s
sentencing-phase issues on direct appeal is subsidiary to most of those issues and, did not need to
be separately-designated as an issue. See IAR 35(a)(4) (“The statement of issues presented will
be deemed to include every subsidiary issue fairly comprised therein.”). Further, Mr. Hall has
properly supported his challenge to the application of a fundamental error review to unobjected-
to capital sentencing errors with both argument and citation to authority. Compare IAR 35(a)(4)
& (6) (requiring appellant to identify issues presented for review with support) with App. Br.
pp.44-51 (identifying Mr. Hall’s challenge to the fundamental error standard for reviewing
capital sentencing errors as an issue on appeal with support).
Turning to the merits, this Court’s pronouncements of new standards for reviewing
capital sentencing errors on appeal—first in Dunlap, and again in Abdullah14—ignores the plain
14The State acknowledges this Court may have further limited its review of capital sentencing
errors in Abdullah to only those errors of constitutional dimension. Resp. Br., p.68, n.19.
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language of section 19-2827, violates separation of powers principles, violates federal
constitutional requirements, and, if applied to Mr. Hall, will violate his Due Process rights.
Similar arguments were fully briefed in both Dunlap and Abdullah, and were rejected in
both cases. Thus, the State claims this Court in Dunlap and Abdullah has addressed and rejected
Mr. Hall’s arguments,15 and as a result, stare decisis requires this Court to follow Dunlap and
Abdullah. However, this Court has never addressed the substance of the arguments challenging
those standards. In neither Dunlap nor Abdullah did  this  Court  ever  address  how  its  new
standards of review comport with the plain language of section 19-2827; and how more than
three decades of contrary precedent are impacted by the new standards; whether the new
standards violate separation of powers principles; and, whether application of the new standards
to capital defendants like Mr. Hall, whose sentencing trials preceded this Court’s adoption of the
new standards by nearly ten years, violate defendants’ federal and state due process rights.
Mr. Hall urges this Court to now do so and disavow those standards.
Mr. Hall maintains that by turning applicable standards of review into a moving target—
deciding on a case-by-case basis—rather than simply applying section 19-2827 as written, and as
informed by more than three decades of precedent, this Court has introduced uncertainty and
inconsistency to the review of capital sentencing errors. In Dunlap, this Court set forth the
15The State places great weight on this Court’s passing comment in Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 363,
that an incentive for “sandbagging” may be greater in capital cases. Resp. Br., pp.67-68. This
argument is lacking in merit and support. The “sandbagging” notion presupposes that defense
counsel has greater knowledge of the law and procedure than both the judge and the prosecutor,
and is remarkably gifted at identifying and disregarding obvious errors, at the expense of a
potential benefit, in hopes of someday securing uncertain appellate relief. The United States
Supreme Court has rejected such an argument in the strongest terms possible. See Henderson v.
United States, 133 S.Ct. 1121, 1129 (2013) (“If there is a lawyer who would deliberately forgo
objection now because he perceives some slightly expanded chance to argue for “plain error”
later, we suspect that, like the unicorn, he finds his home in the imagination, not the courtroom.”)
An attorney willing to expose his client to such a risk at trial is ineffective per se.
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applicable standard.16 See 155 Idaho at 363. Dunlap says nothing about constitutional errors. In
contrast, this Court subjected the unobjected-to capital sentencing errors in Abdullah to different
standards, requiring that he prove constitutional error on some claims but not others, to qualify
for review. Compare Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 479 (“The  right  of  allocution  derives  from  the
common law and is preserved by statute only. Abdullah has failed to meet the first-prong of the
Perry analysis based on a claim that his due process rights were violated by the district court’s
limitations on the scope of his allocution.”) with id. at 470-71 (reviewing double-counting jury
instruction challenge for error for the first time on appeal, but concluding even if the instruction
was erroneous, the error was harmless). These cases leave Mr. Hall and other capital defendants
guessing which standard they must meet to obtain this Court’s review, and which burden they
must satisfy to obtain relief.
 For the reasons set forth in his opening brief, Mr. Hall urges this Court to reconsider
both Dunlap and Abdullah, and he asks that the Court address the sentencing errors he raises on
appeal as though they were objected to below, consistent with section 19-2827. In the event this
Court opts to apply one of the new fundamental errors standards retroactively to Mr. Hall’s
sentencing claims, Mr. Hall asks it to apply the Dunlap standard rather than the Abdullah
standard. The stakes simply cannot be any greater.
XII. The HAC Aggravator Is Unconstitutionally Vague
Eighth Amendment vagueness challenges to aggravating circumstances assess whether an
aggravator “fails adequately to inform juries what they must find to impose the death penalty and
16The Court will “consider the issues the defendant has identified, including those claimed errors
raised for the first time on appeal.” Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 363 (emphasis added). If unpreserved
error, the defendant has the burden of proving it occurred and that it was not harmless (i.e. there
“is a reasonable possibility he would not have been sentenced to death.”) Id. (citing Perry, 150
Idaho at 226). If errors were preserved, the harmless error test would apply. 155 Idaho at 363.
Upon a showing of error, the State then has the burden to show the error did not contribute to the
death sentence. Id. (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 227).
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as  a  result  leaves  them and  appellate  courts  with  the  kind  of  open-ended  discretion  which  was
held invalid in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 … (1972).” Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S.
356, 361-62 (1988). In Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980), the United States
Supreme Court condoned the use of limiting constructions for otherwise vague aggravating
circumstances, so long as those constructions provide juries with detailed guidance, and where
the constructions themselves are not so vague and broad that they could apply to every murder.
Here, Mr. Hall’s jury was instructed that the State had to prove “the murder was
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity.” 31528 J.I.43.
Although the terms “heinous,” “atrocious,” and “cruel” were defined, 31528 J.I.44, the
definitions were just as vague as the terms themselves.17 Moreover, while jurors were told that
whether a murder is especially heinous, especially atrocious, or especially cruel refers to the
“actual commission of the first-degree murder,” including the “defendant’s state of mind at the
time of the offense, as reflected by his words and acts,” 31528 J.I.44, jurors were never told how
to decide whether the murder itself “was accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime
apart from the norm of first-degree murders.” 31528 J.I.44 (emphasis added). Similarly, although
jurors were told “exceptional depravity exists only where depravity is apparent to such an extent
as to obviously offend all standards of morality and intelligence,” they were also instructed that
“[i]t might be thought that every murder involves depravity.”18 31528 J.I.44. The definition of
exceptional depravity provided was just as vague as the term “exceptional depravity” itself.19
17The United States Supreme Court has deemed these exact definitions of “especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel” to be unconstitutionally vague in a jury sentencing regime in Shell v.
Mississippi, 498 U.S.1, 1 (1990) (per curiam); see also id. at 2 (Marshall, J., concurring).
18These instructions included most, but not all, of the HAC limiting constructions adopted by this
Court in State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 417-18 (1981), under judge sentencing.
19In Moore v. Clark, 904 F.2d 1226, 1227-29 (8th Cir. 1990), the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals deemed the aggravating circumstance that the murder “manifested exceptional depravity
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These limiting constructions for HAC, all adopted during Idaho’s judge sentencing
regime, are insufficient to satisfy the 8th Amendment requirements of narrowing the sentencer’s
discretion in a jury sentencing era. The State downplays the importance of jury sentencing to the
constitutionality of HAC, relying on this Court’s decisions upholding the Utter Disregard
aggravator against a vagueness challenge under jury sentencing. Resp. Br., p.71. But these
decisions have no bearing on the constitutionality of HAC; the United States Supreme Court has
always relied on the distinction between jury and judge sentencing to assess the constitutionality
of HAC.20
By contrast,  in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled on other grounds by
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the Court upheld Arizona’s aggravating circumstance that
the murder was committed in an especially “heinous, cruel or depraved manner” against a
vagueness challenge for a judge sentencing. In reaching its conclusion, the Walton Court relied
upon the difference between judge and jury sentencing regimes, and the degree to which limiting
constructions are sufficient to narrow the sentencer’s discretion:
by ordinary standards of morality and intelligence[,]” unconstitutionally vague in a judge
sentencing regime, even with a limiting construction of “so coldly calculated as to indicate a
state of mind senselessly bereft of regard for human life,” unresisting victims, or exceptional. Id.
The aggravator deemed unconstitutional in Moore is identical to the limiting construction this
Court placed on “manifested exceptional depravity.” Notably, the Eighth Circuit later upheld a
different limiting construction for exceptional depravity. Moore v. Kinney, 320 F.3d 767, 772-73
(8th Cir. 2003).
20In Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428, the Court held Georgia’s aggravating circumstance that the
murder was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhumane,” was unconstitutionally
vague for a jury. The Court found there was nothing “that implies any inherent restraint on the
arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence. A person of ordinary sensibility could
fairly character almost every murder as ‘outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.’”
Id. at 428-29. Similarly, in Maynard v. Cartwright, the Supreme Court held Oklahoma’s
aggravating circumstance that “the murder was ‘especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,’” was
unconstitutionally vague for a jury. 486 U.S. at 364 (quoting OKLA. STAT., tit. 21, §§ 701.12(2)
and (4) (1981)). In reaching this conclusion, the Court observed these terms did nothing to guide
the jury’s discretion, and that an ordinary person could honestly believe every unjustified,
intentional killing was especially heinous. Id. at 363-64.
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When a jury is the final sentencer, it is essential that the jurors be properly
instructed regarding all facets of the sentencing process. It is not enough to
instruct the jury in the bare terms of an aggravating circumstance that is
unconstitutionally vague on its face. That is the import of our holdings in
Maynard and Godfrey. But the logic of those cases has no place in the context of
sentencing by a trial judge. Trial judges are presumed to know the law and to
apply it in making their decisions.
Id. at 653–54. Even where capital sentencing decisions were split between a judge and jury, with
the judge having ultimate sentencing authority, an “especially wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel”
aggravator was deemed unconstitutionally vague. Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1080-81
(1992).
This distinction between judge and jury sentencing was essential to this Court’s decisions
upholding Idaho’s HAC aggravator against vagueness challenges similar to those made to
Oklahoma’s  HAC  aggravator  in Maynard. In State v. Lankford, this Court held that the
distinction between Oklahoma and Idaho is that “Oklahoma has jury sentencing while Idaho
adheres to judicial sentencing in capital murder cases. These aggravating circumstances are
terms of art that are commonly understood among the members of the judiciary.” 116 Idaho 860,
877 (1989); see also State v. Leavitt, 121 Idaho 4, 6 (1991) (relying on Idaho’s judge sentencing
regime to uphold HAC against a vagueness challenge); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 771-73
(1991) (same), overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991). The
introduction of jury sentencing in Idaho undermines the logic of Lankford and all its progeny.
Jurors do not have the ability to compare murders to determine whether the one at hand is
comparatively heinous, cruel, atrocious or cruel, and exceptionally depraved, in a way that would
set it “apart from the norm of first-degree murder.” 31528 J.I.44. Moreover, the United States
Supreme Court did not approve the limiting construction “that the murder must be accompanied
by acts setting it apart from the norm of murders,” Resp. Br., p.71, to save Florida’s similar HAC
aggravator from a vagueness challenge. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1976)
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(approving Florida’s adoption of “conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily
tortuous to the victim” instruction to narrow HAC where judge was final sentencing authority).
In fact, the United States Supreme Court does not appear to have ever addressed a limiting
construction that requires jurors, not judges, to assess whether a specific murder is accompanied
by  acts  that  set  it  apart  from  the  norm  of  murders.  This  limiting  construction,  while  useful  in
judge sentencing, is useless before a jury.
Moreover, even assuming this Court’s HAC limiting constructions are constitutionally
sufficient, the district court omitted a significant portion of it when instructing Mr. Hall’s jury.
This Court has held that to be heinous, atrocious or cruel, the actual commission of the murder
must be accompanied by additional acts that set it apart from the “norm” of other first-degree
murders, reflecting “the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily tortuous to the
victim.” Osborn, 102 Idaho at 212-13 (quoting with approval State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla.
1973), cert. den., 416 U.S. 943 (1974)); see also State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 251
(1989), reversed on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991). This limiting
construction was the same one relied upon by the Supreme Court to save Florida’s HAC
aggravator from a vagueness challenge, Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255, and relied upon by the Ninth
Circuit to save Idaho’s HAC aggravator from a similar challenge. Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809,
836-37 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the district court failed to provide Mr. Hall’s jury with the
“conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily tortuous to the victim” limiting
construction for HAC. 31528 J.I.44. Because this language is essential to provide adequate
guidance to the jury, the jury’s HAC finding in Mr. Hall’s case is unsupportable and cannot be
relied upon to support his death sentence.
XV. The Felony-Murder Aggravator Fails To Serve The Constitutionally-Required Narrowing
Function Where The Murder Conviction Is Also Premised Upon Felony-Murder
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The district court erred by submitting the Felony-Murder aggravator to the jury to decide
Mr. Hall’s death eligibility where felony-murder was also the basis for Mr. Hall’s first degree
murder  conviction.  Absent  a  stipulation  from the  State  that  it  was  relying  solely  on  Mr.  Hall’s
first degree premediated murder conviction, rather than his first degree felony-murder conviction
for the penalty phase trial, the jury could not impose death upon Mr. Hall based on the Felony-
Murder aggravator without violating Mr. Hall’s 8th and 14th Amendment rights.
The  State  argues  that  duplication  of  the  elements  of  the  underlying  offense  and  the
statutory aggravator in a capital case does not violate the 8th Amendment. (Resp. Br., pp.73-75.)
For support, it cites State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 102-03 (1998), and Tuilaepa v. California, 512
U.S. 967, 972 (1994). Rather than explaining why Wood applies, the State focuses instead on
concurring opinions in Tuilaepa and a variety of federal court of appeals’ cases holding that
felony-murder is a valid aggravator.21 Resp. Br., pp.74-75. The State misunderstands Mr. Hall’s
argument. He has never claimed felony-murder is an invalid aggravator; he has simply observed
that in Idaho, felony-murder cannot be the basis for the underlying first degree murder
conviction and simultaneously serve the narrowing function required by aggravating
circumstances. The State also makes arguments that confuse the difference between the
eligibility decision and the selection decision in capital cases. Resp. Br., pp.73-75.
The State argues that because the Felony-Murder aggravator requires the jury to find the
defendant “killed, intended a killing, or acted with reckless indifference to human life,”22 while
21The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the 8th Amendment does not bar death
eligibility in felony-murder cases for major participants in the felony, even if those participants
do not themselves kill or intend to kill, so long as they act with reckless indifference to human
life. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156-58 (1987). Tison’s analysis applies to individuals who
act  with  others  to  commit  felony  offenses  during  which  a  murder  is  committed,  but  not  to
individuals who act alone. See also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).
22 I.C. § 19-2515 (9)(h).
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the felony-murder charging statute does not,23 that language fulfills the constitutional narrowing
requirement. Though the State’s argument may have merit in cases where a felony-murder
charge involves at least two participants and there are questions about degrees of culpability
between them, it has no application in cases involving a single defendant. Requiring a jury to
find that the only person charged with and alleged to have participated in a felony-murder
actually killed, does not narrow the class of individuals eligible for the death penalty in Idaho.
Moreover, the State’s citation to State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1988), is misplaced. In
Wood, the defendant pled guilty to, inter alia, first degree murder not felony murder. Id. at 93,
104-05. The State then alleged the Felony-Murder aggravator at the defendant’s sentencing,
relying on some of the same facts that formed the basis for his first degree murder conviction. Id.
at 102. The district court found the existence of the Felony-Murder aggravator and sentenced the
defendant to death. Id. at 103. The defendant challenged the Felony-Murder aggravator on
appeal, arguing “the elements of the (g)(7) aggravator [Felony-Murder] found by the district
court are the same as elements found under § 18-4003(d) defining first degree murder.” Id. In
rejecting the defendant’s argument, this Court held that although the Felony-Murder “aggravator
in I.C. § 19-2515 duplicates an element of first degree murder in I.C. § 18-4003 [it] does not
violate any constitutional standard.” Id. (emphasis added).
Where the defendant in Wood pled guilty to first degree premeditated, deliberate, and
willful murder, not felony-murder,24 the felony murder aggravator may have duplicated some
23The Idaho Code defines felony-murder as “[a]ny murder committed in the perpetration of, or
attempt  to  perpetrate,  …  arson,  rape,  robbery,  burglary,  kidnapping  or  mayhem  …”  I.C.  §
18-4003(d).
24State v. Wood, Appellant’s Br., 1996 WL 33657734,* 20 (July 24, 1996) (“James Wood was
not charged with violating 18-4003(d). His murder was alleged to be first degree murder because
there was premeditation (18-4003(a)).”); State v. Wood, Respondent’s Br., 1996 WL 33657733,
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elements of premeditated, deliberate and willful murder, but the elements were not identical. For
example, premeditated murder did not require that the murder be committed in the perpetration
of a felony, whereas the Felony-Murder aggravator did.25 Wood simply does not apply where the
State alleges the Felony-Murder aggravator and where the underlying crime is first degree
felony-murder.
Mr. Hall maintains that because he was found guilty of first degree felony-murder, the
State was precluded from alleging the Felony-Murder aggravator because the aggravator failed to
serve the narrowing function required by the 8th and 14th Amendments. The aggravator never
should have been before his sentencing jury.26 Consequently, Mr. Hall was prejudiced.
XVI. The Grand Jury Was Required To Make An Individualized Finding As To The Statutory
Aggravating Circumstances Alleged
Mr. Hall asked this Court to reconsider its decision in State v. Abdullah, where it held
that aggravating circumstances are not elements of a crime that must be alleged in the indictment
or information, and which need not be proven by probable cause “to properly notify the
defendant of its intent to seek the death penalty.” 158 Idaho at 459-60. Mr. Hall already
explained why Abdullah was wrongly decided. See App. Br., pp.62-65. However, the State’s
*15 (August 22, 1996) (“Wood claims that he received insufficient notice . . . because Wood was
charged with premeditated murder and not murder committed in the course of a felony.”).
25Notably, at the time of the defendant’s crime and sentencing in Wood, the felony-murder
aggravator provided: “The murder was one defined as murder in the first degree by section
18-4003, Idaho Code, subsections (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f), and it was accompanied with the
specific intent to cause the death of a human being.” I.C. § 19-2515(g)(7) (1984) (emphasis
added). The felony-murder aggravator was amended in 1995 to provide that “[t]he murder was
committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary,
kidnapping or mayhem and the defendant killed, intended a killing, or acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” I.C. § 19-2515(h)(7).
26Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 220 (2006) (“An invalidated sentencing factor (whether an
eligibility  factor  or  not)  will  render  the  sentence  unconstitutional  by  reason  of  its  adding  an
improper element to the aggravation scale in the weighing process unless one  of  the  other
sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the same facts and
circumstances.” (footnote omitted)).
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claim that every other state, except one, has found that aggravating circumstances in capital cases
need not be alleged in the indictment, is simply wrong. In states that retain capital punishment,
facts that trigger death-eligibility can be contained in the definition of the capital crime itself,
separately enumerated as aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase, or both. Tuilaepa, 512
U.S. at 971-72; Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 244-46.
Contrary to the State’s assertion, twelve state courts that have considered the issue have
concluded aggravating circumstances which trigger a defendant’s death-eligibility are not
elements of the offense and need not be charged by indictment or information. 27 In contrast,
another twelve jurisdictions, aggravating circumstances are alleged in the indictment or
information by default, because they are contained within the definition of a capital crime.28 As a
result, courts in these jurisdictions require, if only by default, aggravating circumstances be
contained in the charging document and subject to a pretrial probable cause finding.29 Whether
death-eligibility is defined by the charged offense, aggravating circumstances at the penalty
27Only capital cases addressing the aggravator by indictment or information issue are included,
and only those jurisdictions that retain the death penalty are considered. See McKaney v.
Foreman ex rel. Cnty of Maricopa, 100 P.3d 18, 20-23 (Ariz. 2004); People v. Famalaro, 253
P.3d 1185, 1211-12 (Cal. 2011); Jones v. State, 653 S.E.2d 456, 461-62 (Ga. 2007); Soto v.
Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 841-43 (Ky. 2004); State v. Dixon, 974 So.2d 793, 799-800
(La. App. 2d Cir. 2008); State v. Johnson, 207 S.W.3d 24, 48 (Mo. 2006); Floyd v. State, 42 P.3d
249, 256 (Nev. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Grey v. State, 178 P.3d 154 (Nev. 2008);
State v. Hunt, 582 S.E.2d 593, 602-06 (N.C. 2003); Primeaux v. State, 88 P.3d 893, 899-900
(Okla. Crim. App. 2004); State v. Wood, 607 S.E.2d 57, 61 (S.C. 2004); Moeller v. Weber, 689
N.W.2d 1, 18-22 (S.D. 2004); State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 311-12 (Tenn. 2005).
28See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. § 13A-5-40; ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-10-101, 5-10-102; FLA.  STAT.
ANN. § 782.04(1)(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5401, 21-6620; MISS.  CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-19(2),
97-3-21; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 630:1, 630:1-a; OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2903.01, 2903.02,
2929.02; OR. REV. CODE §§ 163.095, 163.105, 163.115; TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 12.31,
19.02(b)(1), 19.03; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-202, 76-5-203; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-31, 18.2-
32; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.32.030, 9A.32.040, 10.95.030.
29Whether the penalty phase aggravating circumstances in these jurisdictions are also elements of
capital or aggravated murder which must also be alleged in the indictment or information is an
issue not addressed here.
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phase, or both, some states—by constitutions, rules or statutes—require aggravating
circumstances to be alleged in the charging document and subject to a probable cause
determination. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(9)(a)(1); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2929.02, 2929.03,
2929.04(A), 2941.14; cf. Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 13(a).
Notably, all of the state cases addressing this issue were decided before Alleyne v. United
States, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), where the United States Supreme Court overruled
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), and held that any fact,  other  than  a  prior
conviction, that increases either the floor or ceiling of punishment, is an element of the offense
that must be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at
2155. The Supreme Court has also held that aggravating circumstances necessary to render a
defendant eligible for the death penalty “operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a
greater offense’” for purposes of the 6th Amendment. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002)
(quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, n.19). Finally, the Court has required the government to
observe fundamental constitutional guarantees in capital sentencing proceedings, Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463 (1981), including due process, protections against double jeopardy, the
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to an impartial jury, and the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.30
Because aggravating circumstances are elements of death-eligible murder in Idaho, or
their functional equivalent, Mr. Hall should have been extended the same constitutional
protections that  apply to any other element of a charged offense.  Mr. Hall’s right to notice and
30See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (due process clause); Bullington v. Missouri,
451 U.S.430, 446 (1981) (double jeopardy); Estelle, 451 U.S. at 462-63 (privilege against self-
incrimination); Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1992) (constitutional right to an
impartial jury); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984) (constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel).
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due process through an individualized finding of the statutory aggravators alleged against him
should not turn on whether the legislature has arbitrarily placed the death-eligibility question at
the  penalty  phase,  rather  than  in  the  guilt  phase.  For  these  reasons,  this  Court’s  decision  in
Abdullah is contrary to plain and obvious principles of federal constitutional law, is manifestly
wrong, and overruling it is necessary to remedy continued injustice.
XVII. The Court Erred In Admitting Mr. Hall’s “Mugshot” (Exhibit 149)
The district court erred in admitting Mr. Hall’s sinister-looking mugshot during the
sentencing phase. See App. Br., pp.65-68. It was wholly irrelevant, as his appearance at the time
of his arrest had no bearing on whether he should live or die, and, because it was such an
unflattering photo, the risk of a prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value.
The State argues the Rules of Evidence have no application in a capital sentencing proceeding,
and so Mr. Hall’s appellate argument—based on Rules 401, 402, and 403—fails on that basis.
Resp. Br., pp.77-78. This issue was addressed in Mr. Hall’s opening brief, wherein he provided a
detailed analysis of why the Rules of Evidence should be held to apply in capital sentencing
proceedings. See App. Br., pp.81-82. Therefore, no further reply is necessary.
Even if the Rules of Evidence do not apply, the State concedes irrelevant evidence is
nonetheless inadmissible under I.C. § 19-2515(6). See Resp. Br., pp.77-78. The State offers no
cogent argument as to how the mugshot is relevant. It relies on a Connecticut case to argue that
the photo would be relevant to the reliability of a witness identification where considerable time
has elapsed. Resp. Br., p.78 (quoting State v. Woods, 370 A.2d 1080 (Conn. 1976)). It goes on to
claim that offering the mugshot was necessary “to establish [Michelle] Deen’s credibility.” Id.
This argument is misleading. Woods was a typical eyewitness identification case, i.e., a case
where the assailants were unknown to the victims and, thus, the victims’ identification of the
assailants was an issue in the case. See Woods, 370 A.2d at 1081-82. In contrast, Mr. Hall’s
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identification was not an issue because Mr. Hall was well-known to Ms. Deen through their
previous relationship, see 31528 Tr., p.4816, L.6-p.4817, L.7. Thus, the mugshot did not
corroborate any testimony of Ms. Deen, or lend to her credibility in any way.
The State also claims that the question of undue prejudice was not preserved below, and
so his argument on appeal must be reviewed for fundamental error. Resp. Br., p.79. This is not
true because counsel objected on the bases of relevance and prejudice. With regard to prejudice,
counsel first argued that Exhibit 149 “portrays [Mr. Hall] in a jail outfit and it’s a demeaning
type of picture.” 31528 Tr., p.4825, Ls.22-25. Moments later, he argued, “I don’t think there’s
any reason for it other than to show him in that kind of a pose ….” Id., p.4826, Ls.3-6. Next, he
argued, “the only purpose of [Exhibit 149] is to show him in this demeaning position.” Id.,
p.4826, L.24-p.4827, L.1. Finally, he argued, “there’s no reason for this photograph other than
for the purpose as I stated.” Id., p.4827, Ls.18-19.31 In substance, this was an argument based on
the “unfair prejudice” standard of Rule 403. See State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277 (2003)
(“For an objection to be preserved for appellate review, either the specific ground for the
objection must be clearly stated or the basis of the objection must be apparent from the context.”
(citation omitted) (emphasis added)).
The State also addresses the substance of Mr. Hall’s “unfair prejudice” argument. See
Resp. Br., p.79. It claims the court made factual findings that: (a) the mugshot does not actually
look  like  a  mugshot,  and  (b)  it  is  in  no  way  demeaning.  Resp.  Br.,  pp.77-78.  It  points  out
Mr. Hall has not challenged these supposed factual findings as clear error and, therefore, it
31Although counsel did not use the phrase “unfair prejudice,” the clear thrust of his argument was
that the only purpose served by Exhibit 149 was to portray Mr. Hall negatively and prejudice the
jury against him.
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suggests this Court should defer to the court’s “findings.” Resp. Br., pp.77-78.32 However, the
court’s opinions as to how the jury would perceive the mugshot are not factual findings entitled
to deference. First, they are characterizations of the evidence undertaken as part of the court’s
balancing of probative value versus the risk of unfair prejudice—a legal determination which has
been properly challenged as an abuse of discretion. Second, the court’s characterizations of the
mugshot were based exclusively on the same evidence before this Court—Exhibit 149. The court
had no unique ability to evaluate the mugshot, and no special insight into how it would be
perceived by the jury. Thus, this Court can ascertain that it was a sinister-looking mugshot, with
the natural consequence of creating bias against Mr. Hall.
The State also argues the only potential prejudice created by the mugshot was to inform
the jury of Mr. Hall’s incarceration. Resp. Br., p.79. It then argues that this was not a concern at
the sentencing phase, as the jury had already heard about Mr. Hall’s prior offenses, and had
already found him guilty. Id. This argument is misplaced. First, as explained elsewhere, the
sentencing jury should not have heard about Mr. Hall’s prior convictions because they were not
relevant to any of the statutory aggravators and were not admissible. See Section XIX(A) & (B),
infra; App. Br., pp.79-81. Second, the mugshot did more than establish his prior incarceration; it
was a visual depiction of him as a sinister-looking criminal. See Ex.149. As the Supreme Court
has recognized, when it comes to capital sentencing proceedings, depictions of the defendant as
being a dangerous criminal are problematic even after he has been found guilty.33 Thus, the
32Although the State does not explicitly tie its argument to the question of unfair prejudice, the
logical relevance of those “findings” clearly goes to the court’s balancing of its probative value
against the risk of unfair prejudice.
33A visual display which depicts the capital defendant as dangerous “inevitably undermines the
jury’s ability to weigh accurately all relevant considerations—considerations that are often
unquantifiable and elusive—when it determines whether a defendant deserves death.” Deck v.
Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 633 (2005).
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mugshot itself was still highly prejudicial, as it “placed a thumb on death’s side of the scale” by
depicting him as dangerous. Id. (quoting Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 532 (1992)).
The State is incorrect that even if the court erred it was harmless. Resp. Br., p.79. First,
the  State’s  argument  rings  hollow  given  that  the  prosecutor  used  it six times in its closing
argument PowerPoint. See Ex.45 (Sent. Phase), Slides 45-48, 56, 60. Second, the State’s
argument rests, in part, on the incorrect assumption that Mr. Hall’s prior criminal history was
properly considered by the jury. In fact, it was inadmissible. See Section XIX, infra; App. Br.,
pp.73-87. Third, the State’s argument utterly fails to account for any of the very compelling
mitigation heard by the jury.34
Finally, to suggest the death penalty was inevitable in this case based on nothing more
than the nature of the crime and Mr. Hall’s criminal history is to fundamentally misunderstand
how the death penalty is to be applied. The death penalty is not a one-size-fits-all punishment; it
may only be imposed in light of the unique characteristics and circumstances of each capital
defendant. See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302-04 (rejecting a mandatory death penalty and
requiring the sentencer to consider the defendant as a “uniquely individual human being[ ]”).
Indeed, other courts have rejected “brutality trumps” arguments such as that which the State
makes in this case:
[O]ur decades of experience with scores of § 2254 habeas cases from the death
row of Texas teach an obvious lesson that is frequently overlooked: Almost
without exception, the cases we see in which conviction of a capital crime has
produced a death sentence arise from extremely egregious, heinous, and shocking
facts. But,  if  that  were  all  that  is  required  to  offset  prejudicial  legal  error  and
convert it to harmless error, habeas relief based on evidentiary error in the
punishment phase would virtually never be available, so testing for it would
amount to a hollow judicial act.
34See, e.g., 31528 Tr., p.4971, L.1-p.5028, L.25, p.5049, L.1-p.5075, L.23, p.5076, L.1-p.5099,
L.9, p.5099, L.23-p.5140, L.13, p.5140, L.18-p.5163, L.3, p.5191, L.16-p.5289, L.4, p.5290,
L.12-p.5390, L.23.
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Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551, 563 (5th Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see
also Walbey v. Quarterman, 309 Fed. Appx. 795, 804 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (per curiam)
(rejecting brutality trumps argument in context of 6th Amendment ineffective assistance of
counsel claim).
XVIII. Mr. Hall Was Deprived Of Effective Counsel Insofar As His Attorneys Labored Under A
Conflict Of Interest Adversely Affecting Their Performance
Mr. Hall’s counsel had a conflict of interest because his lead counsel, Amil Myshin, was
concurrently representing April Sebastian, one of the State’s aggravation witnesses. App. Br.,
pp.68-73. Specifically, the court erred in failing to remedy the conflict because, not only was
there an actual conflict, but that conflict had an adverse effect on counsel’s representation. App.
Br., pp.70-72. Alternatively, the court failed in its duty to adequately inquire into the conflict.
App. Br., pp.72-73.
A. The Court Erred In Failing To Remedy The April Sebastian Conflict
Because his counsel failed to seek relief based on his own conflict of interest, in order to
prevail on appeal, Mr. Hall has to show not only an “actual conflict of interest,” but also that the
conflict “adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348
(1980). As to whether there was an actual conflict of interest, as opposed to a possible conflict,
Mr.  Hall  asserts  that  in  a  criminal  case,  where  the  defense  attorney  not  only  represents  the
defendant but also concurrently represents a government witness against the defendant, and
possesses confidential, privileged information which could potentially be used to impeach that
witness, he has an actual conflict of interest.
Although ethical standards are not strictly controlling of 6th Amendment standards, Nix v.
Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165-66 (1986), the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct are
nonetheless highly instructive in determining whether a conflict of interest impaired a
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defendant’s constitutional right to conflict-free counsel. See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,
705 (2009); State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 98-99 (1998). Under the Rules, it is clear a conflict
existed in this case. A conflict exists if “the representation of one client will be directly adverse
to another client.” IRPC 1.7(a)(1). “[A] directly adverse conflict may arise when a lawyer is
required to cross-examine a client who appears as a witness in a lawsuit involving another client,
as when the testimony will  be damaging to the client who is represented in the lawsuit.” IRPC
1.7 cmt.6. Here, Ms. Sebastian’s testimony (alleging Mr. Hall had previously exhibited anger,
had exhibited violence with another ex-girlfriend, may have forced himself on women sexually,
and had beaten and robbed strangers) was undoubtedly damaging to Mr. Hall in that it was used
to implore the jury to sentence him to death. Competent counsel would have had every incentive
to undermine her testimony and her credibility generally. Mr. Myshin needed to be able to
undermine the credibility of one client (Ms. Sebastian) in order to defend another (Mr. Hall).
This was a conflict of interest.
Further, there is a conflict if “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client ….”
IRPC 1.7(a)(2). This includes situations where a lawyer is called upon to “use information
relating to the representation of [another] client to the disadvantage of th[at] client,” IRPC 1.8(b).
In this case, when asked by the court whether he had a conflict of interest, Mr. Myshin
responded, “I mean I know things about April.” 31528 Tr., p.4870, Ls.2-9. Later, when asked the
same  question  by  the  court,  Mr.  Myshin  said,  “No,”  but  also  offered  the  same  enigmatic
qualification that, “I think it’s more the nature of—I mean I’m very familiar with April’s
background.” Id., p.4872, Ls.9-14. Mr. Myshin’s responses raise the inference that as her
attorney he was aware of confidential, privileged information which could potentially be used to
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impeach her testimony. Given that fact, he could not thoroughly cross-examine her (to benefit
Mr. Hall) without revealing privileged matters (to her detriment). This was a conflict under Rules
1.7(a)(2) and 1.8(b).
In response, the State contends there has been no showing of an actual conflict,  only  a
possible conflict. Resp. Br., pp.81-83, 85-86. The State fails to recognize that representing one
client who is adverse to another client is itself an actual conflict. See IRPC 1.7(a)(1)  & cmt.6.
Additionally, the State suggests the opinion of Mr. Myshin is dispositive. While a court can rely
upon an attorney’s disclosures in determining whether there is a potential conflict to be
investigated, Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 346-47, ultimately the determination of a conflict is a legal
determination to be made by the court. Id. at 342; see, e.g., Severson, 147 Idaho at 704.35 Thus,
deferring to Mr. Myshin was an error because there was evidence establishing an actual conflict.
See 31528 Tr., p.4875, Ls.3-12.
Given a conflict exists, the next question is whether it adversely affected counsel’s
performance. The State argues that Mr. Hall’s arguments concerning any adverse effect is
speculative. See Resp. Br., pp.83-84. The State first questions whether Mr. Myshin was even
aware of information which would have impeached Ms. Sebastian, pointing out that Mr. Myshin
did not disclose any such information below. Id., pp.83-84. However, if Mr. Myshin possessed
confidential, privileged information which would have impeached Ms. Sebastian, he was not
able to use it in Mr. Hall’s case. See IRPC 1.6 (duty of confidentiality); IRE 502 (attorney-client
privilege); IRCP 26(b)(1)(A) & (b)(3) (work-product doctrine). Consequently, it would not
appear in the record. That reality is consistent with Mr. Hall’s “conflict of interest” argument—
35If counsel’s loyalties truly lie elsewhere, he is in no position to take proper steps to safeguard
his client’s interests. Cf. Trevino v. Thaler, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013) (noting the
need for a new lawyer in asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel—presumably
because a lawyer cannot be counted on to recognize or admit his own failings).
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no one can know specifically what Mr. Myshin knew about Ms. Sebastian because he was not at
liberty to disclose that information.
Nevertheless, the limited information available reveals the conflict did have an adverse
effect  on  Mr.  Hall’s  case.  First,  Mr.  Myshin’s  cryptic  answers  to  the  court’s  questions  on
whether he believed he had a conflict strongly suggested he possessed confidential, privileged
information which could have been used to impeach Ms. Sebastian. This is consistent given that
he had represented her at sentencing and anticipated representing her at her review hearing, see
31528 Tr., p.4868, L.24–p.4870, L.1, and, therefore, should have been familiar with her criminal
record and social history. Second, Mr. Myshin treated Ms. Sebastian with exceptional kindness
in front of the jury, clearly conveying his affinity for her. See, e.g., 31528 Tr., p.4895, L.18-
p.4896, L.8. Third, although Mr. Myshin questioned Ms. Sebastian about her pattern of
burglaries/thefts, compare 31528 Tr., p.4876, L.12-p.4877, L.17 with id., p.4894, L.24-p.4895,
L.17, he followed that questioning up with “softball” leading questions which allowed her to
testify that she is no longer a dishonest criminal, see id., p.4895, L.6-p.4896, L.8. He failed to
follow up on her rider performance, her hope to be placed on probation, and her incentive to
testify favorably for the State in an effort to increase her chances of a favorable recommendation.
See generally id., p.4888, L.4-p.4896, L.9.
The State also argues that Mr. Hall’s direct appeal claim fails because the subsequent
post-conviction investigation revealed no evidence that Mr. Myshin had additional impeachment
information on Ms. Sebastian. However, the evidence discovered in conjunction with Mr. Hall’s
post-conviction investigation has no bearing on his direct appeal claim concerning the conflict
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because that evidence was not before the court at the time.36
B. The Court Erred In Failing To Inquire Further Into The Conflict
The State argues because Mr. Myshin said there was no actual conflict of interest the
court had no duty to inquire further. Resp. Br., pp.84-86. The State focuses on Mr. Myshin’s
cryptic responses to the court’s inquiry, arguing that because these responses were ambiguous
there was no conflict. Id.
First, the State’s argument ignores the fact that Mr. Myshin’s representation of
Ms. Sebastian was directly adverse to his representation of Mr. Hall. See IRPC 1.7(a)(1) &
cmt.6. The question of whether Mr. Myshin had confidential, privileged information with which
to impeach Ms. Sebastian goes only to the second basis to find a conflict, see IRPC 1.7(a)(2),
and the question of whether any conflict adversely affected the representation.
Second, the State’s reliance on a selected portion of Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610 (2013),
is misplaced. In Hall, this Court acknowledged that, “In determining whether a conflict exists, a
trial court may rely on the representations made by counsel, or may inquire further into the
facts.” Id. at 618-19. However, this does not mean that where there is evidence of a conflict, the
court may defer to counsel’s determination of whether a conflict exists. The Court spoke of “the
representations made by counsel”—presumably referring to representations of fact; it said
nothing of deferring to counsel’s legal conclusions. Indeed, the Hall Court went on to distinguish
the vague possibility of a conflict (as in that case) from the situation where there is evidence to
substantiate a possible conflict (as in this case), and suggested that while the duty of inquiry does
not exist in the former instance, it does in the latter. See id. at 619. Here, because there were facts
in the record from which the court knew of a conflict, it had had a duty to inquire. See Mickens v.
36This evidence is not relevant to the direct appeal claim, it is relevant to his post-conviction
claim  on  this  same  topic,  so  Mr.  Hall  responds  to  the  State’s  arguments  concerning  the  post-
conviction evidence in section XLVI, infra.
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Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168-69 (2002); Hall, 155 Idaho at 619.
Third, in this case there were objective facts putting the court on notice of a conflict.
Mr. Myshin’s concurrent representation of Ms. Sebastian was directly adverse to his
representation of Mr. Hall. Mr. Myshin’s comments about knowing things about Ms. Sebastian
raised the inference that Mr. Myshin possessed confidential, privileged information about
Ms.  Sebastian  which  could  be  used  to  impeach  her  testimony.  The  court  had  a  duty  to  make  a
thorough inquiry.
XIX. The Court Erred In Admitting Evidence Of Mr. Hall’s Bad Acts As “Non-Statutory
Aggravation” Evidence Or Evidence Of A “Propensity To Commit Murder”
The district court erred in admitting copious bad act/character evidence at sentencing
because: (A) it was not relevant to the Propensity aggravator; (B) insofar as it was “non-statutory
aggravation” evidence, it was irrelevant under Idaho’s death penalty statute; (C) it was
inadmissible under IRE 403 and/or 404; (D) its admission violated Mr. Hall’s 8th and 14th
Amendment rights; and (E) admission of the evidence concerning Norma Jean Oliver violated
Mr. Hall’s 6th and 14th Amendment rights. See App. Br., pp.73-87.
A. The Bad Act/Character Evidence Was Not Relevant To The Propensity Aggravator
The State acknowledges that under the plain language of I.C. § 19-2515(h)(8) as it
existed in 2000, the Propensity aggravator could only be proved with evidence of prior conduct
or evidence of conduct in commission of the murder, not subsequent conduct. (Resp. Br., pp.88-
89.) Thus, the State concedes evidence of bad acts committed after Ms. Henneman’s death in
2000 was improperly admitted in support of the Propensity aggravator. See id. Since three of the
State’s aggravation witnesses—Michelle Deen, Evelyn Dunaway, and Rebekka McCusker—
testified only to events occurring in 2001-2002, their testimony should have been excluded in
toto. In addition, since much, if not all, of Ms. Sebastian’s testimony concerned events in 2001-
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2002, it should have also been excluded.
Nevertheless, the State dismisses the fact that a significant portion of its aggravation
evidence was improperly admitted in support of the Propensity aggravator and claims the jury
would have known to disregard evidence of subsequent conduct in considering the Propensity
aggravator. See Resp. Br., p.89. However, the prosecutor expressly urged the jury to consider it
for this purpose. See 31528 Tr., p.4733, Ls.2-12 (State’s opening, explaining that the State’s
entire sentencing-related evidentiary presentation was aimed at proving the Propensity
aggravator), p.5457, L.17-p.5459, L.21 (State’s closing, arguing the subsequent conduct proved
the Propensity aggravator), p.5507, L.6-p.5509, L.25 (State’s rebuttal closing, arguing, in part,
that the subsequent conduct proved the Propensity aggravator). The notion that a lay jury parsed
out the instructions, and chose to ignore the State’s arguments after realizing they were
inconsistent with the instructions, is absurd given that neither the prosecutor nor the court
understood that subsequent conduct could not be used to support the Propensity aggravator.37
Thus, the error to allow the consideration of subsequent conduct in support of the Propensity
aggravator is not so easily dismissed.
Given the State’s concession, the only aggravation evidence the State can argue about is
that which pertained to alleged prior conduct—the Oliver rape case, Mr. Hall’s prior criminal
history,  and  perhaps  one  minor  car  crash  incident  testified  to  by  Ms.  Sebastian.38 The State
37See, e.g., 31528 R., pp.236-37 (State arguing that although the alleged Hanlon murder was
subsequent to the Henneman murder, it should nonetheless be admitted to prove Propensity);
31528 Tr., p.754, L.23-p.756, L.21 (court reversing its prior ruling and determining the Hanlon
evidence would be properly admitted in support of the Propensity aggravator, excepting its
prejudicial effect); 31528 R., pp.378-81 (court ruling other “non-statutory aggravating
circumstances” admissible to prove Propensity).
38The State suggests Mr. Hall conceded other evidence presented to the jury related to prior
conduct. Resp. Br., p.89. While Mr. Hall indeed argued that evidence was not indicative of a
propensity to murder, he never admitted it was prior conduct. See App. Br., pp.79-80.
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argues Mr. Hall’s alleged violence toward Ms. Oliver is indicative of “an escalation in the nature
of his violence” and is similar to the evidence found to be properly admitted in State v. Porter,
130 Idaho 772, 789-90 (1997). Resp. Br., pp.89-90. However, two data points do not
demonstrate a trend toward increasing violence. As discussed in Mr. Hall’s opening brief, to the
extent that Porter or other authorities have held prior non-lethal violence somehow evidences a
proclivity to commit murder, those authorities are manifestly wrong and should be overruled. See
App. Br., pp.79-80 & n.28.
The State also argues Mr. Hall’s prior “escape” conviction was particularly probative, as
it showed his propensity to commit murder is a “continuing threat to society.” Resp. Br., p.90.
However, the “escape” evidence was not indicative of a continuing threat that was in any way
attendant to a propensity to commit murder. Further, the “escape” evidence served only to
mislead the jury. Since the circumstances of Mr. Hall’s incarceration in 1994 were so dissimilar
from those he could expect in relation to this case, see 31528 Tr., p.4920, L.18-p.4921, L.9,
p.4948, L.23-p.4949, L.18, the fact that Mr. Hall walked away from a dairy outside the walls of a
minimum security facility in 1994 had no bearing whatsoever on the threat attendant to any
tendency to commit murder.
Finally, the State argues that any error in admitting the bad act/bad character evidence in
support of the Propensity aggravator is necessarily harmless because the jury also found the other
charged aggravators. Resp. Br., p.90. As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, where
a capital jury is permitted to consider irrelevant facts and circumstances—whether related to an
eligibility factor or not—the death sentence is unconstitutional and cannot stand. See Brown v.
Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 220-21 (2006). That is because of the risk that inadmissible facts added
to the aggravation side of the scale “in the weighing process unless one of the other sentencing
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factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances.” Id.
Here, none of Mr. Hall’s alleged prior bad acts had any relevance to the Propensity aggravator.
Consequently, the evidence added improper weight to the aggravating scale and impacted the
jury’s decision.
The State’s harmless error argument is based on Abdullah, where this Court held that any
error would be harmless because the jury voted for death based on a second aggravator. 158
Idaho at 463-64. However, there is no suggestion in Abdullah that additional evidence, unique to
the aggravator, was improperly admitted to prove that aggravator.39 See id. Thus, Abdullah does
not appear inconsistent with Brown v. Sanders, and it does not have any application in this case.
Here, because the bad act evidence should not have been admitted to prove the Propensity
aggravator, the jury wound up hearing aggravation evidence it never should have heard. Under
Brown, that error is not harmless.
B. The Bad Act/Character Evidence Was Not Relevant As “Non-Statutory Aggravation”
Evidence Because It Had No Proper Role In The Jury’s Deliberations
First, while the State recognizes that Idaho’s death penalty statute includes no provision
for a capital jury’s consideration of non-statutory aggravation evidence, it insists that such
evidence is relevant. It argues that because the statute calls for admission of “all relevant
evidence in aggravation and mitigation,” all evidence in aggravation and mitigation must
therefore be relevant. Resp. Br., pp.90-91 (quoting I.C. § 19-2515(6)). This reasoning is circular.
The statute qualifies what is admissible by requiring that the aggravation and mitigation be
relevant. “Relevant,” therefore, must mean something other than that which it modifies
(“evidence in aggravation and mitigation”). It clearly limits the aggravation and mitigation
39The challenged aggravator in Abdullah was “knowingly creat[ing] a great risk of death to many
persons,” I.C. § 19-2515(9)(c), so it is unlikely that the State introduced additional aggravating
facts which had not already been heard by the jury during the guilt phase.
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evidence to that which is pertinent to the issues to be decided by the jury, i.e., whether the State
proved the statutory aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt and, if so, whether in light of any
such aggravator found, mitigating circumstances make the imposition of the death penalty unjust.
See I.C. § 19-2515(8)(a).
Second, the State argues the use of non-statutory aggravation evidence is constitutionally
permissible. (Resp. Br., p.92.) However, that argument is nonresponsive. Mr. Hall readily
concedes the legislature could have written a statute allowing for consideration of non-statutory
aggravation evidence, but maintains it did not. See App. Br., pp.80-81. The State’s preference to
rewrite the death penalty statute does not give this Court license to do so. See Verska, 151 Idaho
at 896.
Conspicuously absent from the State’s brief is any explanation of how non-statutory
aggravation evidence could be relevant to the jury’s determinations under Idaho’s statute.40 As
noted, under I.C. § 19-2515(8)(a) there is no room in the analysis for consideration of any non-
statutory aggravation evidence. See Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 498-99 (Ind. 2002)
(holding that under a similar death penalty statute, Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(b) (2000), the
sentencer could consider only the statutory aggravators, not non-statutory aggravation evidence).
40Subsection (8) of Idaho’s death penalty statute provides that a sentencing jury in a capital case
shall decide: “(i) Whether the statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt; and (ii) If the statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, whether all mitigating circumstances, when weighed against the aggravating
circumstance, are sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust.” I.C. § 19-
2515(8). In other words, the statute prescribes a very precise formula, which does not allow for
consideration of non-statutory aggravation evidence. The State’s brief cited a series of cases. See
Resp. Br., pp.216-17 (citing United States v. Taylor, 302 F.Supp.2d 901 (N.D. Ind. 2003),
Lawrie v. State, 643 A.2d 1336 (Del. 1994), State v. Anderson, 306 S.W.3d 529 (Mo. 2010), and
Whatley v. State,  509  S.E.2d  45  (Ga.  1998)).  But  in  each  of  those  states,  the  relevant  statutes
specifically provided for consideration of non-statutory aggravation evidence. See 18  U.S.C.  §
3592(b), (c) & (d); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(1) & (4); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b);
MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.
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E.  Admission Of The Bad Act/Character Evidence Concerning Ms. Oliver Violated
Mr. Hall’s 6th And 14th Amendment Rights
Rather than parse out each of Mr. Hall’s contentions concerning his inability to defend
himself against the Oliver allegations, this Court should view them as a whole. This is not a case
where just one witness died, or where just the PSI mysteriously disappeared; it is one where two
witnesses died,  the PSI went missing, the State failed to provide discovery in a timely fashion,
and the complaining witness was uncooperative.41 Mr. Hall asserts that under the totality of the
circumstances, he was denied a full and fair opportunity to defend himself. See Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (“The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process
is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations.”).42
With regard to the fundamental error standard, the State argues Mr. Hall satisfied none of
the three-prongs of the Perry/Abdullah standard.43 Mr.  Hall  has  already  argued  the
41To  an  extent,  the  State  blames  trial  counsel  for  Mr.  Hall’s  failure  to  sooner  and  more  fully
prepare to meet the Oliver evidence. Mr. Hall’s counsel were woefully deficient in failing to
investigate the critical Oliver evidence. Indeed, they were constitutionally ineffective. See App.
Br., pp.195-98; Section XXXIX, infra. However, owing to the loss of evidence, Mr. Hall could
not fully defend himself against the State’s allegations.
42It is wrong for the State to suggest the core principle from State v. Larsen, 42 Idaho 517
(1926)—that it is unfair and unjust to use one crime as a pretext in order to make the accused
defend himself for another offense against which he is unprepared to defend himself—has no
application here. The State used the sentencing phase in this case to essentially “convict”
Mr. Hall of a forcible rape which it never proved 13 years earlier.
43The State claims Mr. Hall “conceded … he must establish fundamental error.” Resp. Br., p.94
(citing App. Br.,  p.86).  That is  untrue.  Mr. Hall  simply explained that  trial  counsel objected to
admission  of  the  Oliver  evidence  on  the  basis  that,  owing  to  the  passage  of  time  and  loss  of
evidence, he was unable to defend against the State’s current allegations, and acknowledged that
counsel failed to cite any specific authority in support of this objection. See App. Br., p.86; see
also id., p.225. He then said, “To the extent this Court concludes Mr. Hall’s current argument
was not preserved, Mr. Hall contends admission of the Oliver evidence constitutes fundamental
error ….” App. Br., pp.86-87. This Court could just as easily conclude the issue was preserved
because, given the context and substance of trial counsel’s objection, that objection could not
have been anything other than a due process argument. See Hansen v. Roberts, 154 Idaho 469,
473 (2013). Indeed, the district court subsequently stated its belief that this issue had been
argued by counsel. See 41059 R., pp.2353.
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inapplicability of the Perry/Abdullah standard (and the Dunlap standard), so no further response
is needed. However, the State’s arguments as to the third-prong of the Perry/Abdullah standard,
i.e., its “harmless error” argument, warrants a response. First, the State has no basis to make any
representations as to the actual grounds for the jury’s verdict.44 Second, the State later
contradicts  itself  when  arguing  that  a  different  error  is  harmless,  claiming  Mr.  Hall  was
sentenced to death based on the brutal nature of the crime, the evidence in support of the
aggravators, “and the non-statutory aggravation” evidence. Resp. Br., p.141. Finally, the State’s
“brutality trumps” claim misapprehends the nature of a jury’s selection decision in a capital case,
as discussed in Section XVII, supra.
XXIII. The Court Incorrectly Instructed The Jury During The Penalty Phase
A. The Court Failed To Instruct The Jury That The Same Evidence Could Not Be Used To
Support More Than One Aggravator
The district court erred in failing to instruct Mr. Hall’s jury that it could not rely on the
same evidence, without more, to find more than one aggravating circumstance. Such an
instruction was particularly important in Mr. Hall’s case where the State alleged four separate
aggravators. In response, the State concedes that the absence of such an instruction is error, see
Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 365, but it claims this Court cannot address it for the first time on appeal
because it is not of constitutional dimension. Resp. Br., pp.103-05. Even assuming the State is
correct, this Court reviewed the same instructional error for the first time on appeal in both
44In a “harmlessness” inquiry the Court does not inquire into the actual basis of the jury’s
verdict; it employs an objective standard, asking “whether there is a reasonable possibility that
the evidence complained of might have contributed” to the verdict. Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 23 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)). However, if it were to
delve into the jury’s actual deliberations, it would find it clear that the Oliver evidence had a
profound effect upon the jury’s decision, as one of Mr. Hall’s jurors later revealed to a reporter
that the jury was split as to whether to impose the death penalty, but one witness in particular had
a great impact on the jury: “It was a runaway. He raped and strangled her when she was 17.” PC
Ex.86.
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Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 365, and Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 470-71. Presumably this Court would not
have reviewed the errors for the first time on appeal in either case had it not considered them to
be fundamental. Because the instructional error in Hall is identical to the errors reviewed in those
cases, the error is fundamental and can only be harmless if at least one aggravating circumstance
passes constitutional muster.
B. The Court  Erroneously Instructed The Jury It  Had To Be Unanimous In Its  Finding Of
Whether The Mitigating Factors Were Sufficiently Compelling To Render The Death
Penalty Unjust
Mr. Hall explained the error and inconsistency of the jury instructions regarding
unanimity in his Appellant’s Brief. See App. Br., pp. 98-100. The State argues the same
challenge was rejected by this Court in Abdullah. Resp. Br., pp.105-06. In Abdullah, this Court
concluded that the instructions as a whole adequately informed jurors that they did not have to
unanimously agree that the death penalty would be unjust. 158 Idaho at 471-72. The State, in
Mr. Hall’s case, and this Court in Abdullah, relied upon other jury instructions to reach the
conclusion that the instructions, as a whole, did not improperly tell jurors they had to be
unanimous in deciding whether mitigating evidence made death an unjust sentence. Resp. Br.,
pp.106-08; Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 472.
This Court’s decision in Abdullah regarding the unanimity instruction is contrary to well-
established precedent of the United States Supreme Court and cannot stand. In McKoy v. North
Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990), the Supreme Court deemed the unanimity instructions45
45In McKoy, if jurors unanimously found a mitigating circumstance had been proven by a
preponderance of the evidence, they were instructed to write “yes” on the verdict form; if the
jurors did not unanimously find a mitigating circumstance had been proven by a preponderance,
they were instructed to write “no.” 494 U.S. at 436. Jurors were then asked whether they
unanimously found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the mitigating circumstance(s) found
was/were insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance(s) found. Id. at  437.  If  the
answer was “yes,” jurors were asked whether they unanimously found, beyond a reasonable
52
erroneous and vacated the defendant’s death sentence, holding “North Carolina’s unanimity
requirement violates the Constitution by preventing the sentencer from considering all mitigating
evidence,” id. at 435, and “impermissibility limits jurors’ consideration of mitigating evidence
….” Id. at 443 (citing Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988)).
Similarly, the instruction telling Mr. Hall’s jurors they could only consider mitigating
evidence if they unanimously agreed it existed, violated the Constitution by preventing
Mr. Hall’s sentencing jury from adequately considering mitigating evidence. At a minimum, the
instructions requiring unanimity regarding mitigating circumstances on the one hand, and
requiring jurors to individually determine the existence of mitigating circumstances on the other,
were confusing and misleading.46
Like in McKoy, there is a reasonable likelihood Mr. Hall’s jury applied Instruction 48 and
the verdict forms in a way that required all jurors to agree on the existence of mitigating
circumstances before such circumstances could be considered at all in sentencing. This is
apparent from the verdict form where jurors found that “all mitigating circumstances are not
sufficiently compelling to make imposition of the death penalty unjust.” 31528 R., pp.610-12.
doubt, that the aggravating circumstance(s) found was/were sufficiently substantial to call for the
imposition of death when considered in light of the mitigating circumstance(s) found. Id.
46In Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 390 (1999), the Supreme Court explained:
[w]e have considered similar claims that allegedly ambiguous instructions caused
jury confusion. See, e.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 … (1994); Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 … (1991); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 … (1990).
The proper standard for reviewing such claims is “‘whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that
violates the Constitution.” Estelle, supra, at 72 … (quoting Boyde, supra, at
380 …); see also Victor, supra, at 6 … (applying reasonable likelihood standard
to direct review of state criminal conviction).
See also State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372 2002) (holding instructions that mislead the jury or
prejudice the complaining party constitute reversible error).
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The error was plain and Mr. Hall was prejudiced because his jury found the mitigating
circumstances in his case were not sufficiently compelling to render death unjust.
C. The Court Should Not Have Instructed The Jury On The Penalties For Rape And
Kidnapping
The State argues that Instruction 49, which told jurors the penalties for rape and first
degree kidnapping, cannot be challenged because the erroneous instruction was invited, or at
least acquiesced to, by counsel. Resp. Br., pp.107-08. The only support for this proposition is a
statement by the district court that “49 is some pride of authorship on your part.” 31528 Trial Tr.,
p.5422, Ls.6-7. There is no indication which portion of Instruction 49 trial counsel may have
authored because those discussions took place off the record. There are indications the State
authored or edited Instruction 49, where the prosecutor in response to the judge’s inquiry about
objections stated, “[n]o. Once we changed this No. 49 we don’t have.” 31528 Trial Tr., p.5421,
Ls.16-20. Accordingly, the most that can be said is the record reflects a failure of defense
counsel to object to Instruction 49. This Court has repeatedly recognized that counsel’s failure to
object to flawed instructions is not invited error. Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 449-50; State v. Blake,
133 Idaho 237, 240 (1999). In nearly identical circumstances, this Court even found that
counsel’s response to the district court’s after-the-fact summary of an off-record jury instruction
conference,47 stating, “Your Honor, we would concur. We have nothing to say on the record at
this time,” was not invited error. Blake, 133 Idaho at 239-40. Because the error in Instruction 49
was neither invited nor objected to, this Court must review it for fundamental error. Draper, 151
Idaho at 588.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that when a jury does not impose sentence, it
must be instructed to “reach its verdict without regard to what sentence might be imposed.”
47In Blake, in summarizing an off-the-record instructions conference, the district court gave the
parties a chance to make an objection on the record. 133 Idaho at 240.
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Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 40 (1975). In the capital sentencing realm informing jurors
of potential penalties for non-murder offenses invites jurors to consider matters outside their role
and to craft a penalty for murder based on speculation about matters in the judge’s hands.
Further, by instructing jurors that there was no minimum mandatory sentences for rape and
kidnapping, the court improperly suggested to jurors that it would treat Mr. Hall with leniency
when sentencing him for those crimes, thereby inducing jurors to hedge their bets by imposing a
death sentence for first degree murder. See, e.g., State v. Koch, 673 P.2d 297, 303-04 (Ariz.
1983). Finally, by instructing jurors that the maximum possible penalty for rape and kidnapping
was life without parole (LWOP), the court improperly suggested to jurors that the only way to
meaningfully punish Mr. Hall for Ms. Henneman’s death was to impose death, because a
sentence of LWOP was already an appropriate punishment for his non-lethal crimes.
E. The Court Erred In Instructing The Jury Regarding The Supposed Potential For The
Governor To Grant A Pardon Or Commutation
The State argues that any error attendant to Instruction 49 was invited error. For the
reasons explained above, the failure to object to an instruction is not invited error. See subsection
C, supra. The State then argues Instruction 49 accurately informed jurors of the Governor’s
power to commute or pardon a death sentence. Resp. Br., pp.109-14.48 That is not the case. The
Idaho Constitution exclusively entrusts the board of pardons with the pardoning power, subject to
limitations imposed by the legislature. IDAHO CONST.  art.  IV,  §  7.  In  contrast,  the  Idaho
Constitution and Idaho Code section 20-240 restrict  the Governor’s power to “grant respites or
reprieves in all cases of convictions for offenses against the state, except treason or
imprisonment on impeachment, but such respites or reprieves shall not extend beyond the next
session of the commission.” In Idaho, the Governor has no authority, constitutional or otherwise,
48Presumably, the State meant to cite § 20-240 throughout its argument, not § 19-240.
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to pardon or commute a sentence for murder. Moreover, the Board’s own rules preclude a person
serving a fixed life sentence or a death sentence from being eligible for a pardon. Instead, such a
person may seek a commutation through the Board, which then may provide a recommendation
to the Governor. See IDAPA 50.01.01.550.05.a. “Commutation is a process whereby clemency
may be considered and granted to modify a sentence imposed by the sentencing jurisdiction.”
IDAPA 50.01.01.450.04 & .05. Such recommendations for commutation are not effective until
presented to and approved by the Governor. If not approved within thirty days of the
recommendation, the recommendation is deemed denied. IDAPA 50.01.01.450.04.a.–c. For these
reasons, and because commutation is not only extraordinary but rare,49 Instruction 49 misstated
the law to the jury by telling jurors that Mr. Hall was eligible for pardon or commutation by the
Governor, when such authority is explicitly vested with the Board of Pardon. Because this
instruction did not accurately inform jurors of the powers of the Governor and the Board of
Pardons with respect to reprieves, respites, commutations and pardons, the instruction was
legally incorrect. Cf. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 995 (1983) (finding no constitutional
defect in capital jury instruction accurately advising jurors of the Governor’s power to
commute). In addition to being legally inaccurate, informing jurors of the responsibility or ability
of anyone, other than the sentencing jury, to modify a death sentence relieved the jurors of their
sense of responsibility for imposing a death sentence. Although the State relies on Ramos to
support its argument that Instruction 49 was proper, Ramos provides no such support.50 This
49IDAPA 50.01.01.450.03.
50In Ramos, the defendant challenged the district court’s instruction telling jurors about the
Governor’s power to commute a LWOP sentence, but also argued if such an instruction was
given, jurors must also be told of the Governor’s power to commute a death sentence. Id. at
1012. Although the Court upheld the instruction with respect to the Governor’s power to
commute a LWOP sentence, it reached a different conclusion with respect to the Governor’s
power to commute a death sentence. The Supreme Court observed, “It is precisely this
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minimization of the importance of the jury’s decision to impose death in a capital case is
precisely what the Supreme Court prohibited in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29
(1985) (“[I]t is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made
by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the
appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests elsewhere.”).
Because Instruction 49 was an improper statement of the law and reduced jurors’ sense of
responsibility by telling them Mr. Hall’s final sentencing decision was vested in the Governor,
the instruction violated Mr. Hall’s 6th and 8th Amendment rights to a qualified jury.
XXIV.  The Prosecution Engaged In Numerous Instances Of Misconduct
On appeal, Mr. Hall has identified ten types of misconduct infecting the prosecution’s
case. See App. Br., pp.105-30. In response, the State claims there was no misconduct or, if there
was, it was not that bad. See Resp. Br., pp.114-41. For the reasons detailed below, the State’s
attempts to persuade this Court to turn a blind eye to the prosecution’s egregious behavior, are
without merit.51
perception that the defendant is prejudiced by an instruction on the possible commutation of a
death sentence that led the California Supreme Court in People v. Morse … 388 P.2d 33 (1964),
to prohibit the giving of such an instruction.” Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1011-12 (footnote omitted). In
Morse, the California Supreme Court held, “by suggesting that some other authority would
review the propriety of the jury’s decision to impose death, the instruction tended to reduce the
jury’s sense of responsibility in fixing the penalty.” Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1012 n.26 (citing with
approval Morse, 388 P.2d at 46).
51In addition to the accepted standards for reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the
State, citing a Tenth Circuit case, claims that “in the context of capital sentencings, ‘Inquiry into
fundamental fairness requires examination of the entire proceedings, including the strength of the
evidence against the petitioner, both as to the guilt stage of the trial and as to moral culpability at
the sentencing phase.’” Resp. Br., p.115 (quoting Le v. Mullin, 311 F.3d 1002, 1013 (10th Cir.
2002)). Notably, Mullin cites Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974), for this
proposition, although Donnelly says no such thing. See Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643. While
Donnelly holds that in evaluating whether a prosecutor’s misconduct “so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process,” and a reviewing court
should engage in an “examination of the entire proceedings in [the] case,” it does not hold that
the strength of the government’s evidence is a critical factor in determining whether a trial was
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A. Using Closing Arguments To Mislead Jurors As To The Definition Of “Mitigation
Evidence”
In a series of arguments which tainted the whole of the prosecution’s closing arguments,
the prosecution told jurors that evidence of Mr. Hall’s horrendous childhood and his emotional
disturbances as an adult are “not mitigation” and are “not relevant” to the selection decision
because they did not cause him to kill  Ms. Henneman. The State led the jury to believe moral
culpability and criminal liability are the same, so unless the jury could find the killing to be
legally excused it had to impose the death penalty. This recurring theme grossly distorted the law
and was prosecutorial misconduct. See App. Br., pp.105-08.
Preliminarily, the State would have this Court believe the improper comments were
isolated “snippets.” Resp. Br., p.116. However, the entire theme of the State’s rebuttal was
“choice,” and a critical component of the “choice” theme was that Mr. Hall’s background and
mental state were not relevant and should not be considered. See generally 31528 Tr., p.5490,
L.11-p.5513, L.14. Far from being isolated comments, the improper arguments infected the
whole of Mr. Bourne’s rebuttal closing.
The State also wants this Court to believe that Mr. Bourne’s argument was something it
was not—a simple request to weigh the mitigation against the aggravation. Resp. Br., pp.116-18.
At no point did Mr. Bourne ever recognize that the evidence concerning Mr. Hall’s background
and mental condition was mitigating. See generally 31528 Tr., p.5490, L.11-p.5513, L.14. At no
point did Mr. Bourne ever implore the jury to give the defense evidence less weight, or to find
that its weight was comparatively less than the aggravation. See generally id. Instead, he told the
jury to disregard the defense’s evidence in its entirety. The argument amounted to the improper
fair. Id. To focus on the strength of the government’s evidence is to approach a dangerous
standard where those who are “obviously” guilty can never be found to have received an unfair
trial. Also see Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107 (1945) (“Even those guilty of the most
heinous offenses are entitled to a fair trial.”).
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claim that evidence is only relevant to mitigation if it is causally connected to commission of the
offense. See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284-87 (2004); see also Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S.
37, 45 (2004).
Alternatively, the State argues the prosecutor’s misconduct was not prejudicial because
the jury was instructed as to the definition of mitigation.52 Resp. Br., pp.118-19. This argument is
weak because the presumption to follow instructions is tempered by realism. Where there is a
substantial risk that jurors will be influenced by an error, Idaho’s courts do not turn a blind eye to
that error just because the jury should have, in theory, ignored it. The jury was repeatedly misled
by the prosecutor as to perhaps the most critical issue in a capital sentencing hearing, and one
with which jurors naturally struggle.53 To suggest the jury would have disregarded these
arguments in favor of their own reading of the instructions is unrealistic.
B. Questioning A Witness In Such A Way As To Mislead Jurors As To The Definition Of
“Mitigation Evidence”
The prosecution’s attempts to mislead jurors as to the meaning of “mitigation” were not
limited  to  closing  arguments,  but  were  also  part  of  its  cross-examination  of  Dr.  Pettis.  The
State’s primary response is to argue once again that the prosecution did not seek to have the jury
disregard the mitigation evidence, but only to give it little or no weight. Resp. Br., pp.120-21.
For the reasons set forth above, this is not an honest reading of the prosecution’s tactics. See
subsection A, supra.
52If Mr. Bourne, an experienced prosecutor, did not properly understand the instruction defining
“mitigation,” how could the lay jurors? Otherwise, the State’s argument only survives if one
assumes Mr. Bourne knowingly misstated the law to manipulate the jurors into imposing death.
53The prosecution understood that jurors often struggle with the concept. A cursory review of the
jury selection in this case reveals a typical prospective juror tended to come into this case with a
simplistic view of the death penalty: if the defendant committed premeditated murder, he should
be executed. See, e.g., 31528 Tr., p.933, Ls.4-24 (prospective juror explaining her view that the
death penalty should be imposed unless the killing was accidental), p.1073, Ls.8-23 (prospective
juror stating her view that the background and character of the defendant do not matter because
“as adults we are responsible for our actions”).
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The State next asks this Court to disregard its own language in State v. Payne, where it
indicated it was “improper” to question the defendant’s “mental health witnesses as to whether
his conditions caused the rape and murder,” 146 Idaho 548, 569 n.10 (2008), in favor of Dunlap,
where the Court held that while it is improper to argue that “mitigation evidence is not relevant
simply because there is no nexus between the evidence and the defendant’s commission of the
offense,” a prosecutor is not “barred from arguing that the jury should give little or no weight to
mitigation evidence that lacks a nexus to the crime,” 155 Idaho at 372. Resp. Br., pp.120-21.
However, Payne need not be disregarded because the prosecution in this case did not use the
cross-examination in question to buttress an argument about how to assign weight to the
mitigation  evidence;  it  explicitly  used  it  to  argue  the  jury  should not consider the mitigation
evidence. See subsection A, supra; App. Br., pp.105-10.
Finally, the State argues Mr. Hall failed to show the prosecutor’s improper cross-
examination of Dr. Pettis was prejudicial. Resp. Br., p.121. It argues that because this Court
found to be harmless the sentencing judge’s error in failing to consider mitigation evidence that
lacked a nexus to the crime in Payne, the misconduct in seeking to impose a nexus requirement
in this case must be harmless as well. Id. The State’s argument fails for at least two reasons.
First, harmlessness is determined on a case-by-case basis. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24-26.
Second, as discussed in subsection A, supra, the misconduct was highly prejudicial because it
went to a critical issue in the case and took advantage of the jurors’ struggles with the concept of
“mitigation.” Furthermore, as already discussed, the misconduct in questioning Dr. Pettis
facilitated the State’s improper closing. See App. Br., pp.109-110.
C. Distorting And Mischaracterizing Mr. Hall’s Mitigation Case
The State also mischaracterized the mitigation evidence by falsely claiming the defense
was trying to say that Mr. Hall’s childhood abuse and neglect caused him to become a murderer.
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App. Br., pp.111-12. The State concedes that neither Dr. Pettis nor Dr. Cunningham ever
testified that Mr. Hall’s abuse and neglect caused him to commit the crimes in this case, but it
argues they implied as much. See Resp. Br., pp.121-23. However, both were explicit in testifying
that they were not claiming a causal effect. See 31528 Tr., p.5282, L.5-p.5285, L.19 (Dr. Pettis),
p.5300, Ls.15-22 (Dr. Cunningham). Both made it clear they were simply talking about risk
factors and protective factors, which both correlate to negative life outcomes. See generally
31528 Tr., p.5191, L.16-p.5390, L.23. For the State to equate this discussion of risk factors and
protective factors with a cause-and-effect relationship, is to argue that correlation implies
causation. There is no reason to employ such a fallacy with regard to the defense experts’
testimony in this case, and there is certainly no reason to believe the jurors would have done so.
E. Disparaging The Defense Experts
As already detailed, the prosecution encouraged jurors to mistrust and disbelieve
Drs. Pettis and Cunningham because they were not from Idaho and had impressive credentials; it
claimed they were “in the business of supplying criminal defendants with excuses”; it denigrated
them by dismissing their testimony as “performances”; it ascribed to them motives that were not
fairly supported by the record and suggested they intentionally sought to mislead or distract the
jury; and it sought to anger jurors by highlighting the cost of their testimony to taxpayers. See
App. Br., pp.114-18. At one point the State asserts that, “as explained above, [the challenged
prosecutorial comments] constituted appropriate comment on the experts’ bias and credibility.”
Resp. Br., p.128. However, the argument actually made is that, even if the prosecutors’
arguments were improper, they did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See id.,
pp.126-28. This is the argument to which Mr. Hall replies.
The State begins by disagreeing with two of the authorities cited in Mr. Hall’s opening
brief—Butler v. State, 102 P.3d 71 (Nev. 2004), and State v. Lundbom, 773 P.2d 11 (Or. Ct. App.
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1989). See Resp. Br., p.126. In Butler, the Nevada Supreme Court found prosecutorial
misconduct rising to the level of a constitutional violation where the prosecutor disparaged
defense witnesses in much the same way that the prosecution disparaged the defense experts in
this  case—by  casting  one  of  them  as  an  elite,  who  was  getting  paid  too  much,  and  selling  a
product, and by calling another witness a “pseudo expert” who makes a living off of taxpayer
funds,  and who was less than truthful as a matter of course. Butler, 102 P.3d at 899. The State
criticizes this holding on two grounds. First, it claims the Butler Court did not apply “the correct
test for a due process violation based upon a prosecutor’s closing argument—whether the alleged
error ‘so infect[ed] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process.’” Resp. Br., p.126 (quoting Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-82). However, this is false because
the Butler Court adopted the US Supreme Court’s standard from Darden:
To determine if prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct occurred, the
relevant inquiry is whether a prosecutor's statements so infected the proceedings
with  unfairness  as  to  make  the  results  a  denial  of  due  process.  However,  a
criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's
comments standing alone, and the alleged improper remarks must be read in
context.
Butler, 102 P.3d at 896 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). Second, the State
points out that Butler was a plurality opinion, and it argues the one-justice dissent was correct.
Resp. Br., p.126. It is unclear why a lone dissent should carry more weight than the plurality.
In Lundbom, the Oregon Court of Appeals found reversible prosecutorial misconduct
where the prosecutor disparaged a defense expert by claiming he was paid to testify a certain
way because “[t]hat’s his job” and “[t]hat is what he is hired to do,” by calling the expert a
“pimp,” and by asserting that if the expert did not testify favorably for the defendant, “he would
not make a dime. And no defense attorney would hire him.” 773 P.2d at 12-13. The State
attempts to diminish the force of the Lundbom opinion by arguing it did not apply “the correct
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test for a due process violation ….” Resp. Br., p.126. However, this argument is misleading, as it
suggests the Lundbom Court applied an incorrect test.  The Lundbom Court did not analyze the
misconduct as a due process violation, because the misconduct was not challenged on due
process grounds. See Lundbom, 773 P.2d at 12-13. Thus, Lundbom stands only for the limited
proposition that disparaging a defense expert is misconduct. Mr. Hall has never suggested
otherwise. Interestingly, the Lundbom Court’s prejudice analysis made it clear that, had the
prosecutor’s misconduct been challenged as a due process violation, the defendant likely would
have prevailed on that basis as well—precisely because the misconduct infected the trial:
In this case, the prosecutor’s remarks were not only inappropriate in and
of themselves, but highly likely to influence the jury. . . . To attempt to establish a
defendant’s guilt by making unwarranted personal attacks on his attorney and the
witness is not only unfair, but it impugns the integrity of the system as a whole.
Such comments dangerously overshadow what a defendant’s case is really about,
and we presume that they prejudice a defendant.
Id. (emphasis added).
The  State  cites  a  number  of  authorities  of  its  own—Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 485
S.W.2d 310 (Ky. 2016), People v. Emerson, 727 N.E.2d 302 (Ill. 2000), State v. Jones, 595
S.E.2d 124 (N.C. 2004), and State v. Clayton, 995 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. 1999). See Resp. Br.,
pp.127-28. However, most of these authorities are not helpful to the State. Jones simply held it is
proper for a prosecutor to argue that a defense expert is not credible. Jones, 595 S.E.2d at 141-
42. That is not in dispute and Mr. Hall readily concedes the prosecution could have argued that
Drs. Pettis and Cunninghman should not be believed, or that their testimony should carry little
weight. In Emerson, the prosecution argued the defendant was a “con man,” that his mitigation
evidence was a “con job,” and that his mitigation expert was “a hired gun” who was involved in
that “con job.” Emerson, 727 N.E.2d at 343. The Supreme Court of Illinois held these arguments
were improper. Id. Ultimately, the Emerson Court concluded that the prosecutor’s misconduct
63
“was not so highly inflammatory, in and of itself, that it require[d]” a new sentencing hearing. Id.
However, the misconduct was not recurrent, as it was Mr. Hall’s case.
Dickerson actually cuts against the State’s argument. Initially, the standard actually
applied by the Kentucky Supreme Court appears similar enough to the Constitutional standard to
make the case relevant. See Dickerson, 485 S.W.2d at 329, 335. The Dickerson Court held the
prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing the expert’s testimony was offensive and
outrageous because the prosecutor labeled the expert a “hired gun” who “says whatever the
person  paying  the  money  to  say,”  “takes  facts  and  twists  them  for  a  dollar,”  and  who  the
prosecutor characterized as “some hired whore who comes in here and tells you all this crap and
has become a multimillionaire on the backs of dead children ….” Id. at 332-33. The Court found
two factors that weighed in favor of a finding of flagrancy (the misconduct was prejudicial and
the misconduct was not accidental), while two did not (the misconduct was isolated, and the
defendant  was  clearly  guilty),  so  the  Court  focused  primarily  on  the  weight  of  the  evidence
against the defendant and concluded that because the evidence against him was so overwhelming
the misconduct did not render the trial unfair. Id. at 333-35. Here, as in Dickerson, two factors—
prejudice and intent—weigh in favor of a finding of overall unfairness. But unlike Dickerson, it
is not beyond doubt that the jury would have reached the same conclusion, i.e., a death sentence,
regardless of the misconduct. The jury could very easily have found the mitigation evidence
rendered the death penalty unjust.
The only case cited that is supportive of the State’s position is Clayton. In that case, the
prosecutor argued the defense expert was not credible, claimed the expert’s opinion was
“voodoo,” and asserted the expert “hopes that he can fool you.” Clayton, 995 S.W.2d at 479-80.
The  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri  found  no  fault  with  any  of  these  tactics,  holding  that
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“[p]rosecutors  may  …  comment  on  the  evidence  and  the  credibility  of  witnesses,  even  to  the
point of belittling and/or discussing the improbability of specific testimony.” Id. at 480. Thus,
Clayton seems to adopt an “anything goes” approach with regard to prosecutors impugning,
disparaging, and demeaning defense experts. However, as already shown, this is not the
prevailing approach. Further, as already discussed, this is not consistent with the approach of
either the United States Supreme Court or the Idaho Supreme Court. See App. Br., pp.114-15
(discussing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 9 & n.6 (1985), and State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho
267, 280-81 (2003)).
F. Imploring  Jurors  To  Impose  Death  To  Deter  Future  Crime,  Save  The  Lives  Of  Future
Would-Be Victims, And Give The Victim’s Family Retribution
The State offers little defense of prosecutorial arguments seeking to have the jury render
a verdict based on concerns about general deterrence, other hypothetical victims, larger societal
issues concerning crime, or sympathy for victims. See Resp. Br., pp.130-31. Rather, it assumes
the challenged prosecutorial statements “were clumsy or improper,” and goes on to argue that
they do not rise to the level of a due process violation. Id., pp.131-33. In presenting this
argument though, the State assumes the improper arguments were isolated “snippets” which do
not reflect the prosecution’s closing arguments as a whole. Id., pp.131-32 & n.30. However, the
improper arguments were not isolated, but were quite extensive. See 31528 Tr., p.5462, L.3-
p.5463, L.8, p.5510, L.22-p.5512, L.21. Furthermore, these improper pleas were part of closing
arguments that were littered with misconduct. See subsections A, C, D, E, G, H, I & J; App. Br.,
pp.105-08, 111-18, 123-30.
The State also focuses on the portion of the prosecution’s rebuttal argument where
Mr. Bourne spoke of the value of Ms. Henneman’s life, sought to compare her death to
Mr.  Hall’s  execution,  and  argued  that  only  the  taking  of  Mr.  Hall’s  life  would  give
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Ms. Henneman’s own life value, see 31528 Tr., p.5510, L.22-p.5512, L.21, and tries to spin
those arguments into something less offensive—a proper discussion of the mercy (or lack
thereof) shown during the commission of the murder. See Resp. Br., pp.132-33. However, the
State’s attempt to repackage the argument should be rejected. Mr. Bourne was not speaking of
the nature of the offense,54 but was seeking to have the jurors rely on sympathy for
Ms. Henneman and her surviving family, and on a desire to send a broader message, in making
their selection decision, see 31528 Tr., p.5510, L.1-p.5513, L.14, all of which was improper.
G. Mischaracterizing The Jury’s Role As A Link In The Law Enforcement Chain And
Comparing Jurors To Soldiers
The State offers an argument concerning the prosecutor’s effort to compare the jurors to
soldiers. It attempts to distinguish the challenged arguments in this case from those at issue in
Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1985), and Weaver v. Bowersox, 438 F.3d 832 (8th
Cir. 2006)—the authorities primarily relied upon by Mr. Hall—on the basis that the comparisons
of the jurors to soldiers were far more explicit in those cases than here. Resp. Br., pp.135-36. The
State attempts to whitewash the prosecutorial comments in this case, claiming there was “no
reference to soldiers” and “not even a reference to duty.” Resp. Br., p.136. That is not a fair
characterization of the arguments in question.55 When the prosecutor referred to “the citizens of
our country” doing “a hard thing on the beach of a foreign country,” he was unambiguously
referring to soldiers engaged in combat. 31528 Tr., p.5512, L.24-p.5513, L.14. Likewise, when
the prosecutor spoke of asking American citizens “to do hard things,” he talked about how
“certain things are expected of citizens” and told jurors to “go and do” what they knew “needs to
be done,” he was indisputably speaking of “duty.” Id. In light of these references to soldiers and
54As was the case cited by the State, Reese v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 675
F.3d 1277 (11th Cir.). The holding was very clear that the victim’s suffering was properly
considered by the jury because it was relevant to Florida’s HAC aggravator. Id. at 1292.
55The arguments made by the prosecution are set forth in Mr. Hall’s Appellant’s Brief at p. 126.
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duty,  the message sent to the jurors in Mr. Hall’s case was that  it  was their  patriotic and civic
duty to impose the death penalty. That was misconduct.
H. Expressing A Personal Belief As To The Appropriate Punishment
The State relies upon a single Court of Appeals case—State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279
(Ct. App. 2007)—to argue there was nothing wrong with the prosecutor’s argument because it
did not suggest to the jury that he was privy to additional information, not presented to the jury,
which corroborated the State’s theory. Resp. Br., pp.136-37. However, the fear of jurors
assuming the prosecution is privy to additional evidence is not the only concern underlying the
prohibition against prosecutors offering their personal opinions concerning the guilt of the
defendant or whether he should be subjected to the death penalty. As the United States Supreme
Court has explained, “the prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government
and may induce the jury to trust the Government’s judgment rather than its own view of the
evidence.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1985); accord State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho
108, 110-11 (1979); State v. Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho 124, 131 (Ct. App. 1986).
I. Stating As Fact A Claim Not Supported By The Record, i.e.,  That  Lethal  Injection  Is
Painless And Humane
The State seeks to defend the prosecutor’s argument regarding the application and nature
of lethal injection as being based on “common sense,” not evidence. Resp. Br., p.138. However,
the painless peacefulness of lethal injection is not common sense; it is an assumption. And while
this may be an appealing assumption to jurors, life does not necessarily mirror the assumptions
we make about it. As was discussed in the post-conviction proceedings, lethal injections are not
always peaceful and painless; further, the unavailability of certain anesthetics in recent years has
caused states to experiment with alternative drugs—which may be insufficient to properly
anesthetize the condemned and cause them to remain conscious for an excruciating death. See
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35055 R., pp.1272-73; 41059 R., pp.1834-36, 1841-42, 1850-84; PC Exs.81 & 123.
J. Asking Jurors To Speculate About Post-Mortem Acts In Finding The HAC Aggravator
The State argues because HAC encompasses post-mortem conduct, the prosecutor
properly relied on post-mortem acts in his argument urging jurors to find HAC. For support, the
State cites this Court’s decisions in State v. Wood, 132 Idaho at 103-04, and State v. Leavitt, 121
Idaho 4, 6-7 (1991). In Wood, this Court condoned the district court’s reliance on the defendant’s
post-mortem mutilation and sexual abuse of the victim’s body to find Utter Disregard, not HAC.
132 Idaho at 103-04. This Court observed the sentencing judge “properly considered additional
evidence to support its finding of the [Utter Disregard] aggravator.” Id. Based on this Court’s
opinion and analysis of the relevance of post-mortem conduct to the Utter Disregard finding, it
seems clear that the post-mortem conduct was the “additional evidence” the district court relied
on  to  find  Utter  Disregard  and  it  was  not  relied  upon  for  HAC.  Thus,  the  State’s  reliance  on
Wood is misplaced.
In Leavitt, 121 Idaho at 6-7, this Court affirmed the district court’s finding of the HAC
aggravator based on specific facts: the defendant’s infliction of multiple knife wounds on the
victim, several of which could have caused her death and several of which appeared to be
defensive wounds; and “as part of the death dealing attack or as a grisly aftermath, there was an
anal cutting and removal of certain sexual organs from the nude body of the victim.” Id. To the
extent Leavitt suggests  post-mortem  acts  can  be  relied  upon  to  support  HAC,  such  an
interpretation is incorrect and irreconcilable with both HAC’s plain language and this Court’s
limiting constructions.56 The State cannot both rely on this Court’s HAC limiting constructions
to withstand a vagueness challenge, and disregard them as mere suggestions when they do not
56Mr. Hall maintains the limiting constructions are insufficient to save HAC from a vagueness
challenge. See Section XII, supra; App. Br., pp.51-54.
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support its arguments. Where this Court’s limiting constructions are the only things saving HAC
from unconstitutional vagueness, these constructions must be scrupulously honored.
XXV. Because Mr. Hall’s Convictions For Kidnapping And Rape Merged With His Conviction
For Felony-Murder, The Sentences For The Lesser Offenses Violated Double Jeopardy
The  State’s  response  assumes  Idaho  applies  only  a  statutory  theory  and  not  a  pleading
theory to determine whether a crime is a lesser-included offense of another. Resp. Br., pp. 143-
44. The State argues that even assuming the pleading theory applies, it is premised only on the
Idaho Constitution, to which fundamental error analysis does not clearly apply. Resp. Br., p.144.
The State’s arguments lack merit because this Court has applied both the statutory and pleading
theories to determine whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another, for both state
and federal double-jeopardy purposes. See, e.g., State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527-29 (2011);
Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 211-12 (1986); State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 433-44 (1980).
Here, the issue is whether Mr. Hall’s rape and kidnapping convictions and sentences can
stand where Mr. Hall has been convicted and sentenced to die for felony-murder committed by
means of the same rape and kidnapping. Mr. Hall  concedes the district  court  had the power to
sentence him for felony-murder, but maintains that his sentences for the lesser-included offenses
of rape and kidnapping merge with his felony-murder sentence. In Sivak,  this  Court  held  that
where an offense is alleged in the information as a means or element of the commission of the
higher offense, it is included and must merge with the greater. 112 Idaho at 211-12. Applying
this test to the facts in Sivak, this Court held the defendant’s conviction for felony-murder by
way of robbery merged with his robbery conviction, requiring the robbery conviction to be
vacated. Id. at 213. Similarly, in State v. Pizzuto, the defendant was charged with and convicted
of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of
robbery and one count of grand theft, in connection with the deaths of two people. 119 Idaho
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742, 756 (1991). This Court held that even though the two murders were premeditated, deliberate
and willful, and committed during the course of a robbery, robbery was a lesser included offense
of felony-murder and merged with that conviction. Id. at 757-58.
In  passing,  the  State  relies  on State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 841 (2013), for the
proposition that “when a jury finds a defendant guilty of both felony-murder and premeditated
murder, the resulting sentence [for the underlying felony] does not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause.” Resp. Br., p.173. The State’s characterization of McKinney is inaccurate. In McKinney,
this Court allowed the defendant’s sentences for premeditated murder and robbery to stand
because they “each require proof of separate elements.” McKinney,  153  Idaho  at  841.  In  that
case, the defendant was convicted of robbery and first degree murder, premised on both felony
and premeditated murder for a single killing. Id. at 839-40. After his death sentence was vacated
by a federal court, the defendant entered a sentencing agreement pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule
11 and “consented to a sentence of fixed life without possibility of parole for first degree
murder.” Id. at 839. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion arguing his sentences were illegal.
Specifically, he claimed his fixed life sentence for first degree felony murder was illegal on
double jeopardy grounds because he had already been sentenced for the lesser-included offense
of robbery. Id. at 839-40.
In evaluating the contractual nature of the Rule 11 agreement, this Court noted it was
silent as to the felony-murder/premeditated-murder distinction, but held it “defied belief that the
State would gratuitously absolve McKinney of serving any sentence whatsoever for premeditated
murder.” Id. at 841 n.7. As a result, this Court concluded the defendant’s premeditated murder
and robbery convictions and sentences were not lesser included offenses of each other and would
stand, under both the Rule 11 agreement and double-jeopardy principles. This Court’s decisions
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in Pizzuto and Sivak,  both  of  which  compel  merger  of  Mr.  Hall’s  kidnapping  and  rape
convictions with his felony murder conviction, are unaltered by McKinney.
The State also claims Mr. Hall has suffered no prejudice as a result of the double-
jeopardy violations because his non-capital sentences are consecutive to his death sentence, and
therefore, he will never serve them. Resp. Br., pp.144-45. This is simply wrong. Absent merger,
Mr. Hall will serve fixed life sentences, regardless of any relief he may receive on the murder
conviction and sentence. If his sentences for rape and kidnapping merge with his felony-murder
sentence, and his death sentence is vacated, Mr. Hall may receive a sentence of less than fixed
life because at the time of his offenses, absent a death sentence, first degree murder was
punishable by a minimum fixed ten-year term, up to life. The difference between Mr. Hall
having a sentence where parole is a possibility and a fixed life sentence constitutes prejudice.
ISSUES ON POST-CONVICTION APPEAL
The State incorrectly identifies the standards governing this Court’s review of Mr. Hall’s
summarily dismissed ineffective assistance claims, essentially arguing such claims are virtually
unchallengeable. See Resp. Br., pp.148-50. In so doing, the State improperly conflates the
standards applicable to claims denied after an evidentiary hearing with those governing
Mr. Hall’s claims, which were dismissed without the benefit of such a hearing. Summary
dismissal may only be granted if a petitioner’s evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact
that, if resolved in his favor, would entitle him to relief. Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 383. If a factual
issue is presented, a hearing must be conducted. Id.
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review for this
Court  is  the  same  standard  as  that  used  by  the  district  court  in  ruling  on  the
motion. Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts should be construed
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in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from  the  record  are  to  be  drawn  in  favor  of  the  non-moving  party.  This  Court
exercises free review over questions of law.
Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009) (quoting Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 147
Idaho 67, 69 (2009) (citations omitted)); accord Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 383. In contrast, when this
Court reviews a district court’s denial of post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, the
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the district court’s findings. Abdullah, 158
Idaho at 417.
The State also urges this Court to apply the doubly-deferential review standards for
evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims lifted from two Supreme Court decisions
reviewing cases in federal habeas corpus proceedings: Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 188-
89 (2011) (“We take a highly deferential look at counsel’s performance, through the deferential
lens of § 2254(d) ….” (internal citations and quotations omitted)), and Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (reiterating that Strickland v. Washington and the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)57 standards are highly deferential, and “when the two
apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so ….” (citation omitted)). Pinholster and Richter involved
federal review of ineffective assistance claims under AEDPA, after state  court  review  of  the
same claims deemed them undeserving of relief. Id. On federal review of a state supreme court
decision, the Supreme Court observed “[w]e take a ‘highly deferential’ look at counsel’s
performance, through the ‘deferential lens of § 2254(d) ….’” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 190
(citations omitted). This doubly-deferential standard has no application to this Court’s initial
57Under AEDPA, the federal court shall not grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on a
claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication “resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d).
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review of the district court’s summary dismissal of Mr. Hall’s ineffective assistance claims.
In addition, the State asks this Court to impose an improperly high burden on Mr. Hall to
prove prejudice arising from his counsels’ deficient performance. Specifically, the State argues
Mr. Hall must prove his counsels’ performance was objectively unreasonable and that the
deficiency would have changed the outcome. Resp. Br., p.147. This standard argued by the State
is wrong. “The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id. However, a “defendant need not show that counsel's deficient
conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.” Id. at 693. Indeed, the “reasonable
probability” standard is a less than a preponderance of the evidence:
An ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence of one of the crucial
assurances that the result of the proceeding is reliable, so finality concerns are
somewhat weaker and the appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat
lower. The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the
proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a
preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).
XXVIII. The Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hall’s Claim That Counsel Were
Ineffective For Failing To: Conduct An Adequate Voir Dire, Move To Strike Certain Jurors For
Cause, And Use A Peremptory Strike On A Biased Juror
Mr. Hall’s counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately voir dire jurors, and for
failing to move to strike biased, unqualified jurors. Counsels’ deficient voir dire stemmed from a
lack of preparation and ignorance of capital jury selection standards,58 both of which repeatedly
revealed themselves during voir dire through counsels’ failure to move to strike objectively
58Trial counsel had never conducted jury selection in a capital case or presented a mitigation case
to a capital jury. PC Ex. 15, p.108, L.22-p.109, L.16; PC Ex.13, p.80, L.15-p.81, L.6.
73
biased jurors. The State, like the district court,59 mischaracterizes Mr. Hall’s challenges to his
counsels’ voir dire performance  as  limited  only  to  counsels’  failure  to  follow  the  Colorado
Method.60 The  State  argues  counsels’  failure  to  comply  with  the  Colorado  Method  was  not
objectively unreasonable, given that counsels’ use of this method purportedly angered jurors.
Resp. Br., pp.151-52. The State also argues counsel were not deficient for failing to provide the
district court with Supreme Court case law which bars mitigation-impaired jurors—jurors who
cannot give meaningful consideration to mitigation evidence—from serving on a capital jury,
because no such authority exists. Resp. Br., pp.152-53.
While Mr. Hall does not suggest trial counsel must engage in jury selection tactics
designed to alienate jurors, counsel in a capital case must be willing and able to question
potential jurors about their opinions and beliefs regarding the death penalty. Both Idaho and
United States Supreme Court precedent recognize the general importance of voir dire in criminal
cases. A criminal defendant has a constitutional and statutory right to trial before an impartial
jury. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, VIII, XIV; IDAHO CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 13; I.C. §§ 19-1902, -
2019, -2020. The right to a fair and impartial jury is protected by voir dire, through which
potential jurors with actual or implied bias can be identified and removed. See ICR 24.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that great latitude is allowed in the
examination of veniremen upon their voir dire for the purposes of determining
whether there is sufficient ground to challenge the veniremen for statutory cause,
I.C. §§ 19-2017 to 19-2022, or whether it is expedient to challenge them
peremptorily, I.C. §§ 19-2015 and 19-2016.
State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 819-20 (1967) (citations omitted).
59The district court erroneously characterized Mr. Hall’s claim, identifying it as a challenge to
“counsel’s failure to properly implement the Colorado Method.” 41059 R., pp.2277-78.
60The Colorado Method is a manner of selecting a jury, grounded in well-established Supreme
Court case law, which considers only the juror’s views on the death penalty. See Abdullah, 158
Idaho at 524-25 & n.10.
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Moreover, established Supreme Court precedent recognizes the special significance of
capital voir dire and outlines the parameters imposed by the 6th and 14th Amendments to ensure
the impartiality of jurors in capital cases. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992);
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423-24 (1985); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522
(1968). In Morgan, the Supreme Court made it clear the right to an impartial jury includes the
right to conduct adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors:
Were voir dire not available to lay bare the foundation of petitioner’s challenge
for cause against those prospective jurors who would always impose death
following conviction, his right not to be tried by such jurors would be rendered as
nugatory and meaningless as the State’s right, in the absence of questioning, to
strike those who would never do so.
504 U.S. at 733-34. In a capital case, a juror’s assent to general questions about fairness and
impartiality and their willingness to follow the law and the judge’s instructions, is insufficient to
identify bias; instead, exacting and thorough voir dire is necessary to determine whether a juror
can be fair and impartial. Id. at 735-36, 738-39.
Contrary to trial counsels’ belief—and now the State on appeal—that “the phrase,
‘meaningful consideration to mitigation’ is nowhere to be found in Supreme Court precedent,”
Resp. Br., p.153, n.31, the United States Supreme Court has long recognized jurors’ ability to
meaningfully consider and give effect to mitigation as a predicate to capital jury qualification:
sentencing juries must be able to give meaningful consideration and effect to all
mitigating evidence that might provide a basis for refusing to impose the death
penalty on a particular individual, notwithstanding the severity of his crime or his
potential to commit similar offenses in the future. Three of the five cases decided
on the same day in 1976—Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 …, Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 …, and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 … —identified the
background principles we would apply in later cases to evaluate specific rules
inhibiting the jury's ability to give meaningful effect to such mitigating evidence.
Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007) (emphasis added). There is no
explanation for counsels’ failure to question jurors about their ability to give meaningful
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consideration and effect to mitigating evidence, and no explanation for counsels’ failure to
provide this authority to the district court to support the exclusion of mitigation-impaired jurors
from the jury. Counsels’ failure to undertake a thorough and exacting voir dire of potential jurors
in Mr. Hall’s case, and their failure to move to strike mitigation-impaired jurors was deficient
and unreasonable, as explained in Mr. Hall’s opening brief and is not repeated. See App.  Br.,
pp.140-46. In summarily dismissing this claim, the district court engaged in an unwarranted but
lengthy, fact-intensive analysis, which accorded no deference to Mr. Hall and which failed to
liberally construe inferences in Mr. Hall’s favor. Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 361. Instead, the district
court attributed counsels’ failures in voir dire to reasonable strategies, even though this
attribution finds no support in the record. To the contrary, the record supports a reasonable
inference that counsels’ shortcomings in voir dire and jury selection resulted from inadequate
preparation and ignorance of the law, not strategy. See PC Ex.13, p.77, Ls.13-14, p.79, Ls.20-25,
p.80, Ls.9-14, p.107, L.10-p.108, L.16, p.155, Ls.15-18; PC Ex.15, p.176, Ls.10-14. “An
attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that is fundamental to his case combined with his failure to
perform basic research on that point is a quintessential example of unreasonable performance
under Strickland.” Hinton v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089 (2014).
XXIX.  The Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hall’s Claim That Counsel Were
Ineffective For Eliciting Evidence Of Other Bad Acts
The State claims that because Mr. Hall has acknowledged that similar questioning of a
witness under different facts may not constitute deficient performance, 41059 R., p.1347, he has
somehow “conceded” there was no deficient performance in this case. Resp. Br., p.160. This
ignores the reality that each case has to be judged on its own facts. Here, counsel’s performance
was deficient because when he asked the question that elicited the prejudicial testimony, he knew
or should have known what the answer was going to be, and he should have recognized the
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danger in asking that question. Indeed, Mr. Hall pointed out the uniqueness of this case: “Trial
counsel knew that Mr. Hall was charged in another rape-murder [in the Hanlon case], and should
have known that the second box [containing a second saliva swab from Mr. Hall] would have
been used for evidence against Mr. Hall in that case.” 41059 R., p.1347.
The State also argues that counsel’s subsequent admission of his mistake should be
ignored. See Resp. Br., p.160. While counsel’s after-the-fact assessment of his own performance
is by no means dispositive, his testimony is highly probative. For example, it will indicate
whether there was a strategic basis for his act or omission. And here, counsel’s testimony that “it
just happened,” and it was a “horrible mistake,” PC Ex.13, p.27, Ls.1-4, suggests he did not think
through his question in advance and did not have a strategic reason for asking it.
XXX. The Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hall’s Claim That Counsel Were
Ineffective For Failing To Consult A Forensic Pathologist
The State’s primary argument is that counsel were not ineffective for failing to
investigate the pathology evidence so long as they knowingly chose not to investigate that
evidence. Resp. Br., pp.161-62 (relying upon Richter, supra). This argument fundamentally
misconstrues the applicable standard. Under Strickland, “strategic choices made after thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable ….” 466
U.S. at 690 (emphasis added). Thus, before the State may hide behind the strategic decisions of
counsel, counsel must have first engaged in an appropriate investigation.
[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the
limitations  on  investigation.  .  .  .  counsel  has  a  duty  to  make  reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary.
Id. at 690-91; accord Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521-23 (2003) (examining whether the
investigation supporting counsel’s decision was itself reasonable.). Here, counsel chose to cross-
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examine Dr. Groben without first investigating the appropriateness of his actions or the
soundness of his opinions. Thus, when counsel made that decision, they had an insufficient basis
to do so under Strickland and its progeny.61
Next, the State attempts to argue that counsel’s cross-examination of Dr. Groben was
somehow an adequate substitute for use of a defense expert in forensic pathology. Resp. Br.,
pp.162-63. The State emphasizes that counsel asked a lot of questions of Dr. Groben and elicited
a concession that he could not be 100% certain of various conclusions. Id.  The  number  of
questions asked by counsel is irrelevant, and the concessions cited by the State are minor, and
did little to challenge the legitimacy of Dr. Groben’s expert opinions. The only thing that could
have undermined his critical opinions was the testimony of a qualified forensic pathologist (such
as Dr.  Aiken),  who, imbued with the aura of her own expertise,  could have directly challenged
Dr. Groben’s fanciful “hogtied” theory—either by persuading the court that it was too
speculative to be admitted in the first instance or by persuading the jurors to give it little weight.
An expert  like  Dr.  Aiken  could  have  testified  that  Dr.  Groben’s  testimony was  not  based  on  a
reasonable degree of medical probability. App. Br., pp.149-50 (citing PC Ex.46).
Next, the State argues that Dr. Aiken’s disagreements with Dr. Groben’s testimony would
not have affected the outcome. Resp. Br., p.163. It claims her attack on the “hogtied” testimony
and re-enactment evidence would have made no difference because that evidence was properly
admitted and because Dr. Groben conceded his opinion was “not … definitive.” See id.
However, the State’s arguments at the time the testimony was admitted has no bearing on
61The State’s reliance on Richter is misplaced because that case simply acknowledged that,
because the question is reasonableness, counsel need not engage every conceivable expert in
every case. Nevertheless, counsel’s decisions must be evaluated based on the unique facts of the
case. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 106-10. Again, Richter involved federal review of an ineffective
assistance  claim  under  AEDPA,  after  state  court  review  of  the  same  claims  deemed  them
undeserving of relief, meaning the Court was applying a doubly-deferential standard.
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whether the successful rebuttal of that testimony by the defense may have impacted the verdict.
It does not even impact the question of whether Dr. Groben’s “hogtied” evidence may have been
excluded if the court had additional information, such as a defense pathologist’s testimony
revealing just how speculative and inappropriate Dr. Groben’s theory was. The State also claims
the discrepancy between Dr. Aiken and Dr. Groben’s opinions concerning the manner of death
was “of little value” because Dr. Groben ultimately conceded there were other possible causes of
death. Resp. Br., p.163. However, this argument overlooks the fact that Dr. Groben stuck by his
opinion that Ms. Henneman was strangled with her own shirt. 31528 Tr., p.4069, L.3-p.4071,
L.22. This, in turn, lent credibility to his speculative “hogtied” theory.
Finally, the State complains that Dr. Aiken had an “agenda to discredit [Dr. Groben’s]
work.” Resp. Br., p.164. This allegation of a personal vendetta, however, is without any basis in
the record. In addition, there is no reason why one expert cannot criticize the work of another
without having an improper motive.
XXXI.  The Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hall’s Claim That Counsel Were
Ineffective For Failing To Challenge The State’s DNA Evidence
The State first argues that the defense did have a DNA expert; it asserts “Myshin testified
that a DNA expert was retained [and] assisted in cross-examining the state’s experts even though
the  expert  was  not  in  court  at  the  time  ….” Id., pp.164-65 (emphasis added). While Mr. Hall
concedes his counsel consulted a DNA expert in advance of trial, see PC Ex.95; see also App.
Br., p.153, there is no factual basis for the State to claim that expert assisted in cross-
examination. During his deposition, Mr. Myshin clearly had no memory of any assistance in this
regard. When asked whether the expert assisted his cross-examination preparation, Mr. Myshin
said,  “I guess.” PC Ex. 13, p.205, Ls.5-8 (emphasis added). Additionally, when asked if he
prepared his cross-examination of the State’s experts in advance and wrote things down,
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Mr. Myshin responded, “probably,” but then conceded, “I don’t know.” Id., p.205, Ls.12-29.
The State next argues any failure to more fully utilize a defense expert was a “tactical
decision” immune from challenge. See Resp. Br., pp.165-66. This argument suffers from two
flaws. First, the court’s conclusion that counsel’s failure to more fully utilize a defense expert
was a strategic decision was clearly erroneous, see App. Br., pp.154-55, and the State has not
demonstrated otherwise, see Resp. Br., pp.165-66. The State tries to circumvent this error by
claiming the court presumed counsel made a strategic decision. Resp. Br., p.166. However, that
is not true. The court asserted—as fact—that counsel made a tactical decision; there was nothing
in the court’s language that suggested it was discussing a presumption. See 41059 R., p.2309
(“Trial counsel’s decision … was a tactical decision that was not objectively unreasonable ….”).
Second, even if counsel had made a strategic decision, that fact would not be dispositive. The
“relevant question is not whether counsel’s choices were strategic, but whether they were
reasonable.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000). Here, the failure to utilize an
expert at trial was objectively unreasonable for reasons already discussed. See App. Br., p.155.
The State also argues that Mr. Hall cannot rely on a new expert, whose opinions were
first identified in post-conviction proceedings, to establish the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel.
See Resp. Br., pp.165-66. The State is incorrect. In order to survive dismissal, Mr. Hall was
required to present evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact with regard to
whether his counsel’s performance was deficient and, if so, whether he was prejudiced. The
affidavits of Dr. Hampikian do just that—they reveal that a qualified defense expert, if called to
testify, could have made it clear that the State’s expert had minimized the significance of the 13
allele, and that allele indicates, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, there was a second
male contributor to the DNA found in Ms. Henneman’s vagina. This would have undermined the
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State’s theory that if Mr. Hall had sex with Ms. Henneman, he must have also killed her.
The State also argues that Mr. Hall’s claim was properly dismissed because any attempt
to use a defense expert would have been more harmful than helpful. Resp. Br., pp.166-67. The
State reasons that a defense expert would have had to concede Mr. Hall’s DNA was found inside
Ms. Henneman, thereby “confirming Hall was Lynn’s rapist, kidnapper, and murderer.” Id.,
p.167. This does not follow. The relevant question was whether Mr. Hall acted alone, because if
he did not, that information alone would raise a reasonable doubt. The State then argues that a
defense  DNA  expert  would  not  have  changed  the  outcome  of  the  case.  Resp.  Br.,  p.167.  As
noted, if Mr. Hall was not the only assailant, it is impossible to say that he was Ms. Henneman’s
killer. Even if he participated in the killing, it is impossible to say how culpable he was. These
doubts raise a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different.
XXXII. The Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hall’s Claim That Counsel Were
Ineffective For Failing To Adequately Investigate An Alternate-/Co-Perpetrator
The State first posits that because counsel were aware of some of the Hoffert evidence,
recognized it was a “double-edged sword,” and made the strategic decision not to investigate
further, their actions are immune from challenge. Resp. Br., p.170. However, a “reasonable”
investigation is one that is curtailed only if a “reasonable professional judgment[ ] support[s] the
limitation[  ]  ….” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; accord Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521-23. Here, the
decision not to pursue the Hoffert lead was based on incomplete information caused by errors of
the defense team. Counsel stopped pursuing the Hoffert evidence because they felt they could
not link Mr. Hoffert’s suicide to Ms. Henneman’s murder. PC Ex.14, p.411, L.3-p.413, L.19; PC
Ex.15, p.221, L.16-p.22, L.10. However, unknown to counsel at the time, their investigator,
Glenn Elam, did possess such a link. Mr. Elam knew Mr. Hoffert said “something about raping
some girl” shortly before he killed himself, PC Ex.38, p.8, Ls.13-21, p.21, Ls.14-20, but that
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critical evidence was apparently never shared with counsel, PC Ex.14, p.413, L.20-p.414, L.9;
PC Ex.15, p.219, L.4-p.220, L.2; see also PC Ex.13, p.72, Ls.17-23. Thus, the decision not to use
the Hoffert evidence at trial was itself based on inadequate preparation.
The State makes no attempt to defend the court’s ruling that the Hoffert evidence would
have been inadmissible hearsay. See Resp. Br., p.170 & n.36. Rather, it simply argues the
Hoffert evidence was not relevant. See id. at 170-71. It reasons that because Mr. Hoffert’s
statement about “raping some girl” was not as explicit as it could have been, i.e., it did not
identify Ms. Henneman nor did it specifically say the rape occurred the previous day, it was
somehow irrelevant. Id. This argument misapplies the meaning of “relevance.”62 Evidence is
relevant  if  it  has  “any tendency to make the existence of any fact  that  is  of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” IRE 401 (emphasis added). This standard is a liberal one. Any evidence which raises
an inference with regard to a fact of consequence is relevant. See State v. Rocha, 157 Idaho 246,
251 (Ct. App. 2014); see, e.g., State v. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446, 449 (1973). And under the
facts of this case—where Mr. Hoffert was seen with Ms. Henneman shortly before her
disappearance, claimed to have seen to it that she made it back to her hotel, and killed himself
the very next day—his comment about raping a girl, made shortly before committing suicide,
raises the very reasonable inference that he was involved in the rape the previous day, and that
his suicide was indicative of a guilty conscience.
Finally, the State argues that had the Hoffert evidence been fully uncovered and
62The State’s argument relies upon a case cited as “State v. Lynch, 135 Idaho 55, 530-31 [sic]
(Ct. App. 2001),” Resp. Br., p.171; presumably, the State meant to refer to State v. Leach, 135
Idaho 525 (Ct. App. 2001). Leach does not support the State’s argument. There, the Court of
Appeals questioned the admissibility and relevance of a conclusory statement in an affidavit
because that statement was an attempt to assert as fact the state of mind of another. Id. at 530-31.
Here, in contrast, no one would testify as to what Mr. Hoffert was thinking, only what he said.
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presented, it would not have made a difference in the case. Resp. Br., p.171. The State reasons
that even if they heard all of the Hoffert evidence, the jury simply would not have believed it. Id.
The question is simply whether there is a “reasonable probability” that the failure to present the
Hoffert evidence affected the outcome. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). Given
the State’s burden of proving guilt, as well as the aggravators, all beyond a reasonable doubt, and
the weighing process dictated by I.C. § 19-2515, it cannot be said that there is no reasonable
probability that raising an inference of a second assailant would not have changed the outcome.
XXXIII.  The Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hall’s Claim That His Constitutional
Rights Were Violated When He Was Noticeably Shackled
The  State  first  tries  to  invoke  a  procedural  bar  under  the  UPCPA.  It  argues  Mr.  Hall’s
claim  was  correctly  dismissed  because  it  was  not  a  proper  post-conviction  claim  and  must  be
raised on direct appeal. Resp. Br., p.173. As authority, the State relies upon Shackelford v. State,
160 Idaho 317, 372 P.3d 372 (2016). However, Shackelford was not a capital case and, thus, was
based solely on the UPCPA. See 372 P.3d at 377. Even assuming the State correctly construes
the UPCPA,63 because this is a capital case, the more specific capital post-conviction statute, I.C.
§ 19-2719, controls over the UPCPA. See Fields v. State, 155 Idaho 532, 534-35 (2013). Under
section 19-2719, someone sentenced to death “must file any legal or factual challenge to the
sentence or conviction that is known or reasonably should be known” within 42 days of entry of
judgment, I.C. § 19-2719(3), and his failure to do so “waive[s] such claims as were known, or
63Mr. Hall does not concede the State correctly construes and applies the relevant portion of the
UPCPA. Under the UPCPA, “[a]ny issue which could have raised on [direct] appeal, but was
not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings ….” I.C. § 19-4901(b)
(emphasis added). Mr. Hall’s claim regarding his noticeable shackling could not have been
raised as part of his direct appeal because the direct appeal record does not contain evidence
sufficient to assert that claim. Specifically, because trial counsel failed to object to the shackling,
see Section XXXIV, infra; App. Br., pp.168-70, and because the district court failed to make the
appropriate findings before allowing Mr. Hall to be shackled, see App. Br., p.167 & n.72, the
direct appeal record contains only a vague description of the restraints used, see 31528 Tr.,
p.592, Ls.2-16, and virtually no evidence as to how obvious those restraints were to the jury.
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reasonably should have been known,” I.C. § 19-2719(5). Under Idaho’s capital post-conviction
scheme, there is no prohibition against raising claims that theoretically could be pursued on
direct appeal. Further, the forfeiture language of the UPCPA would make no sense if applied in
the capital context. Under section 19-2719, post-conviction proceedings occur before the direct
appeal is even required to be filed. I.C. § 19-2719(1), (2) & (6). It would be illogical to say that a
claim that “could have been raised” in a proceeding that has not yet occurred is forfeited by
virtue of its not having been raised in that very same proceeding.
The  State  argues  Mr.  Hall’s  claim  was  correctly  dismissed  because  the  only  evidence
suggesting the restraints were noticeable appears in Mr. Hall’s affidavit, where he averred the leg
brace made a clicking noise when he stood up. Resp. Br., p.174. It argues, “there is no evidence
establishing any juror, or anyone else for that matter, actually heard any noise, let alone a noise
that could be associated with the leg brace.” Id.  Insofar  as  the  State  suggests  Mr.  Hall  cannot
prevail in the absence of evidence of what the individual jurors actually heard, its argument
should be rejected. As the State well knows, Mr. Hall was not permitted to contact the jurors in
his case, see Hall v. State, 151 Idaho 42 (2011), and, even if he had been, he would have been
limited in his ability to use their statements in evidence, see IRE 606(b); Payne v. State, 159
Idaho 879, 885 (Ct. App. 2016); see also Roberts v. State, 132 Idaho 494, 496 (1999).
The State attempts to suggest that Mr. Hall’s counsel disputes his allegations. See Resp.
Br., pp.173-74. In doing so, it claims inter alia that co-counsel, D.C. Carr “affirmed the brace did
not  make  any  noises.”  Resp.  Br.,  p.174.  However,  the  State  neglects  to  mention  that  while
Mr. Carr twice said the brace was silent, Ex.15, p.199, Ls.7-9; Ex.16, p.307, Ls.2-6, he later
conceded he suffered from hearing loss, such that if the brace did make a noise he would not
have heard it. Ex.16, p.307, Ls.5-13. Even if the State’s characterization of the facts were
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correct, it would have succeeded only in highlighting a genuine issue of material fact
necessitating a hearing. See I.C. § 19-4906(c).
Finally, the State argues Mr. Hall’s claim was correctly dismissed because he “failed to
explain how any alleged error was not harmless.” Resp. Br., pp.174-75. However, Mr. Hall has
no obligation to prove prejudice. In Deck v. Missouri,  the  Supreme  Court  held  that,  absent
adequate justification and findings relating to the specific circumstances of the case, noticeable
restraints are inherently prejudicial. 544 U.S. at 635.
XXXIV. The Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hall’s Claim That Counsel Were
Ineffective For Failing To Object To His Noticeable Shackling
On appeal, Mr. Hall has argued the district court’s dismissal based on his claim being
vaguely drafted was improper because he had no prior notice of this reason for dismissal, and
because his claim was, in fact, sufficiently clear. App. Br., p.169. The State does not respond to
the latter argument, apparently conceding that Mr. Hall’s claim was, in fact, sufficiently clear.
See Resp. Br., p.175. However, in a footnote, the State argues Mr. Hall’s notice argument should
fail because: (1) pursuant to Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517 (2010), he cannot challenge the
adequacy of the notice he received; and (2) “the necessity of giving prior notice of a reason for
dismissal in a capital case is exceptionally questionable” in light of I.C. § 19-2719(11). Both of
the State’s arguments turn on its misreading of the authorities relied upon. First, while Mr. Hall
cannot challenge the sufficiency of the court’s notice for the first time on appeal, he can
challenge a complete lack of notice, see Kelly, 149 Idaho at 521-22, and here Mr. Hall’s
argument is that he did not receive any notice of this reason for dismissal.  Second, the State is
incorrect to rely on section 19-2719(11) because, although it contains language which, if read in
isolation,  would  seem helpful  to  the  State  (“Such  [dismissal]  order  shall  not  be  subject  to  any
requirement for the giving of notice of the court's intent to dismiss.”), that language appears in a
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portion of the statute pertaining to successive petitions for post-conviction relief. Since
Mr. Hall’s petition is not successive, subsection 11 does not apply.
Turning to the merits, the State argues Mr. Hall’s counsel could not be ineffective for
failing to object to his noticeable shackling because any such motion would have been overruled.
Resp. Br., p.175. It reasons that the court made findings that special circumstances existed to
support the shackling, and those findings (there were allegations of kidnapping, rape, and murder
in  this  case;  Mr.  Hall  was  a  suspect  in  the  Hanlon  case;  and  Mr.  Hall  had  a  criminal  record)
meant there was no reasonable possibility Mr. Hall could have remained unshackled. Id. First,
the specific findings presently relied upon by the State were made many years later, during the
post-conviction case. See 41059 R., p.2317. Thus, they were a post hoc justification and carry
little weight. Second, to say that shackling was inevitable is to overlook the controlling standard
of Deck. In Deck, the Court held “courts cannot routinely place defendants in shackles or other
physical restraints visible to the jury during the penalty phase of a capital proceeding.” 544 U.S.
at 633. Since capital sentencings will only involve individuals convicted of murders (and should
only involve individuals convicted of the most heinous murders), and there can be no routine
shackling of such defendants, clearly there is more to consider than just the brutal nature of the
crime. As already detailed, the totality of the circumstances did not justify noticeable shackles in
this case. See App. Br., p.170 n.73.
XXXVII. The Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hall’s Claim That Counsel Were
Ineffective For Failing To Adequately Investigate And Present Evidence Of Mr. Hall’s
Neurological Damage
The State appears to argue this issue as though Mr. Hall had received the benefit of an
evidentiary hearing, rather than having his petition summarily dismissed. Ignoring that the
standard of review requires the facts and inferences be drawn in Mr. Hall’s favor, the State
argues at length about conflicting evidence that could contravene Mr. Hall’s assertions. See
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Resp. Br., pp.181-89. Based on what has been submitted by Mr. Hall, he has demonstrated a
genuine issue of material fact which making summary dismissal inappropriate.
A. Trial Counsels’ Failure To Adequately Investigate And Present Readily Available
Evidence Of Mr. Hall’s Neurological Damage Was Objectively Unreasonable
To perform effectively in the penalty phase of a capital case, competent counsel must
investigate, present, and explain “the significance of all the available [mitigating] evidence.”
Williams v. Taylor,  529  U.S.  at  399.  Counsel  act  outside  of  the  bounds  of  reasonableness,  and
thereby tender deficient performance, when they are aware of potential mitigating evidence, but
fail to investigate it. Williams, 529 U.S. at 362; Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 943-945 (9th Cir.
2008). Particular instances in a defendant’s history that indicate a brain injury may be present
can give rise to the duty on the part of counsel to investigate further, and have been found to be
the basis of a finding of deficient performance. Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 950-51 (2010);
Correll, 539 F.3d at 943-45; see also Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335, 340 (Ga. 2011). Even if
counsel conduct a limited investigation into mitigating evidence, their representation may
nevertheless be deficient if the investigation is unreasonably limited. Correll, 539 F.3d at 943-
945. Such was the case here.
The State relies largely upon statements made by Mr. Hall’s trial counsel to argue their
failure to present readily available evidence of neurological damage was not deficient. The State
cites claims by Mr. Hall’s counsel about seeking to avoid a psychiatric diagnosis as a purported
strategy for not investigating evidence of brain damage. Resp. Br., p.181. But the “relevant
question is not whether counsel’s choices were strategic, but whether they were reasonable.”
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 481. Trial counsel’s reliance on information gleaned from
psychologists in determining not to conduct investigation into potential neurological damage was
objectively unreasonable.
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Neurological testing can show damage to the brain and reveal information that other
psychological, or even neuropsychological, testing cannot. As Dr. Merikangas put it,
“Neuropsychological testing is not a substitute for brain imaging.” PC Ex.3. This is because
neuropsychological tests can only give rise to inferential data about potential damage based on a
limited set of brain functions. Id. In contrast, brain images show conclusively areas of actual
damage to the brain. Id. A critical limitation for non-imaging tests for neuropsychological
damage relates to damage to the frontal lobes—crucial to behavior, impulse control, judgment,
and reasoning. According to Dr. Merikangas, non-imaging tests are inadequate to show
functioning or damage to this area. PC Ex.3. In his expert opinion, no reasonable neurologist
would substitute psychological testing for brain imaging. Id.
Moreover, the State’s claim that trial counsel relied on the assessments of various experts
in deciding whether to investigate is both inaccurate and unavailing. See Resp. Br., p.182. The
State claims counsel’s failure to investigate can be justified through counsel’s consultation with
five experts: Dr. Ward, Dr. Froming, Dr. Gummow, Dr. Pettis, and Dr. Cunningham. Resp. Br.,
p.182. However, trial counsel admitted that, “Gummow, Pettis, and Cunningham were the ones I
actually consulted with. I didn’t do much with Clay Ward or Karen Froming.” PC Ex.14, p.394,
Ls.13-21 (emphasis added). Accordingly, by counsel’s own account, he only consulted three out
of these five experts. And of those three, counsel admitted he had no recollection of
Drs. Cunningham or Pettis ever seeking to dissuade him from conducting brain imaging tests. PC
Ex.13, p.58, Ls.11-13. Trial counsel did, however, admit that this type of evidence—showing
Mr. Hall had damage to critical areas of his brain—would have been helpful to Mr. Hall’s case,
and would not necessarily have contradicted the testimony of Drs. Cunningham and Pettis. Id.,
p.58, L.14-p.59, L.2.
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More importantly, Dr. Cunningham provided an affidavit in support of Mr. Hall’s
petition that underscored the critical nature of brain imaging tests in this case, and counsel’s
deficiency in failing to investigate such tests. PC Ex.11, pp.2-4. This is the same
Dr. Cunningham relied upon by the State in seeking to minimize the importance of this
information. See Resp. Br., p.182. Dr. Cunningham characterized the evidence revealed by
Mr. Hall’s brain scans as, “extraordinarily important” information that was “critically absent
from the information available to [him] at trial,” and said this documentation of Mr. Hall’s brain
function presented a “profoundly important conclusion” that could have been incorporated into
his testimony. PC Ex.11, pp.2-4. By Dr. Cunningham’s account, Mr. Hall’s MRI and PET scans
showing his abnormal brain functioning as an adult would have significantly enhanced the
mitigation evidence presented at sentencing:
Had I had these findings of brain abnormalities in Mr. Hall I would have offered
testimony supporting a nexus between Mr. Hall’s brain dysfunction and his
criminal history and offense conduct.  I  would  have  testified  that  there  is  a
relationship between brain dysfunction and violent offending, particularly in the
face of traumatic experience and substance abuse. I would have cited and
discussed psychological, psychiatric, and neurological literature which identify
that brain damage is present in disproportionately high incidence among violent
offenders.
PC Ex.11, p.3 (emphasis added). The MRI of Mr. Hall’s brain also showed evidence of brain
damage consistent with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD). PC Exs.4 & 11. According to
Dr. Cunningham, “The information available at trial resulted in me suspecting FASD, but I
lacked sufficient confirmatory data to offer this factor to the jury.” PC Ex.11, p.3. Had
Dr. Cunningham had the confirmatory evidence of damage indicative of FASD, he would have
offered this and explained to the jury “both the childhood implications of FASD as well as
FASD-related deficits in impulse control and judgment that persist in adulthood.” Id., pp.3-4.
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A review of the materials provided to trial counsel by Dr. Gummow supports the
conclusion that trial counsel were in possession of evidence that called for further investigation
into brain imaging, and that the failure to do so was objectively unreasonable. These materials
included a synopsis of her preliminary findings after a review of a variety of Mr. Hall’s mental
health, education, and correctional records, as well as information from his family members. PC
Ex.14, p.400, L.17 p.405, L.10; see also PC Ex.14, ex.E. After completing test data analysis,
Dr. Gummow’s very first preliminary finding indicated: “1. Moderate brain damage.” PC Ex.14,
ex.E, p.17051 (emphasis added). In this same document, Dr. Gummow also noted the need to
rule out brain damage due to fetal alcohol exposure. Id. In her records summary, Dr. Gummow
identified several instances of trauma in Mr. Hall’s history that gave rise to the inference that
significant brain damage may have resulted. On one occasion when Mr. Hall was outside with
his step-father and siblings, he fell off a bicycle and was knocked unconscious. Id., ex.E,
p.17104. When Mr. Hall was only five years old, his step-father picked him up by the throat and
threw him across the room for breaking a toy. Id. Mr. Hall lost consciousness as a result of being
slammed to the ground, but was not taken to the hospital. Id., ex.E, pp.17104-05. Mr. Hall
reported that similar incidents happened more than once in his early childhood. Id. Around this
same time frame, Mr. Hall’s mother reported that he would have episodes of blacking out. Id.
There was ample evidence of cognitive and developmental deficits, as well as extensive trauma
in Mr. Hall’s early school years. Id., ex.E, pp.17102-12. Thus, it is clear that the evidence trial
counsel received from Dr. Gummow established the need for brain imaging tests, rather than the
absence thereof. This was not the only source of information that demonstrated this need.
Trial counsel also knew, or reasonably should have known, there was specific evidence—
requiring further investigation—as to whether Mr. Hall had suffered brain damage that would be
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easily revealed by brain imaging tests. Mr. Hall’s family members spoke of severe abuse, such as
his siblings frequently throwing rocks at Mr. Hall, or the multiple black eyes and facial injuries
he had received at his father’s hand. 31528 Tr., p.4998, L.14-p.5004, L.13. This abuse persisted
to the point where one of his siblings used to tease Mr. Hall that, if they shaved his head, “he’d
have all kinds of scars there.” Id., p.4998, Ls.14-23. In addition, there was also evidence that
Mr. Hall’s older brother once delivered a blow to his head that was severe enough to knock
Mr. Hall unconscious. Id., p.5056, Ls.18-25. This particular type of violence was commonplace.
Id., p.5057, Ls.6-17, p.5081, Ls.1-12.
Various other sources also made clear the need for brain imaging. Upon his review of
Mr. Hall’s educational, medical, social, and criminal records, Dr. Merikangas determined that
both neurological and psychological testing were warranted. PC Ex.3. This conclusion was
based, in part, on reports that: Mr. Hall’s mother abused drugs and alcohol, possibly throughout
her pregnancy with Mr. Hall; he suffered from extensive, severe physical abuse throughout his
early life; he had very early signs of an emotional disturbance; he struggled in school and was, at
one point, diagnosed with mild mental retardation; and he began using alcohol and drugs at an
early age. Id.
Finally, counsels’ claim that they were somehow reasonable not to conduct an
investigation because they did not know what that investigation would reveal reflects a core
misunderstanding of their duty to investigate—or, more basically—the very purpose of
investigation. See PC Ex.13, p.56, L.20-p.57, L.7; Resp. Br., pp.182-85. A similar justification
tendered by defense counsel was dismissed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals as one that
simply “does not make sense.” Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 492 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Because
trial counsel does not know what an investigation will reveal is no reason not to conduct the
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investigation. Counsel was obligated to find out the facts, not to guess or assume or suppose
some facts may be adverse.”).
Additionally, counsels’ claim is called into question by other evidence. Mr. Hall’s
mitigation specialist, Rosanne Dapsauski, provided an affidavit in support of his petition where
she repeatedly and specifically disavowed the notion that there was anything inconsistent with
the theory of mitigation used at trial and evidence of actual brain injury as demonstrated by
Mr. Hall’s MRI and PET scans. See PC Ex.10. Ms. Dapsauski also recalled the issue of brain
scans being raised in discussions about mitigation. Id.  What she did not recall was any specific
decision not to conduct such an examination. Id. Her affidavit indicates that the omission of this
evidence was likely the product of oversight, as opposed to a tactical decision.
B. Trial Counsel’s Failure To Present Evidence Of Mr. Hall’s Neurological Damage Was
Prejudicial
Mr. Hall also created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the failure to
investigate neurological damage was prejudicial, particularly in light of Idaho’s capital
sentencing scheme. For jurors charged with determining whether to impose death, Idaho has
adopted a weighing scheme whereby each alleged aggravator—standing alone—has to be
weighed against all the mitigating evidence collectively. I.C. § 19-2515(8)(a)(ii). If even one
juror finds the balance tips in favor of mitigation, a defendant cannot receive the death penalty.
I.C. § 19-2515(7)(b). Therefore, Mr. Hall merely had to show a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether even a single juror reasonably might have struck a different balance in favor of life
had the jury received the mitigating evidence at issue. He did so.
In its argument, the State (as did the district court) seeks to isolate the issue of whether
counsel’s failure to present brain imaging evidence was prejudicial. See Resp. Br., pp.186-89.
This is not the proper standard. When reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for
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the failure to present readily available mitigating evidence in a capital sentencing trial, this Court
examines prejudice in light of the totality of the evidence—“both that adduced at trial, and the
evidence adduced in the [post-conviction] proceeding”—in reweighing it against each
aggravating factor found by the jury. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 397-98. “In assessing
prejudice, we reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of the mitigating
evidence.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534. If, after viewing the whole of the mitigating evidence that
was and could have been presented, there is a reasonable probability that even one juror would
have struck a different balance, prejudice has been shown. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537.
The determination of whether to impose the death penalty is one that, under the 8 th
Amendment, must be rooted in a meaningful review of the culpability of the offender. See, e.g.,
Atkins v Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-321 (2002). The same concerns that motivated the United
States Supreme Court to hold that intellectually disabled defendants are categorically exempt
from capital punishment are also relevant to those defendants with organic brain injury in areas
that are crucial to informed decision making and impulse control. The identified critical areas of
concern are those involving one’s “diminished capacities to understand and process information,
to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical
reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.” Id. These are the very
areas where evidence of Mr. Hall’s brain injury demonstrates he lacks the culpability for which
the death penalty is reserved. See App. Br., pp.177-80.
Contrary to the State’s assertion, other courts have recognized that mitigating evidence of
organic brain damage has an impact on jurors that is of a special quality and character. As noted
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals:
Evidence of organic brain damage is something that we and other courts,
including the Supreme Court, have found to have a powerful mitigating effect….
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And for good reason—the involuntary alteration of brain structures, with its
attendant effects on behavior, tends to diminish moral culpability, altering the
causal relationship between impulse and action.
Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d 817, 860 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hooks v. Workman, 689
F.3d 1148, 1205 (10th Cir. 2012)) (alterations in original). Here, as in Atkins, the same rationale
can be applied, where “[b]ecause of their impairments, they have diminished capacities to
understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions
of others.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. Moreover, this Court has held that easily available mitigation
evidence related to mental health “cannot be ignored,” and has found that the failure to present
such evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel was constitutionally
ineffective. Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 388.
Taken as a whole, evidence of Mr. Hall’s brain damage and abnormalities provides
significant scientifically reliable evidence that would have made a compelling case to the jury
that Mr. Hall has the type of diminished culpability that renders the death penalty fundamentally
unjust. Had even one juror struck a different balance in light of the totality of mitigating
evidence, the result of his proceedings would have been altered in favor of life.
XXXVIII. The Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hall’s Claim That Counsel Were
Ineffective For Failing To Adequately Investigate And Present Mitigating Evidence
Although  the  State  relies  on State v. Abdullah, the petitioner in that case received the
benefit of an evidentiary hearing on his claims; therefore the Court applied a more deferential
standard of review when assessing the trial court’s denial of relief. In order to survive summary
dismissal, Mr. Hall merely had to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his counsel
tendered deficient performance and whether he was prejudiced as a result. Dunlap, 155 Idaho at
361. In conducting this review, this Court liberally construes the facts, and draws reasonable
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inferences, in favor of the petitioner. Id.
Additionally, the State overlooks the individualized nature of this Court’s review under
Strickland. The State cites an excerpt from this Court’s decision in State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303,
313 (1998), but substitutes Mr. Hall’s name for Ms. Row’s regarding this Court’s holding
denying Ms. Row relief. See Resp. Br., p.179. But the reasonableness of counsel’s actions can
only be determined under the facts present in this particular case. The Strickland test “of
necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at
391. To the extent that the State’s articulation of this Court’s holding in Row merely substitutes
Mr. Hall’s name for Ms. Row’s as though these two cases were interchangeable, the State
misstates the proper standard of review of this Court.
Further, Row was decided prior to seminal United States Supreme Court decisions that
delineate capital defense counsel’s duty to investigate mitigation: Williams, Wiggins, and
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005). Unlike Row, these cases focused not on the actions
taken and evidence that counsel chose to present, but rather on the reasonableness of counsel’s
failure to uncover and present additional mitigation evidence that was readily identifiable and
available. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 395; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522; Rompilla, 545 U.S. at
385-89. Even when trial counsel pursues an alternate mitigation strategy, such a decision is
unreasonable if undertaken without a “thorough investigation of the defendant’s background,”
and the decision not to present readily available mitigating evidence must itself be reasonable.
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522-23. These refinements in the law alter the analysis from Row, which
focused instead on what counsel did at the sentencing phase of Ms. Row’s capital case, instead of
looking at the reasonableness of what counsel failed to investigate or present.
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Finally, the State discourages this Court from relying on or considering the standards
vetted and promulgated by the American Bar Association (ABA) as the prevailing professional
norms for evaluating the reasonableness of an attorney’s actions. See Resp. Br., p.180. There is
one glaring problem with the State’s suggestion: the standard relied on by Mr. Hall for this claim
is one that—while originally promulgated by the ABA—has been expressly adopted by the
United States Supreme Court, and is therefore part of the standard attendant to Mr. Hall’s claim.
See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524; see also App. Br., p.182. This standard has also been cited to and
relied upon by this Court. See, e.g., Dunlap,  155  Idaho  at  388.  To  the  extent  the  State  now
appears to be arguing against the application of this standard to Mr. Hall’s claim, the State does
so in contravention of clearly established precedent.
Moreover, the ABA Guidelines have historically been cited as an important resource—or
even the starting place—in the analysis of whether counsel’s performance was reasonable under
prevailing professional norms.64 Refusal  to  consider  the  ABA  Guidelines  as  reflective  of
prevailing professional norms would be contrary to established Idaho and United States Supreme
Court precedent recognizing the Guidelines and related ethical standards as a starting point for
evaluating the reasonableness of counsel’s performance. See, e.g., Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387-89
& ns.6-7; Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524; Williams, 529 U.S. at
396; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 279 (1998); Charboneau, 116
Idaho at 137; State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 424 (1989); State v. Aragon, 114 Idaho 758, 761
(1988).
64The  State,  relying  on State. v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 782 (1997), claims this Court has
declined to adopt the ABA Guidelines generally. Resp. Br., p.180. The State’s reliance on Porter
for this generalization is incorrect. Porter only rejected adoption of the ABA Guideline which
provides for the assignment of two defense attorneys when death is sought. 130 Idaho at 772. By
the following year, Idaho adopted the two lawyer requirement. See ICR 44.3(2)(a).
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A. Traumatic Childhood
Although the State admits that some evidence was presented attesting to Mr. Hall’s
“abysmal childhood,” Resp. Br., p.190, it fails to acknowledge that trial counsel barely scratched
the surface of the volumes of information that was readily available regarding the extent of the
abuse—even torture—that Mr. Hall endured in his most tender years. This volume of
information was readily available had counsel engaged in a reasonable investigation.
Counsel could have discovered that the violence pervading the Hall home was the
product of generations of abuse reaching back into both sides of Mr. Hall’s family tree.
Mr. Hall’s father was the product of an abusive home. PC Ex.6. Jean Hall was likewise raised in
a verbally and physically abusive home that held out virtually no love or affection for the
children. Id. As with her own children, Jean Hall was also sexually abused—at the hands of her
uncle. Id. The jury never learned this, or that this same uncle later attempted to sexually abuse
Mr.  Hall  and  his  brother.  PC  Ex.20.  The  jury  was  also  never  told  that  Mr.  Hall’s  mother  was
using amphetamines during her pregnancy with him, she drank during her pregnancies, and
Mr. Hall was born prematurely. PC Exs.6, 20.
While there was a general description of the violence that occurred within and among the
family members when Mr. Hall was growing up, the jury only received a sliver of the
information available. What passed for “games” among the children in the cramped home was
brutal, and likely would have inspired the compassion and mercy of the jury. For example, one
of Mr. Hall’s cousins recalled a game the children would play, whereby the older children would
convince Mr. Hall to climb a tree and then they would set the tree on fire. PC Ex.9, p.2. He also
recalled  the  boys  would  shoot  each  other  with  BB  guns,  and  they  would  give  Mr.  Hall  an
unloaded gun so he was unable to defend himself. Id., p.3. Multiple family members also
reported going to a nearby rock quarry and throwing rocks at Mr. Hall. Id.; PC Ex.20. On several
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occasions, Mr. Hall’s brother and cousin tied him up and dragged him behind a tractor. PC Ex.9,
p.3. Sometimes during these episodes of “play,” Mr. Hall hit his head and apparently lost
consciousness. See id. He also received other head injuries as a child. These included falling out
of the back of a pickup truck and off a hay trailer. Id.
Even with regard to the testimony of the few witnesses that were presented in the anemic
mitigation case at Mr. Hall’s trial, there were critical pieces of information that counsel should
have elicited. This included the fact that Mr. Hall was abused by his father in utero. According to
his sister, Deanna Hormann, during his mother’s pregnancy with Mr. Hall, his father would hit or
kick his mother in the stomach based on his father’s belief that  Mr. Hall  was not his child.  PC
Ex.5. This was in addition to the drug abuse that Jean Hall admitted occurred while she was
pregnant with Mr. Hall. PC Ex.6.
Ms. Hormann also saw signs of maladaptive behavior from the time that Mr. Hall was
little, and she believes Mr. Hall had some form of “imbalance”—apparent to her from an early
age—and  that  Mr.  Hall  was  on  the  receiving  end  of  the  majority  of  the  physical  abuse  in  the
household. PC Ex.5. After years of unrelenting abuse, Mr. Hall eventually came to have episodes
of unprovoked rage as a teenager, but would have no memory or recall of these episodes after his
mental storm had passed. Id. Despite these episodes, Ms. Hormann also could have relayed to the
jury Mr. Hall’s strong, innate protective instinct. Had she been asked about Mr. Hall’s
compassionate side, the jury could have learned that Mr. Hall kept his little sister “safe and
protected” from the violence of their  family home, that  she never felt  Mr.  Hall  was a threat  to
her, and that he was a model big brother. Id.
Had counsel asked more questions of Cookie Quirk, Mr. Hall’s juvenile probation
officer, the jury would also have received a much richer picture of her observations of Mr. Hall
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and his home life during the five years she knew him. Ms. Quirk could have told the jury about
what she saw during her periodic unannounced home visits: a home devoid of all the normal
mementos of family life, without pictures of the family, or signs of the children who lived there,
like toys or drawings stuck to the refrigerator. PC Ex.29. What she did see during her visits with
Mr. Hall was a child who wore the exact same clothes every time she saw him. Id. He was often
dirty. Mr. Hall would tell her about having to steal food and he had visibly lost weight. Id. Based
on her training, and her experiences with Mr. Hall, he seemed to be a boy who had been
abandoned to the streets for quite some time. Id.
B. Circumstances Surrounding Mr. Hall’s Placement In Foster Care
With regard to the failure to investigate Mr. Hall’s years in foster care, the State relies
primarily on an assertion (unsupported by any citation to the record) that the nearly non-existent
efforts engaged in by counsel were somehow sufficient. Resp. Br., pp.196-97. In doing so, the
State  ignores  the  only  information  on  this  issue  in  the  record—the  affidavit  of  Mr.  Hall’s
mitigation specialist. Ms. Dapsauski attested to the inadequacy of the investigation into
Mr. Hall’s time in foster care. In her words, “We should have conducted a greater investigation
of Erick’s foster parents. I conducted little investigation in that regard.” PC Ex.10 (emphasis
added). She also acknowledged she made no attempt to contact Linda McQuery, one of
Mr. Hall’s foster parents, despite having information from Mr. Hall about the sexual abuse that
occurred within the McQuery home. Id.  Ms.  Dapsauski  could  recall  no  reason  why Mr.  Hall’s
counsel failed to follow up on this lead. Id. The State’s argument is contrary to the record and to
this Court’s standard of review upon summary dismissal.
Jeff Langston was likewise never contacted by the defense. Mr. Langston lived with
Mr. Hall for a time in Ms. McQuery’s home. He noticed Mr. Hall had issues with hygiene, would
constantly wear the same clothes,  and would seem to hide away and hoard any new clothes he
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received.  PC  Ex.26.  Mr.  Langston  also  could  have  told  the  jury  of  the  severe  and  frequent
headaches that Mr. Hall suffered, as well as Mr. Hall’s reports of hearing voices, agitated
behavior, and irrational belief systems that he observed. Id. Additionally, Mr. Langston could
have informed the jury of his own experience of sexual abuse within the McQuery home. Id.
One  of  the  very  few  safe  harbors  in  Mr.  Hall’s  childhood  was  the  foster  home  of
Sophronia  and  Harry  Selby.  When  Mr.  Hall  was  first  dropped  off  at  the  Selby  home,  he  had
absolutely no belongings of his own—just the clothes on his back. PC Exs.27 & 28. Despite the
availability of clean clothing—a whole closet to choose from—Mr. Hall seemed to cling
desperately to his clothing. Id. It took the Selbys almost a week to convince Mr. Hall that it was
safe to change his clothes. Id. Mr. Hall also seemed reluctant to shower. The Selby family could
only convince him to do so a couple of times per week. Id. Ms. Selby had fostered many children
throughout her years as a foster parent. From her experience, she believed Mr. Hall’s behavior
was  consistent  with  sexual  abuse.  PC  Ex.27.  Mr.  Selby  thought  Mr.  Hall  was  clinging  to  his
threadbare, smelly clothing as some form of protection. PC Ex.28.
The jury never got to hear from the Selby family about the scared, quiet, and insecure
little boy who constantly sought to blend in to his surroundings and avoid notice. PC Exs.27 &
28. They did not hear that Mr. Hall would cling to Mr. Selby, and almost never dared to leave the
Selby home without Mr. Selby by his side. PC Ex.27. None of the jurors were told that it took
nearly four months for Mr. Hall to work up the courage to leave the Selby home without
Mr. Selby. Id. They never got to hear of the Selbys stopping by Mr. Hall’s home to pick up some
familiar clothes or belongings for him, and seeing a place strewn with garbage, both inside and
out.  PC Exs.27 & 28. They never heard that  Mr. Selby saw two little girls—he estimated their
ages as two and four years old—inside this squalor with no apparent adult supervision. Id. Both
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girls were dirty and had uncombed hair. The two year old had only a diaper on. The four year old
was dressed only in her underwear. PC Ex.28. When he asked the four year old where her mother
was, Mr. Selby was told that she was not home. Id. The jury never received this vivid picture of
the chaos and neglect that Mr. Hall struggled to survive, because the Selbys were never
contacted or asked to testify by trial counsel.
All of these stories could have provided the jury with a more complete picture of
Mr. Hall’s humanity, as well as the extreme trauma that followed him even as he sought
temporary reprieve from his family home. But it could have also more fully informed the expert
testimony that was given. As explained by Dr. Cunningham, “Such descriptions provide a
compelling  understanding  of  the  trauma  of  [Mr.  Hall’s]  childhood,  as  well  as  the  resultant
inadequacy and fearfulness that later took expression in his violent offense conduct.” PC Ex.11.
These clear markers of severe trauma and fear could help explain behaviors occurring in adult
life that the jury might otherwise have simply viewed as “volitionally predatory.” Id.
Dr. Cunningham also identified information from Mr. Hall’s life in foster care as having
crucial significance in demonstrating that he suffered from significant psychological dysfunction
in his early to mid-teens. PC Ex.11. The vivid descriptions of Mr. Hall’s lack of basic self-care
and hygiene were indicative of parental deprivation and neglect, as well as “deficient social
development and socialization.” Id. Dr. Cunningham could have also testified about the
molestation in the McQuery home. Mr. Hall told Dr. Cunningham he was molested while he was
supposed to be under Ms. McQuery’s care. PC Ex.11. However, Dr. Cunningham did not discuss
this in his testimony because he lacked corroboration of this relationship. Id. Had he been aware
that Mr. Langston had given similar reports of sexual abuse, he “would have viewed this as
providing important confirmation of perverse sexuality in this setting and inferentially
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supporting of [Mr. Hall’s] reports of also being sexually abused,” and he “would have testified to
these implications at trial had [he] been aware of Mr. Langston’s report.” Id.
C. Good Character As An Adult
Trial counsel also utterly failed to investigate and present evidence of Mr. Hall’s good
character as an adult. The State claims such evidence would have “contradict[ed]” the strategy of
presenting evidence of Mr. Hall’s childhood trauma by showing that he had the capacity for
caring, nurturing, and supportive conduct as an adult. See Resp. Br., pp.198-99. While the
totality of evidence of Mr. Hall’s brutalization at the hands of his family, as well as the evidence
of  head  injury  and  brain  trauma,  helps  to  explain  some of  the  deficits  Mr.  Hall  experienced  in
impulse control, judgment, planning, emotional response, and behavior, these deficits do not
render him incapable of empathy, compassion, or love. The fact that Mr. Hall—despite his own
history of the most extreme abuse and neglect—often sought to care for and protect others only
could have attested to his humanity and his worth as an individual, and would have humanized
him to the jury. But the jury never got to hear about the depths of Mr. Hall’s caring, because trial
counsel never bothered to investigate and present evidence of the positive aspects of Mr. Hall’s
character.
The State relies upon a Ninth Circuit case for the notion that the failure to investigate a
viable theory of mitigating evidence is acceptable, so long as counsel believed they were
investigating the “strongest defense.” See Resp. Br., p.199 (citing Turk v. White, 116 F.3d 1264,
1266-67 (9th Cir. 1997)). The State’s reliance is misplaced for several reasons. First, Turk
concerned a guilt phase trial, see Turk 116 F.3d at 1266-67, not a capital sentencing proceeding
where every bit of mitigation would be placed in the balance against each single aggravator in
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weighing the ultimate penalty.65 Second, Turk involved a decision between competing and totally
incongruous theories of defense. There was a direct contradiction between the theory of self-
defense at trial (which was predicated on acting as a reasonable person would) and pursuit of the
insanity defense (which required proof that the defendant did not know what he was doing).
There is no such contradiction here. Third, Turk was decided in the context of the doubly-
deferential standard of AEDPA review, which is inapposite to this Court’s review of the
summary dismissal of Mr. Hall’s post-conviction petition. Fourth, Turk predates the holdings in
Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, which rejected the notion that pursuit of one mitigation theory
somehow sanctions the failure to conduct reasonable investigation into other theories of
mitigation.
Beginning with the understanding that counsel had a duty to conduct a reasonable
investigation into readily available evidence of mitigation, counsel’s failure to do so regarding
Mr. Hall’s good character as an adult fell below the most basic prevailing professional norms.
For example, Evelyn Dunaway, who testified on behalf of the State at Mr. Hall’s sentencing, was
not contacted by the defense even though she had volumes of information about Mr. Hall’s
caring nature that she could have shared with the jury. The jury received only slivers of
information about the positive side of Mr. Hall’s character through her testimony compared to
what could have been presented.
The jury was told that Mr. Hall tried to help keep Ms. Dunaway off of drugs. 31528 Tr.,
p.4853, Ls.11-12. But trial counsel never investigated or pursued this issue. Had counsel done so,
65Notably, even at the guilt stage, the reach of Turk is limited. The very court which issued Turk
recently rejected a request to extend its holding to cases where counsel failed to investigate other
potentially viable defenses. See Bemore v. Chappell, 788 F.3d 1151, 1162-69 (9th Cir. 2015). It
held the mere fact that counsel selected one defense at trial did not excuse the duty to reasonably
investigate other potential defenses. Id. at 1166-68.
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the jury would have learned of Mr. Hall’s efforts to save Ms. Dunaway from the debilitating
effects of her methamphetamine addiction. The jury never learned, that Mr. Hall was kind and
patient with Ms. Dunaway as he tried to help her kick her drug habit, and made efforts to keep
other drug users away from their home to reduce her temptation to use meth. PC Ex.40, p.2.
Trial counsel elicited testimony that there was another family with small children staying
in their home when the two lived together. 31528 Tr., p.4850, Ls.9-13. But counsel never asked
any questions that would have shown how Mr. Hall stepped into the role of caretaker for these
children. The jury was never told how Mr. Hall took care of one of the young boys, Wesley,
when he was sick with a cough. Mr. Hall would “sit Wesley up to ease his cough, and then …
spoon fe[e]d him some medicine to make him feel better.” PC Ex.40, p.2.
The jury heard about the fights and the eventual drug use that Mr. Hall and Ms. Dunaway
engaged in, but never heard that Mr. Hall would bring Ms. Dunaway flowers almost every day.
Id., p.3. They never heard of how he would help to fix up old bicycles for people who otherwise
would have no transportation, and allowed people into his home who otherwise would have no
place to stay. Id. The jury also never heard of Mr. Hall’s insecurity, his lack of adaptive skills, or
his need for Ms. Dunaway’s near-constant presence. Id. They were not told that Mr. Hall seemed
to lack basic life skills, and struggled with even a rudimentary understanding of managing
money. Id.
This description of Mr. Hall as having limited life skills and low self-esteem, but a strong
ethic of care, could have also been attested to by Wendy Levy and her daughter, Jennifer
Demunbrun.  Ms.  Levy was  a  friend  of  Mr.  Hall.  They  shared  a  common bond as  survivors  of
childhood sexual abuse. PC Ex.2, p.2. During the time they stayed together, Mr. Hall would help
around the house with all of the chores. Id. But he had a particular talent when it came to taking
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care of the children in the home, including Ms. Levy’s special needs daughter. Id. The children
began to refer to Mr. Hall as their “uncle” because of the protection and support he would show
them. Id.; PC Ex.41, p.2. While their mother was at work, he would take the children to the park
to feed the ducks, watch over them vigilantly, and prepare their meals. PC Ex.41, pp.2-3. He
would  take  care  of  the  children  if  they  fell  ill. Id. Mr. Hall never raised his voice or lost his
temper with the children, and never behaved violently toward their family. Id., p.3.
Ms. Demunbrun was the beneficiary of Mr. Hall’s caretaking. Like Ms. Dunaway,
Ms. Demunbrun saw how Mr. Hall used his talent with his hands and mechanical intuition to
rebuild bicycles for the children. Id., p.5. When Ms. Demunbrun eventually had a daughter
herself,  Mr.  Hall  drew pictures of Winnie the Pooh and Tigger for her little girl. Id. He helped
Ms. Demunbrun in her struggle to get off drugs, and was even there for her when she was
occasionally hospitalized for ulcers on her tonsils. Id. During those times, Mr. Hall would visit
Ms. Demunbrun, watched her children for her, and helped her with the painful process of eating,
drinking, and taking her medicine. Id.
Timothy Turley, a friend of Mr. Hall’s for nearly 20 years, also never had the chance to
tell the jury about the positive contributions Mr. Hall made to the lives of those around him.
When Mr. Turley’s pregnant wife went into labor, it was Mr. Hall who drove her to the hospital.
He stayed with her throughout the birth of Mr. Turley’s child while Mr. Turley was taken to a
detox  center  at  Port  of  Hope.  PC  Ex.42.  Mr.  Hall  eventually  became  the  godfather  of  one  of
Mr. Turley’s daughters. Id.
When Mr. Turley was at a nadir in his life, and planning to kill himself, it was Mr. Hall
who intervened. Mr. Hall literally took the gun from Mr. Turley’s mouth and stayed with
Mr. Turley for several hours until he was more emotionally stable. PC Ex.42, p.4. During times
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when Mr. Turley was “drug sick” from heroin, Mr. Hall would sit with him and hold him in his
arms, all the while encouraging Mr. Turley to quit the drugs that were making him ill. Id., pp.4-5.
Mr. Turley also spoke of Mr. Hall giving shelter and food to anyone who needed it. Id., p.4.
Defense counsel spoke to Ms. Demunbrun through their mitigation specialist. PC Ex.41,
p.2. Defense counsel also spoke to Mr. Turley and were aware of the critical information he
could have presented at Mr. Hall’s trial. PC Ex.42, p.2. Though counsel possessed this
compelling mitigation evidence showing the depths of Mr. Hall’s capacity for nurturing and
compassion, they failed to present any of it. Thus, they missed an opportunity to provide a
critical counter-narrative to the State’s claim that Mr. Hall was nothing but a monster.
D. Prejudice
Throughout the State’s response it repeats the claim that this information was merely
cumulative of what was already presented at trial. Resp. Br., pp.189-200. Even a cursory
comparison of the volumes of mitigating evidence that was never developed or discovered, with
the paltry amount of evidence that the jury received, reveals this claim to be false. Moreover, the
crux of the State’s claim is that because trial counsel presented some small measure of mitigating
evidence,  it  is  not  material  to  examine  the  full  weight  of  what  was  omitted  or  ignored.  This
argument is contrary to the weighing process required by Idaho’s capital sentencing scheme,
controlling precedent of the Supreme Court, and the nature of mitigating evidence itself. In
Idaho, a jury weighing whether to impose a death sentence is charged with weighing the
cumulative mitigation from throughout the trial and sentencing against each individual
aggravator. I.C. § 19-2515(3)(b). Given the nature of this process, every piece of information
about a particular defendant that makes him more human or relatable, or provides evidence of
diminished overall culpability, tips that balance toward life. The State’s argument asks this Court
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to overlook the cumulative and substantial weight of the evidence that the jury never had the
chance to consider. This is the opposite of the review that the law requires.
In evaluating prejudice from counsel’s failure to investigate or present readily available
mitigating evidence, the focus of this Court’s review is not on what was presented, but on what
was not. Moreover, this review is cumulative as it relates to mitigating evidence. See Williams,
529 U.S. at 397-98. The cumulative nature of review requires both that: (1) all of the evidence
that could have been presented, but was not, be weighed as a whole against the State’s case in
aggravation, rather than in isolation; and (2) this entirety of the evidence not presented also be
weighed as a whole alongside the mitigation that was presented against the State’s aggravating
evidence. Id. Thus, the proper question for this Court is not whether trial counsel presented
something in the nature of a mitigation case, but whether, in light of the totality of all of the
mitigating evidence that was and should have been presented, confidence in the jury’s verdict
has been undermined.
The omitted evidence would have painted a picture for the jury of a little boy who was
tied up and dragged behind vehicles, pelted with rocks, sexually and physically abused, deprived
of basic life necessities like food and clothing, and left a terrified shell of a child who was afraid
to leave the confines of his foster home without the protective presence of a safe adult. The jury
could have heard from experts about how that trauma leaves scars on a person’s psyche, which
carry through to adulthood and manifest through behavior and emotional development. The jury
could have also learned, despite all of that, Mr. Hall retained a drive to care for and protect
others, particularly the vulnerable. Each piece of evidence, and each humanizing vignette, would
have  weighed  the  scale  further  toward  life.  In  so  doing,  Mr.  Hall  raised  a  genuine  issue  of
material fact as to prejudice.
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XXXIX. The Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hall’s Claim That Counsel Were
Ineffective For Failing To Adequately Investigate The State’s Evidence Regarding Ms. Oliver
The State argues counsel had ample preparation time in response to Mr. Hall’s direct
appeal claim that the Oliver evidence should not have been admitted because the passage of time
and loss of evidence made it impossible for Mr. Hall to adequately defend against the Oliver
allegations.66 Resp.  Br.,  p.96.  Thus,  the  State  suggests  counsels’  deficiencies  led  to  Mr.  Hall’s
inability to adequately defend himself against the Oliver allegations. See id. Now, however, the
State takes the opposite position, arguing counsel were not deficient in failing to more
thoroughly investigate the Oliver case because defense lawyers have “limited time and
resources,” id. at 200-01 (quoting Mahaffey v. Page, 151 F.3d 671, 685 (7th Cir. 1998), vacated
in part, 162 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1998)), and suggesting an attorney’s heavy workload excuses a
failure to properly investigate in a particular case. Besides the obvious fact that the State cannot
have it both ways, the State’s argument fails because it is misleading regarding the proper
standard for evaluating a failure to investigate. When Mahaffey spoke of a defense lawyer’s time
and  resources,  it  did  so  in  the  context  of  explaining  why  the  Constitution  does  not  required  a
“scorch-the-earth” investigation strategy; it requires a “reasonable” investigation strategy.
Mahaffey, 151 F.3d at 685. And a “reasonable” investigation is one that is curtailed only if a
“reasonable professional judgment[ ] support[s] the limitation[ ] ….” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691;
accord Wiggins,  539  U.S.  at  521-23.  If  counsel  simply  lacked  the  time  or  resources  to
investigate, that fact alone does not justify curtailing the investigation. The ABA Guidelines
make it clear that counsel have an obligation to thoroughly and independently investigate issues
relating to the penalty phase of a capital case. See ABA Standard 10.7.A (available at PC Ex.1,
p.77). This includes an obligation to investigate potential aggravation evidence, including prior
66See Section XIX.E, supra; App. Br., pp.85-87.
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convictions. ABA Standard 10.7 cmt. (available at PC Ex.1, p.86), see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at
524 (reiterating that the ABA Guidelines are “guides to determining what is reasonable”
investigation).
The State alternatively argues that since Mr. Myshin later sought to defend his failure to
investigate the Oliver evidence on the basis that he “wasn’t worried about [the Oliver] case”
because it was not similar to this one and it would not be “significant aggravation,” it was a
tactical decision immune from challenge. Resp. Br., p.201 (quoting PC Ex.13, p.19); see also PC
Ex.13, p.274, Ls.15-21. However, to the extent Mr. Myshin truly believed evidence of a prior
forcible rape, including allegations of strangulation, was dissimilar to this case and/or would not
impact the jury’s decision on whether to impose the death penalty, his assessment was
objectively unreasonable. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527 (“In assessing the reasonableness of an
attorney's investigation … a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence already
known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to
investigate further …. Strickland does not establish that a cursory investigation automatically
justifies a tactical decision with respect to sentencing strategy. Rather, a reviewing court must
consider the reasonableness of the investigation said to support that strategy.”). At least a year
before trial, the State put Mr. Hall’s counsel on notice that it intended to argue the Oliver
evidence fit a pattern of behavior—choking women during sex, particularly with their own
clothing. See 31528 R., pp.107-08. The State went so far as to claim the similarities suggested a
modus operandi which would have made the Oliver evidence admissible during the guilt phase
to  show the  identity  of  Ms.  Henneman’s  killer. See generally 31528 R., pp.98-119. And while
the State later withdrew its request to use the Oliver evidence during the guilt phase, it gave
notice of its continuing intent to use it at sentencing. 31528 R., pp.165-66. Thus, counsel was
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aware  that  the  State  would  be  trying  to  use  the  Oliver  evidence  to  portray  Mr.  Hall  as  a
monstrous person, no longer deserving of life. See 31528 R., pp.373, 405. Specifically, counsel
knew the State would argue, as it ultimately did,67 that Mr. Hall should die because his pattern of
sexual violence against women proved the Propensity aggravator. See 31528 R., p.405. Since this
evidence would be relied upon to prove a critical aggravator, counsel should have been prepared
to defend against it. While the Oliver evidence was not actually relevant to the Propensity
aggravator because it did not tend to show that Mr. Hall has a propensity to commit murder, see
Section XIX.A, supra; App. Br., pp.79-80, it did show repeated sexual misconduct, and even
violence, against women, which is itself extraordinarily prejudicial. Effective counsel would
have recognized the aggravating nature of evidence of a prior forcible rape, regardless of
whether it was offered to prove a statutory aggravator. See, e.g., State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 163,
175-77 (1985) (affirming death sentence, in part, based on defendant’s history of raping, beating,
and strangling women), overruled, in part, on other grounds by State v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 721
(1993). Rape is an odious offense, but forcible rape is especially abhorrent. Competent counsel
would have recognized the risk that the jury would impose the death penalty based on nothing
more than a pattern of sexual violence against women.
The State also attempts to downplay the significance of the undiscovered trove of
evidence concerning Ms. Oliver’s mental health problems, arguing the jury would have known
of those problems because: (1) she explained she had been “at Intermountain Hospital, a well-
known in-patient psychiatric hospital”; (2) she testified she had a “chemical imbalance”; and (3)
Mr. Myshin later testified it was obvious to him—primarily when he interviewed her outside the
presence of the jury—that “she was having problems.” Resp. Br., p.202. These arguments are
67See 31528 Tr., p.5456, L.20-p.5457, L.11 (comparing the crimes in arguing Propensity),
p.5507, L.6-p.5509, L.25 (arguing that his violence against women proves Propensity).
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unpersuasive. First, the State simply assumes jurors would have known that Intermountain
Hospital is a psychiatric facility because that fact was never put into evidence; however, that is
not a reasonable assumption. Unless one has had significant contact with the criminal justice
system, worked in the mental health field, or had a close relationship with someone with severe
mental illness, the average person would have absolutely no basis to know that Intermountain
Hospital is a psychiatric institution, as opposed to a “regular” hospital. Second, to say Ms. Oliver
had a “chemical imbalance” is to seriously understate her problems. The phrase “chemical
imbalance”  is  so  ambiguous  as  to  be  unhelpful.  On  the  other  hand,  bipolar  disorder  and
borderline personality disorder are identifiable diagnoses with specific symptoms. Finally,
Mr. Myshin’s testimony as to Ms. Oliver’s fragile state, her “hysteria,” and the fact that “[s]he
was a mess” and “[i]t was obvious to [him] she has mental problems,” during his interview with
her, PC Ex.14, p.329, L.5-p.330, L.8, is unhelpful; he admitted that by the time she took the
witness stand at trial, “she was a little bit better,” id., p.333, Ls.11-12. He did say that when
Ms. Oliver testified, “She looked like she was having a lot of problems”; however, he did not say
she looked like she had mental health problems. Id., p.33, L.13. It could very easily have
appeared that Ms. Oliver was simply upset about trauma inflicted upon her by Mr. Hall. Indeed,
Mr. Myshin acknowledged that even during the interview—when Ms. Oliver was more
hysterical—her symptoms of being mentally ill were that she was “upset,” “confused,”
“pathetic,” “pitiful,” “afraid,” and “afraid to relive the case.” Id., p.329, Ls.5-9, p.388,
L.18-p.389, L.3. These symptoms could easily be taken for trauma (which would tend to suggest
Mr. Hall’s guilt), as opposed to mental illness (which could suggest she was fabricating or
exaggerating her story). Indeed, Mr. Myshin acknowledged that his belief that she was mentally
ill stemmed from his unique perspective (he observed Ms. Oliver during the interview, he was
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exposed to Ms. Oliver when he represented Mr. Hall in the Oliver case in 1991, and he was an
experienced criminal defense lawyer). See id., p.329, L.5-p.330, L.8. Thus, his opinion of
Ms. Oliver’s state cannot necessarily be imputed to the lay jurors.
The State argues counsel’s failure to delve into the substantial delay between the alleged
forcible rape and Ms. Oliver’s disclosures is irrelevant because such delayed disclosures are
common. Resp. Br., p.203. However, even if the State would have been permitted to offer expert
opinion testimony informing the jury that such delayed disclosures are common, that does not
mean the jury would have had to believe the State’s expert and completely discount the
significance of the delay. See State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 22 (1994) (finding no error in
the admission of expert testimony on the phenomenon of delayed disclosure, and making it clear
that it is for the jury to ultimately determine whether the late-disclosed allegations are credible).
Further, had counsel actually investigated the Oliver evidence, they could have presented
evidence that not only was there a significant delay in Ms. Oliver’s reporting, but during the
intervening period she visited friends at a motel where she exhibited behavior seemingly
inconsistent with recently having suffered a brutal forcible rape: “her behavior was flirtatious
and was she [sic] comfortable engaging in physical and sexual behavior with the other
males ….” PC Ex.54, p.2.
The State also argues that Mr. Hall “fails to explain why N.O. would embellish her story
when he admitted to having intercourse” with a minor. Resp. Br., p.203. That is not true.
Mr. Hall has argued Ms. Oliver had a motive to lie because Mr. Hall had previously reported her
as a runaway,68 causing her to be arrested. See App. Br., p.196. If Ms. Oliver wanted retribution,
68The State contends evidence of Ms. Oliver’s runaway status was already before the jury
because Det. Hess testified that Mr. Hall knew she was a runaway, and said he “had run her off.”
Resp. Br., p.203 (quoting 31528 Tr., p.4799, Ls.4-8). However, Det. Hess’ testimony did not
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it would have obviously been far more impactful to allege a violent forcible rape, than to simply
allege a “statutory” rape.69 Alleging forcible rape, as opposed to admitting willing participation
in “statutory” rape also would have allowed Ms. Oliver to avoid responsibility for her own
actions if she feared her abusive father would blame her for having sex with Mr. Hall.
The State also argues about the photos depicting bruises on Ms. Oliver’s body that were
attributed to Mr. Hall. Resp. Br., pp.203-04. The State contends there is no evidence suggesting
those bruises were caused by Ms. Oliver’s father in the time between the alleged rape and its
reporting. Id. The State is correct, to an extent. There is no evidence to suggest Ms. Oliver went
home between the alleged rape and its reporting.70 However,  that  does  not  mean  Mr.  Hall’s
argument fails. The fact remains that, had the defense conducted a proper investigation and
discovered that Ms. Oliver’s father was physically abusive, counsel could have presented this
evidence as an alternate theory for the source of Ms. Oliver’s injuries. See PC Ex.57B, p.34, L.1-
p.37, L.13.
The State also takes issue with Mr. Hall’s contention that effective counsel would have
discovered Ms. Oliver’s arrest history, including evidence of her dishonesty with the police. See
Resp.  Br.,  p.204.  The  State  claims  there  is  no  evidence  to  support  Mr.  Hall’s  contention. Id.
capture the full gravity of the situation. The testimony about Mr. Hall having “run her off” is
ambiguous and certainly does not convey the fact that Mr. Hall, clearly concerned for
Ms. Oliver’s well-being, called the police on December 2, 1991, to report her as a runaway (two
days before the alleged forcible rape), and thus caused her to be arrested that night. See PC
Ex.61, pp.1-2. Because it does not make it clear that Mr. Hall caused Ms. Oliver to be arrested,
the testimony relied upon by the State in no way informed the jury that Ms. Oliver had a reason
to be angry with Mr. Hall and, therefore, had a motive to make a false report.
69Ms. Oliver may not have even understood that, because she was seventeen at the time, Mr. Hall
committed the crime of rape by having sex with her.
70When making this claim originally, see App. Br., p.197, undersigned counsel misinterpreted
the evidence. In early December 1991, Ms. Oliver was arrested as a runaway on two different
occasions just two days apart, both times at the Sands Motel. In preparation of the opening brief,
it appears undersigned counsel mixed up the two arrests. Counsel apologizes for any confusion
this error caused.
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However, Ms. Oliver had many prior adjudications—for running away (three times), joyriding
(twice), battery, and assault. See PC Ex.58. In addition, it appears she was arrested for running
away on at least three other occasions. See PC Exs.60, 61, 62. And during these arrests
Ms. Oliver used at least two different aliases. See PC Exs.60 & 61. So there is ample support for
the contention that counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate Ms. Oliver’s arrest record.
Finally, the State takes issue with Mr. Hall’s representation that, after his trial, one of the
jurors said the Oliver evidence had “the greatest impact on the jury.” Resp. Br., pp.204-05
(quoting App. Br., p.197 (citing PC Ex.87)71). The State assumes Mr. Hall relied on an affidavit
of a juror and, thus, accuses his counsel of engaging in misconduct for procuring such an
affidavit. Resp. Br., pp.204-05. However, the State’s objection is misplaced. Mr. Hall’s
contention is amply supported by a portion of the record obtained properly. He meant to cite
Exhibit 86 of the final amended petition, which consists of copy from a local news outlet’s
coverage of Mr. Hall’s case. See generally PC Ex.86. Included was copy from a December 10,
2006, broadcast which included a quote from a juror who stated Ms. Oliver’s testimony had the
greatest impact on the sentencing verdict. PC Ex.86.72
XLI. The Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Hall’s Brady Claims Regarding
Several Of The State’s Witnesses
The State violated Mr. Hall’s due process rights by suppressing exculpatory evidence,
including impeachment evidence that could have been used to discredit and undermine
Ms. Oliver’s and Ms. Deen’s testimony. Specifically, the State withheld evidence of Ms. Oliver’s
71The citation to exhibit 87 in the opening brief was a typographical error. It should have read,
“PC Ex.86.”
72Having said that, Mr. Hall recognizes he likely could not use the juror’s testimony to prove the
prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness standard. See IRE 606(b); Payne, 159 Idaho at 885; see
also Roberts, 132 Idaho at 496.
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various mental disorders and Ms. Deen’s felony convictions—evidence that could have been
used to undermine the credibility of both witnesses and cast doubt on their testimony.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), holds  that  a  State  violates  a  defendant’s  due
process rights when it suppresses evidence favorable to a defendant, where such evidence is
material either to a defendant’s guilt or punishment. Id. at 87. There are three components to a
Brady violation: (1) the evidence must be favorable to the accused, which includes impeachment
evidence relating to state witnesses; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the state,
either intentionally or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have ensued. Stickler v. Greene, 527
U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).
The State argues that because Jay Rosenthal was no longer employed by Ada County at
the time of Mr. Hall’s trial in this case, his knowledge of exculpatory evidence from the Oliver
case cannot be imputed to the State. Resp. Br., p.224. However, knowledge of exculpatory
information is imputed to prosecutors, even when the evidence is not personally known by the
particular prosecutor, so long as it is known by prosecutorial staff (including fellow prosecutors
in the same office) or government agents investigating a particular case. See, e.g., Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995) (police investigator); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,
154 (1972) (fellow prosecutor); United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149 (3d Cir.1993) (Drug
Enforcement Administration agents); United States v. Morell, 524 F.2d 550, 555 (2d Cir. 1975)
(government agent supervising confidential informant); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480
U.S. 39, 57 (1987) (assuming, sub silentio, that a state prosecutor had constructive knowledge of
information contained in state child services division’s investigative files). Prosecutors are also
constitutionally obligated to look for exculpatory evidence that can be had by a routine
investigation of their own files, or the files of other agencies. See, e.g., Crivins v. Roth, 172 F.3d
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991, 997-98 (7th Cir. 1999); Hollman v. Wilson, 158 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1998); United States
v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 893-95 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Wood, 57 F.3d 733, 737 (9th
Cir. 1995). Thus, Mr. Rosenthal’s knowledge of the Oliver case was imputed to the prosecution
team from the same office in this case.
Moreover, the State seems to suggest that counsels’ failure to independently learn  of
exculpatory impeachment evidence regarding Ms. Deen and Ms. Oliver somehow excuses it
from complying with its constitutional obligations under Brady. Resp. Br., pp.226-28. However,
the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the argument that a prosecutor’s constitutional duties
are excused by a defendant’s (or his counsels’) lack of diligence. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668
(2004). In. Banks, the Supreme Court held:
Our decisions lend no support to the notion that defendants must scavenge for
hints of undisclosed Brady material when the prosecution represents that all such
material has been disclosed. […]
The State here nevertheless urges, in effect, that “the prosecution can lie and
conceal and the prisoner still has the burden to ... discover the evidence,” so long
as the “potential existence” of a prosecutorial misconduct claim might have been
detected. A rule thus declaring “prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek,” is not
tenable in a system constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process.
Id. at 695-98 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Amado v. Gonzalez, 758
F.3d 1119, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2014) (“a prosecutor should not be excused from producing that
which the law requires him to produce, by pointing to that which conceivably could have been
discovered had defense counsel expended the time and money to enlarge his investigations.”).
Because there is no due diligence requirement, the State’s reliance on such an argument to
excuse its failure to comply with its Brady obligations, must be rejected.
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XLIII. The Court Erred In Denying And Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hall’s Claims Alleging
Prosecutorial Misconduct During Sentencing73
The State primarily argues that Mr. Hall’s misconduct claims were inappropriately raised
in post-conviction and it cites a Court of Appeals case—Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696 (Ct. App.
2015)—in support of this proposition. Resp. Br., pp.236-39. However, Bias was decided under
the UPCPA, not Idaho’s capital post-conviction statute. As explained in Section XXXIII, supra,
because this is a capital case, section 19-2719 controls over the UPCPA, and under that section
there is no prohibition against raising claims that theoretically could be pursued on direct appeal.
XLVI. The Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hall’s Claim That Counsel Were
Ineffective Insofar As They Labored Under A Conflict Of Interest Adversely Affecting
Their Performance At Sentencing
The State’s arguments addressing the denial and dismissal of Mr. Hall’s ineffectiveness
claim relating to his counsel’s conflict of interest are unremarkable, see Resp. Br., pp.209-10,
and are adequately addressed in Mr. Hall’s opening brief, see App. Br., pp.220-22. Thus, no
further argument is needed.
However, in response to Mr. Hall’s related direct appeal claim concerning the conflict of
interest, see Section XVIII, supra; App. Br., pp.68-73, the State offers arguments based on
evidence submitted during post-conviction proceedings. See Resp. Br., pp.83. In addressing the
question of whether Mr. Myshin forwent potentially effective cross-examination of
Ms. Sebastian concerning her motive to shade her testimony for the benefit of the State (i.e., her
hope for probation following her rider), the State says there was not “any evidence” that
73The section heading for this claim, along with Claims XLIV, XLV, and XLVIII, in Mr. Hall’s
opening brief omitted the words, “Denying And.” Thus, they read as if his arguments were solely
that the court erred in summarily dismissing these claims. However, the body of his arguments
make it clear that he contends the court not only erred in dismissing these claims, but also that it
erred in failing to grant him relief. See App. Br., pp.214-20, 229-35. In this brief, the section
heading better reflects the argument actually made. Further, because this is an error that occurred
with regard to multiple ineffectiveness claims in Mr. Hall’s opening brief, in each instance it
should be corrected.
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Ms. Sebastian was not a good candidate for probation. Resp. Br., p.84. That is not true. While on
her rider, Ms. Sebastian received a DOR for lying to IDOC staff.74 See 41059 Supp. R., p.979;
PC Ex.111.
The State also cites Mr. Myshin’s deposition, during which he defended his decision to
proceed with his cross-examination of Ms. Sebastian despite the existence of a conflict of
interest. See Resp. Br., p.84. The State suggests Mr. Myshin’s testimony supports the conclusion
that he did not “pull punches” in cross-examining Ms. Sebastian. See id. However, the reality is
that Mr. Myshin’s testimony is of no value. Although he chose to believe he had not performed
unethically or incompetently, Mr. Myshin readily admitted he could not remember the details of
his examination of Ms. Sebastian:
Q. … [T]he petitioners claim that you could have pushed, so to speak, you
could have cross-examined harder on April Sebastian and that you didn’t do that
because of what he claims is a conflict between you and April Sebastian because
you represented her during that period of time. Do you remember your thinking
about  April  Sebastian  and  what  you  thought  you  could  accomplish  by  cross-
examining her differently than you did?
A. I guess the only way I could answer that is in a general way. And that
is,  I  thought  I  was  getting  what  I  needed  out  of  her.  I  think  there  is  a  finesse
element in it where you can come off as a bully …. I don’t know because it’s been
a while since I looked at that transcript, but I thought she was saying things that
were helping us as well.
[….]
Q. Did you not ask her any question or probe any area because you
represented her and you were trying to be nice to her, for her sake I mean?
A. I don’t remember. I don’t think so. I did like her. I still do.
Q. I guess what my question is, did you think that there was information
that she had that you just didn’t ask her about because you liked her?
A. I don’t think I would do that, no.
Q. I mean, was the fact that you represented her and represented Erick
both at the same time, was that a conflict that caused you to not ask her questions
that you could have?
74The DOR occurred on September 24, 2004. PC Ex.111. That was a month before Ms. Sebastian
testified at Mr. Hall’s trial on October 23, 2004. See 31528 Tr., p.4875, L.19-p.4896, L.17. Thus,
it is feasible that Mr. Myshin knew about the DOR when he cross-examined Ms. Sebastian at
Mr. Hall’s trial.
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A. Well, I don’t remember. I don’t think so, but I don’t remember. I don’t
know what that would be other than to try to belittle her.
Q. Did you think —
A. I really try not to let my personal feelings affect the way I perform….
And to sit here now and think about two or three years ago and why I did
something, I just don’t know. I think I told you guys before, my cross-examination
is generally all in my head ….
So that’s why it’s really hard for me now to say, “I had this feeling when I
was doing it or that feeling when I was doing it.” I can’t honestly tell you today
that there was anything I held back about her. I just don’t think I would do that.
But I can’t—honest to God, I just don’t remember.
PC Ex.14, p.385, L.13-p.388, L.5 (emphasis added). And in terms of Mr. Myshin’s assumption
that he would not have acted unprofessionally, his speculative denials of culpability are hollow
because no lawyer would assume he was unethical and/or incompetent and, even if he suspected
he was, he would be unlikely to readily admit as much. After all, he chose to proceed with
Mr. Hall’s case knowing he concurrently represented two clients with adverse interests,
suspecting that this concurrent representation was unethical. See 31528 Tr., p.4871, Ls.22-25.
XLVII. The Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hall’s Claim That Counsel Were
Ineffective For Failing To Adequately Challenge Admission Of The Oliver Evidence
The  State’s  arguments  addressing  the  dismissal  of  Mr.  Hall’s  ineffectiveness  claim
relating to his counsel’s failure to make fuller objections to the Oliver evidence are unremarkable
as to subclaims A through D and are adequately addressed in Mr. Hall’s opening brief. However,
the State’s response regarding subclaim E warrants a response.
In  subclaim  E,  Mr.  Hall  argues  that,  “[a]ssuming arguendo the Oliver evidence was
generally admissible … it was error to have admitted certain of its specifics,” i.e., the assessment
of the prosecutor from the 1991 Oliver case as to the strength of a forcible rape charge, and that
counsel should have objected to that testimony as prosecutorial misconduct. App. Br., pp.226-29.
In response, the State argues the prosecutor’s opinion testimony about the strength of the forcible
rape case was not offered to vouch for Ms. Oliver’s testimony, but rather to explain why the
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prosecutor did what he did in the 1991 case. See Resp. Br., pp.212-13. The question of why the
charge was amended was irrelevant. This Court has noted that why a law enforcement
representative acted as he did is generally not relevant, and eliciting such testimony “is often …
a ruse to put inadmissible evidence before the jury improperly.” Parker, 157 Idaho at 145
(rejecting the State’s argument that, for the sake of showing “the effect on the listener,” it was
entitled to expose the jury to inadmissible hearsay). Clearly, the State just wanted the jury to
know Prosecutor Rosenthal believed he had a strong case for a forcible rape conviction.
Further, even if an explanation of the State’s reasoning in the 1991 case was somehow
relevant to Mr. Hall’s sentencing in this case, the State went too far. The substance of Prosecutor
Rosenthal’s testimony was as follows:
Q. Did there come a time when you amended the charges in that case from
forcible rape to statutory rape?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. Can you explain to the jury why you did that?
A. Norma Jean Oliver, when the crime was committed, was just barely 17.
I think had turned 17 within a month or so of the crime. She was vulnerable, she
was fragile, she was terrified and simply was unable to effectively go on with the
case in front of a jury.
Q. Did you discuss her testimony with her medical health professionals?
A. I did.…
Q. And ultimately did you decide that you could not proceed to trial with
her [Ms. Oliver] as a witness?
A. I  did.  It  was my decision,  as well  as the recommendation of the those
[sic] people who were treating her.
Q. So how did you proceed?
A. Proceeded with a reduction to a statutory rape and a negotiated
resolution.
Q. And that was because of the weakness in your case?
A. It was because of the inability of Norma Jean to be able to sit in a
situation like this and in front of a jury and be subjected to cross examination.
31528 Tr., p.4952, L.25-p.4954, L.9 (emphasis added). By the time it came to the final question
and answer, the reasoning behind the plea agreement had been made clear; the final piece of
testimony was gratuitous. Any honest reading of that testimony reveals it was a naked attempt to
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elicit testimony vouching for Ms. Oliver’s account of the 1991 case.
XLIX. The Court Erred In Denying And Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hall’s Claim That Counsel
Were Ineffective For Failing To Challenge The Non-Statutory Aggravation Evidence
With  regard  to  the  failure  to  instruct,  the  State  misses  the  primary  thrust  of  Mr.  Hall’s
argument.75 His contention is that, in the absence of some instruction from the court, the jury had
no way of knowing how to utilize non-statutory aggravation evidence (assuming, without
conceding, that it was somehow properly admitted). See App. Br., pp.236-37. The jury
instructions said nothing about consideration, or weighing, of non-statutory aggravation
evidence; in fact, they specifically instructed jurors on a weighing process that omitted any
reference to non-statutory aggravation evidence. 31528 J.I.39 & J.I.48.76 Thus, the jurors would
have had no idea how to utilize the non-statutory aggravation evidence, and it is likely different
jurors used it differently.
L. The Court Erred In Denying And Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hall’s Claim That Counsel Were
Ineffective For Failing To Challenge The Victim Impact Evidence
The  district  court  erred  in  denying  and  dismissing  Mr.  Hall’s  claim  that  counsel  were
ineffective for failing to seek limitation on the jury’s use of victim impact evidence (VIE). App.
Br., pp.237-41. Specifically, since VIE is not relevant to any of the jury’s tasks under Idaho’s
death penalty statute, the jury should have either heard that evidence after reaching its sentencing
verdicts or, at a minimum, it should have been strongly admonished not to consider the VIE in its
verdicts, and the failure of counsel to ensure the jury did not use the VIE incorrectly constituted
ineffective assistance. Id., pp.239-41 & n.91.
75The State focuses primarily on whether non-statutory aggravation evidence must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Resp. Br., pp.215-18. However, this is a side issue. The burden
of proof is an important question only if this Court determines non-statutory aggravation
evidence is, in fact, admissible under Idaho’s death penalty statute.
76In contrast, jurors were instructed as to how to consider the evidence specifically contemplated
by the statute. 31528 J.I. 39, 42, 43 & 48.
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In response, the State invokes the district court’s erroneous conclusion that counsel’s
acquiescence to a pattern jury instruction defining a victim impact statement was tactical, as was
counsels’ decision not to ask for an instruction explaining how VIE should be utilized. Resp. Br.,
pp.218-20. Further, it suggests such a “tactical decision” is immune from challenge. See Resp.
Br., pp.218-20.
First, Mr. Hall has argued the court clearly erred in finding that counsel made a tactical
decision. See App. Br., pp.238-39 n.90. In response, the State does not attempt to argue the
court’s finding was supported by substantial, competent evidence (indeed, there is no such
evidence); instead, it claims the court’s finding was actually something different—a
presumption. See Resp. Br., pp.219-20. The court did not invoke any presumption; it simply
described counsels’ failure as a “strategic decision,” as if it were fact. See 41059 R., p.2184
(“[T]rial counsel’s strategic decision not to object to the language of Idaho Criminal Jury
Instruction 1710 was not objectively unreasonable.”).77 Thus, the State’s argument is without
merit.
Second, merely labeling an act or omission of counsel “strategic” or “tactical” does not
immunize counsels’ conduct from scrutiny. As noted, the Supreme Court has held that the
“relevant question is not whether counsel’s choices were strategic, but whether they were
reasonable.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 481. Here, even if counsels’ failure to seek a limitation
on the jury’s use of the VIE is labeled “strategic,” it was objectively unreasonable and, therefore,
deficient. There is no reason for competent defense counsel to refrain from seeking to prevent the
sentencer in a capital case from considering highly-emotional VIE when deciding whether a
77Mr. Hall did not claim simply that counsel should have objected to ICJI 1710; he argued more
broadly that the jury should have been instructed as to how to utilize the VIE (if at all). 41059 R.,
pp.1211-12. This could have been done by modification of ICJI 1710, or by an additional
instruction.
122
statutory aggravator has been proved, or in electing whether to impose the death penalty, where
state law does not provide for the jury’s consideration of such evidence at either stage. There
could virtually never be anything mitigating in VIE evidence, and such evidence is likely to be
extremely prejudicial. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825-27 (1991). Accordingly, there
was no objectively reasonable basis for counsel to have failed to attempt to limit the jury’s
consideration of the VIE in this case.
LI. The Court’s Summary Dismissal Of Mr. Hall’s Capital Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
Violated His Right To Procedural Due Process
The State argues Mr. Hall failed to provide sufficient authority to support his claim that
the district court violated his procedural due process rights by failing to grant him an evidentiary
hearing. Resp. Br., pp.220-21. The State ignores Mr. Hall’s citation to both United States and
Idaho Supreme Court authority in support of this claim, see App. Br., pp.241-43, and instead
focuses on court decisions addressing the 42-day filing requirement of Idaho Code section
19-2719, arguing the principles announced in those decisions are controlling of this issue. Resp.
Br., pp.221-22.
The standard for determining the constitutionally mandated process for ensuring that
Mr. Hall’s due process right to be heard on his post-conviction claims, at a meaningful time, in a
meaningful manner, is set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1978). This Court
has adopted Mathews’ three-factor test for determining whether a challenged process affords a
defendant due process when the State seeks to deprive him of liberty or property within the
meaning of the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See, e.g., State v. Roger, 144 Idaho 738,
840-41 (2007).
The State argues that because the states are not constitutionally obligated to provide
defendants with collateral review of their criminal convictions, and when they opt to do so, there
123
is no requirement that the State supply a lawyer too, citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551,
556-57 (1987), Mr. Hall’s claim fails. The State argues that simply by providing defendants with
a means of collaterally attacking their convictions, Idaho provides defendants like Mr. Hall more
process than they are due. Resp. Br., p.222.
The State ignores recent pronouncements from the United States Supreme Court that
have rendered the continued viability of Finley doubtful, and which have emphasized the
importance of making procedures available to vindicate a defendant’s 6th Amendment right to
effective trial counsel. Specifically, in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 5 (2012), the Court was
asked to reconsider whether the constitutional right to counsel extends to initial review collateral
proceedings. Rather than reaching the constitutional claim, the Supreme Court held instead that:
Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be
raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a
federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at
trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel
in that proceeding was ineffective.
Martinez, 566 U.S. at 17. The following year, in Trevino v. Thaler, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1911
(2013), the Court applied the holding of Martinez to cases “where, as here, state procedural
framework, by reason of its design and operation, makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a
defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel on direct appeal ....” Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921. In light of Trevino and Martinez, and
contrary to the State’s claim, the district court cannot deny Mr. Hall a meaningful opportunity to
raise claims that his trial counsel were ineffective without violating his right to due process.
In addition to his protected liberty interest in his life, Mr. Hall’s protected interest in
vindicating his 6th Amendment right to the effective assistance of trial counsel, entitled him to an
evidentiary hearing on his post-conviction claims involving disputed issues of material fact.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in his opening brief, Mr. Hall requests the Court
vacate any or all of his convictions and/or sentences. He asks that the case be remanded for a
new trial or a new sentencing proceeding. Alternatively, he requests that the order summarily
dismissing his post-conviction case be vacated and remanded for further proceedings.
Dated this 7th day of March, 2017.
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ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Counsel for Mr. Hall
/s/IAN H. THOMSON
IAN H. THOMSON
Counsel for Mr. Hall
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I  HEREBY  CERTIFY  that  on  this  7th day  of  March,  2017,  I  served  a  true  and  correct
copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT as follows:
ERICK VIRGIL HALL     X     Statehouse Mail
INMATE #33835 _____  U.S. Mail
IMSI – J BLOCK _____  Facsimile
P O BOX 51 _____  Hand Delivery
BOISE ID 83707
L. LaMONT ANDERSON             Statehouse Mail
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL _____  U.S. Mail
lamont.anderson@ag.idaho.gov _____  Facsimile
_____  Hand Delivery
    X     Email
/s/KERI H. CLAUSEN______________________
KERI H. CLAUSEN
CLU Administrative Assistant
